Vasquez v. Rockland Cnty., 15-CV-8912 (KMK)

KIM VASQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. ROCKLAND COUNTY, Defendant.

15-CV-8912 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 31, 2017

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Kim Vasquez

Fishkill, NY

Pro Se Plaintiff

Ari Isaac Bauer, Esq.

Catania, Mahon, Milligram & Rider, PLLC

Newburgh, NY

Counsel for Defendant

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Kim Vasquez ("Plaintiff"), currently an inmate at Downstate Correctional Facility, brings this Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Rockland County ("Defendant"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Amendments during the 10 days Plaintiff was incarcerated at Rockland County Jail. (See Am. Compl. 5 (Dkt. No. 6).) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted, denied a change of clothing, denied access to law library material, given inadequate medical treatment due to the falsification of medical records, and retaliated against when he attempted to file a grievance. (Id. at 3.) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (See Mot. To Dismiss (Dkt. No. 27).) For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was first transferred to Rockland County Jail on June 23, 2015 and placed on precautionary watch, (see Am. Compl. 2), despite notifying the facility that he was not suicidal, (id.).¹ After being released from precautionary watch, Plaintiff was transferred to the A-Wing of the facility where he was subjected to a search by a correctional officer ("C.O."). (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that during the course of the search, he was ordered to remove his clothing and was "sexually groped by this C.O. in [Plaintiff's] private area." (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff requested to speak to a sergeant about being sexually assaulted. (Id.) While reporting the incident, the sergeant told Plaintiff to "stand up, be quiet, and turn around," (id.), and Plaintiff was then handcuffed and placed on suicide watch, (id.). Plaintiff alleges that some unidentified prison official "falsif[ied] [his] medical documents," (id. at 5), claiming that Plaintiff was "suicidal and that [he] [made] a prior attempt to injure [himself]," (id. at 3). Plaintiff asserts that the New York State Office of Mental Health "misdiagnosed" him because the "falsifying o[f] [his] psychological records . . . misle[]d" the medical staff. (Id.)

Plaintiff further asserts that during "the entire 10 days" he was at Rockland County Jail, he was "denied a second change of clothes," (id.), and that "everyday [he] was in [the] facility [he] requested access to law library material and was not provided with any," (id.). Plaintiff also alleges that during his time at Rockland County Jail, he "was denied [his] right to observe the month of Ramadan" and could not "pray[] and break[] . . . the fast for [his] Muslim religion." (Id.) Plaintiff further avers that "[he] was . . . [not] permitted to submit grievances," (id.), andthat he was retaliated against for "attempting to inform" prison officials about the alleged abuses, (id.). Plaintiff requests relief "i[n] the form of monetary compensation in the dollar amount of one quabillion dollars U.S. currency." (Id. at 5.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against the Rockland County Sherriff's Department on November 12, 2015. (Dkt. No. 2.) On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. (Dkt. No. 4.) On January 20, 2016, then-Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska issued an Order To Amend, dismissing five out of six of Plaintiff's asserted claims as duplicative of those asserted in other pending actions. (See Order To Amend 2-6 (Dkt. No. 5).)² As to Plaintiff's remaining claim, Judge Preska liberally construed Plaintiff's Complaint "as raising First Amendment retaliation, access-to-courts, and free exercise claims." (Id. at 9.) The Order To Amend stated that Plaintiff had "not provided sufficient facts to state a claim on any of these bases," (id.), but granted Plaintiff "an opportunity to amend [his] complaint to address the deficiencies" identified, (id. at 12). The Order To Amend instructed Plaintiff to:

a) give the names and titles of all relevant persons;

b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff's case[,] including what each defendant did or failed to do;

c) give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event;

d) give the location where each relevant event occurred;

e) describe how each defendant's acts or omissions violated Plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and

f) state what relief Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

(Id. at 13-14.) The Order to Amend further provided that "[e]ach individual defendant must be named in the caption" and that "[a]ny defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim." (Id. at 13 n.7.) The Order also stated that "[i]f Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as 'John Doe' or 'Jane Doe' in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint." (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on February 4, 2016. (Dkt. No. 6.) Defendant filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying memorandum of law on July 21, 2016. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss on Behalf of Def. Rockland Cty. ("Def.'s Mem.") (Dkt. No. 29).) Plaintiff did not file a response.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief thatis plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and "draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff," Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his "submissions . . . liberally" and interprets them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (internal quotationmarks omitted). Furthermore, for the same reason, it is appropriate to consider "materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Monell Liability

Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against it on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). "To state a claim under [§ 1983], the plaintiff must show that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2013). "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable [under § 1983] unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Thus, "to prevail on a claim against a municipality under [§] 198...