Vasquez v. Richland Sch. Dist.

JESUS VASQUEZ, by and through Guardian ad Litem, Christina Garcia, Plaintiff, v. RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, PAUL MARTINEZand DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.

1:19-cv-00327-LJO-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 6, 2019

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(ECF NO. 10)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns claims brought by Jesus Vasquez, by and through his Guardian ad litem Christina Garcia, of inappropriate and violent conduct by his fifth-grade teacher Paul Martinez, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") and California's Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, and related claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligence against Paul Martinez, Richland School District, and Does 1 to 10. ECF No. 6. The case was originally filed with the Court on March 8, 2019, and an amended complaint was filed on April 25, 2019. ECF Nos. 1, 6. On May 30, 2019, Defendant Martinez moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and, assuming the § 1983 claim is dismissed, the entirety of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). ECF No. 10. Plaintiff Vasquez opposed the motion on June 6, 2019, and Martinez replied on June 20, 2019. ECF Nos. 13, 14. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court determined that this matter was suitable for decision on the papers and took it under submission on June 24, 2019. ECF No. 15.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Martinez admits that during the relevant time period he was a fifth-grade teacher at Redwood Elementary School in the Richland School District and that Vasquez was assigned as a student in Martinez's fifth grade classroom. ECF No. 11 at 2. Vasquez alleges that on or about September 19, 2017, Martinez grabbed Vasquez by the neck and choked him hard enough to leave marks on his neck. ECF No. 6 at 2. Vasquez further alleges that in the weeks preceding this incident, Martinez engaged in other inappropriate and aggressive conduct such as using expletives and threatening language, flicking Vasquez's ear, playing "mercy" with Vasquez and other students by grabbing their arms, and squeezing students' hands as punishment for misbehavior. Id. at 2-3.

III. STANDARD OF DECISION

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factualallegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, "bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' . . . are not entitled to be assumed true." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. "[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint . . . must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). In practice, "a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Negligence—Martinez Does Not Have a Relevant Duty

Martinez correctly states that the elements of a claim for negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. ECF No. 10 at 8. Martinez argues that the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") fails to plead sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that Martinez owed a duty to Vasquez or that Martinez breached any such duty. ECF No. 10 at 9. At this time Martinez does not argue any insufficiency in the allegations of causation or damages. ECF No. 10. As the Court determines that Martinez did not have a relevant duty, the Court will not address breach.

"The general rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his torts to the same extent as a private person . . . ." C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 4th 861, 868 (2012) (quoting Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 3d 446, 463 (1982)). Martinez does not dispute that he was an employee of the school district at the relevant times. ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 4, 23, No. 10 at 6. An employee of a school district has "the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally." C.A., 53 Cal. 4th at 870. Therefore, as a school district employee, Martinez had a duty of care to protect Vasquez, although the exact parameters of that duty are in contention.

Vasquez argues that Martinez had a duty to protect students from the sort of harm that occurred in this case. ECF Nos. 6, 13. To support his claim that Martinez had such a duty, Vasquez makes reference to cases that held the existence of a school's and employee's duty to protect students from the actions of third parties: Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741 (1970) (holding a duty existed for school employees to prevent students from harming each other); M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding school district had a duty to protect a student from being sexually assaulted by another student); Virginia G. v. ABC Unified Sch. Dist., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1848 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding school district had a duty to protect a student from being sexually assaulted by a teacher); Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding school and its employees had a duty to protect a student from an attack by a nonstudent third party). These cases establish two kinds of duties. First, that a school has a duty to supervise employees and students and protect students from employees and third parties. M. W., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508; Virginia G., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1848. And second, that a school employee has a duty to supervise students and protect them from other students and third parties. Dailey, 2 Cal. 3d 741; Leger, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448. From these cases, Vasquez can support an argument that the District had a duty to supervise Martinez or Vasquez, or that Martinez had a duty to supervise Vasquez and/or other students.

But Vasquez argues that he was harmed by Martinez's alleged intentional acts, not by the actions of some third party. ECF No. 6 at 7-8 (alleging assault, battery, and false imprisonment by Martinez). Typically, a party's intentional actions cannot form the basis of a negligence claim against that party. See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Evidence that Fairchild intentionally retaliated against them would preclude an assertion that this same intentional action constituted negligence."); Garcia-Barajas v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 1:09-CV-00025-OWW-DLB, 2009 WL 2151850, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (agreeing with a defendant's compilation of cases that supported a conclusion that intentional acts cannot serve as the basis for a negligence claim).Some exceptions to this general principle exist in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 626 (2013) (holding that police officers have a duty to act reasonably when using deadly force and can be negligent when they breach that duty); Waters v. Bourhis, 190 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a psychiatrist's affair with a patient could breach his professional duty to avoid becoming involved with her) (reversed on other grounds in Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424 (1985)).

Vasquez appears to argue that Martinez had a duty to supervise himself, without explaining how this is an exception to the normal rule that intentional acts cannot form a basis for negligence. ECF No. 13 at 7 ("Plaintiff has properly alleged that Martinez owed him a duty and breached that duty through his ineffective and dangerous supervision."). The existence of such an exception for teachers intentionally harming students is not supported by the case law Vasquez provides, nor by any case law of which the Court is aware. Had Vasquez harmed himself or been harmed by another student or some third party, the cited cases may have supported a relevant duty for Martinez to supervise Vasquez. Under the facts given, at best the cited cases may support a relevant duty for the District to supervise Martinez.

With no showing that Martinez had a duty under a theory of negligence to protect Vasquez from Martinez's own intentional acts, a charge of negligence cannot be sustained against Martinez. The Court will dismiss Martinez...