Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc.

2018 IL 123025

123 N.E.3d 1091

429 Ill.Dec. 32

Sarahi VASQUEZ GONZALEZ, as Administrator of the Estate of Rodolfo Chavez Lopez, Deceased, Appellee,

v.UNION HEALTH SERVICE, INC., et al., Appellant.

Docket No. 123025

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed November 29, 2018

Karen Kies DeGrand, Michael J. Borree, and Laura Coffey Ieremia, of Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Nicholas V. Loizzi and Marisa A. Kay, of Loizzi Law Offices, LLC, of Chicago, for appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Sarahi Vasquez Gonzalez, in her capacity as administrator of the estate of Rodolfo Chavez Lopez, also known as Juan Aguilar, brought this wrongful death and survival action in the circuit court of Cook County to recover damages from Union Health Service, Inc. (UHS), and numerous other defendants based on defendants' alleged negligence in providing medical treatment to Mr. Aguilar, the decedent, while he was under their care. UHS moved to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016) ) on the grounds that it is immune from suit under section 26 of the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act ( 215 ILCS 165/26 (West 2016) ). Following a brief hearing at which no evidence or arguments were presented, the circuit court issued a lengthy written order denying UHS's motion. The basis given by the circuit court for its decision was that a 1988 amendment to section 26 was "unconstitutional in violation of U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 & amd. XIV; Ill. Const., art. 1, § 2 ; & Ill. Const. art. IV, § 13" because it left intact UHS's statutory immunity under the law while eliminating that immunity for all other similarly situated entities. UHS now appeals that decision directly to our court "pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) and pursuant to the Court's supervisory authority." It asks that we reverse the circuit court's order, enter an order declaring the 1988 amendment to be constitutional, and remand to the circuit court with instructions to grant UHS's motion to dismiss based on statutory immunity.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 UHS is a "health services plan corporation" organized under the Voluntary Health Services Plan Act (Act) ( 215 ILCS 165/1 et seq. (West 2016) ) for "the purpose of establishing and operating a voluntary health services plan and providing other medically related services" ( id. § 2 (a) ). In 2014, while under the care of UHS physicians, nurses, and technicians, Mr. Aguilar died following a lymph node biopsy. Sarahi Vasquez Gonzalez (plaintiff), in her capacity as administrator of Aguilar's estate, filed a multicount complaint under the Wrongful Death Act ( 740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2016) ) and Survival Act ( 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2016) ) to recover damages from UHS and others involved in Aguilar's care. The complaint alleged that Aguilar had received negligent treatment and asserted that UHS should be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

¶ 4 UHS moved to dismiss the counts against it pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016) ) on the grounds that it was immune from liability under section 26 of the Act ( 215 ILCS 165/26 (West 2016) ). That statute provides:

"A health services plan corporation incorporated prior to January 1, 1965, operated on a not for profit basis, and neither owned or controlled by a hospital shall not be liable for injuries resulting from negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice on the part of any officer or employee of the corporation, or on the part of any person, organization, agency or corporation rendering health services to the health services plan corporation's subscribers and beneficiaries."Id.

¶ 5 Plaintiff opposed UHS's motion, arguing that plan should not be allowed to claim immunity under section 26 because it had purchased liability insurance and thereby waived any immunity it might otherwise have enjoyed. Plaintiff also asserted that the statutory immunity conferred by section 26 violates special legislation and equal protection principles and is therefore unconstitutional. The basis for that claim was that the language in the statute limiting its applicability to plans "incorporated prior to January 1, 1965, operated on a not for profit basis, and neither owned or controlled by a hospital," which was added by an amendment in 1988, left UHS's immunity intact while stripping it from all other similarly situated entities, a result for which it contended there is no rational basis.

¶ 6 Following a brief hearing at which no evidence or legal arguments were presented, the circuit court entered a written order denying UHS's motion to dismiss. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the plan's purchase of liability insurance waived its statutory immunity. It concluded, however, that UHS could not avail itself of that immunity because the 1988 amendment to the statute "purposefully protected and continues to protect a class of only one—UHS." In the court's view, "[c]ontinuing to provide absolute statutory immunity to a class of one is simply not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. The 1988 amendment to section 26 is, therefore, unconstitutional because it violates the Illinois constitution's prohibition against special legislation." Based on this conclusion, the court went on to hold that "the 1988 amendment to the [Voluntary Health Services Plans Act] section 26 is unconstitutional in violation of U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 & amd. XIV; Ill. Const., art. 1, § 2 ; & Ill. Const., art. IV, § 13." This appeal followed.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Before proceeding, we must first consider whether we have authority to do so. The parties themselves are content to have us review the circuit court's order on the merits. No jurisdictional challenge has been raised by either side. That, however, is of no consequence. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver and cannot be cured through the consent of the parties. In re M.W. , 232 Ill. 2d 408, 417, 328 Ill.Dec. 868, 905 N.E.2d 757 (2009). Our court has an independent duty to ensure that jurisdiction is proper. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co. , 202 Ill. 2d 344, 349, 269 Ill.Dec. 882, 781 N.E.2d 1072 (2002).

¶ 9 The jurisdiction of this court is delineated by article VI, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4 ). Article VI, section 4(b) ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4 (b) ), authorizes direct appeals to our court as of right from circuit court judgments imposing a sentence of death. It also authorizes us to provide by rule for direct appeals from circuit courts in other cases.

¶ 10 UHS relies on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011) to support direct appeal from the circuit court in the case before us now. That reliance is misplaced. Although Rule 302(a)(1) does authorize direct appeal to our court in cases where a circuit court has held invalid a statute of the United States or of this state, the rule applies, by its terms, to "[a]ppeals from final judgments of circuit courts." (Emphasis added.) Id. No final judgment has been entered in this case. This appeal arises from an order denying a motion to dismiss. The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final determination. It is an interlocutory ruling and not subject to review under Rule 302(a)(1). Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation , 171 Ill. 2d 510, 540, 216 Ill.Dec. 789, 665 N.E.2d 1346 (1996) (citing Chapman v. United Insurance Co. of America , 234 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 176 Ill.Dec. 738, 602 N.E.2d 45 (1992), and Pizzato's Inc. v. City of Berwyn , 168 Ill. App. 3d 796, 798, 119 Ill.Dec. 583, 523 N.E.2d 51 (1988) (denial of motion to dismiss on basis of governmental immunity not final and appealable order) ).

¶ 11 When a circuit court has found a statute unconstitutional in the context of an interlocutory order, our court has relaxed the finality requirement of Rule 302(a)(1) and entertained the appeal directly in two limited circumstances. Neither is present here.

¶ 12 The first situation where we have reviewed an interlocutory order under Rule 302(a)(1) is where the order falls within one of the various rules we have promulgated specifically authorizing appeals from orders other than final judgments. See, e.g. , id. at 516, 216 Ill.Dec. 789, 665 N.E.2d 1346 (allowing direct appeal of order granting preliminary injunction, normally appealable as of right to the appellate court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Aug. 1, 1989) ); Garcia v Tully , 72 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 17 Ill.Dec. 820, 377 N.E.2d 10 (1978) (allowing direct appeal of order dissolving preliminary injunction, also normally appealable as of right to the appellate court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Jan. 1, 1970) ). This is not such a case. There is no comparable jurisdictional "hook" here. The circuit court's order is not subject to any of the rules we have enacted to permit review of interlocutory orders.

¶ 13 The second circumstance in which we have relaxed the normal finality requirement is where the appeal arose from an order granting summary judgment in a declaratory action challenging the validity of a statute. While entry of summary judgment technically left unresolved a claim for affirmative relief (and meant that the judgment was not fully final), we nevertheless accepted direct review because the constitutionality of the statute was the central issue in the case, the trial court's ruling was effectively final as to that core issue, the unresolved issue was unlikely to affect the ultimate disposition of the litigation, and dismissal of the appeal would have served no purpose other than to delay ultimate resolution of the case's pivotal question. Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. , 217 Ill. 2d 221, 233-34, 298 Ill.Dec. 739, 840 N.E.2d 1174 (20...