Vasquez v. The Reece Sch.

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LISA VASQUEZ, On Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of her Infant Daughter, J.V., Plaintiffs, v. THE REECE SCHOOL, Defendant.

No. 22-CV-5986 (GHW) (JW)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 24, 2024

TO THE HON. GREGORY H. WOODS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

JENNIFER E. WILLIS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Lisa Vasquez (“Vasquez”) brings this case on behalf of herself and her infant daughter, J.V., contesting J.V.'s exclusion from The Reece School pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs also allege state law claims of negligence, negligent supervision negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and breach of contract. Dkt. No. 23. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss claims^[1] in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.^[2] Dkt. Nos. 23, 28. For the reasons explained herein, I recommend that Defendant's Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Facts

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which the Court takes as true for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss.^[3] See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir. 2019).

On November 13, 2017, the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) classified J.V. as a student with a disability due to a speech and language impairment. Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 7. The DOE referred J.V.'s case to the Community Based Support Team for placement in a non-public school. Id. ¶ 7. J.V. was not enrolled until May 2019, when “Ms. Vasquez identified the Reece School as a viable option.” Prior to attending the Reece School in May 2019, Defendant and Ms. Vasquez entered into an enrollment contract that covered the 2018-2019 school year. Id. ¶ 17. JV was enrolled for the remainder of the 2019 school year, and then again for the 2019-20 school year. Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiffs allege the Enrollment Contract allowed for renewal unless the contract was canceled, which Plaintiffs claim could only be “based on behavior in violation of Reece's Code of Conduct by the student or student's parents.” Id. ¶ 17.

Plaintiffs allege J.V. was subject to “daily verbal, physical, sexual, emotional, [and] psychological attacks” by other students. Id. ¶ 25. The Complaint alleges Defendant personnel failed to prevent these attacks from occurring and did not respond to Vasquez's requests for help. Id. ¶25.

Plaintiffs say “Reece considered J.V. and Ms. Vasquez as a burden. Reece considered J.V.'s disabilities something they did not want to deal with. [The Executive Director] in particular disdained Ms. Vasquez's emails requesting reports and updates on how Reece was implementing education programs and related services to address J.V.'s disabilities.” Id. ¶ 40.

Rather than “deal with Ms. Vasquez's requests for protection of her daughter from the frequent and persistent attacks,” instead, in May 2020, “Reece informed Ms. Vasquez that J.V. would not be allowed to return and remain enrolled at Reece.” Id. ¶ 41-42.

Plaintiffs contend that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts, Plaintiffs suffered the following injuries and damages: (a) severe emotional distress; (b) loss of educational opportunity; (c) medical expenses and (d) attorney's fees and costs.” Id. ¶ 44.

2. Procedural History

In July 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) deprivation of J.V.'s rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) discrimination against J.V. pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794; (3) deprivation of Vasquez's rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) negligence; (5) negligent supervision; (6) NIED; and (7) breach of contract. Dkt. No. 1. That same month, “all dispositive motions” were referred to this Court. Dkt. No. 5.

In October 2022, Defendant filed a Motion on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In February 2023, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that Defendant's Motion on the Pleadings should be granted. Dkt. No. 21.

Before the R&R was adopted, the Plaintiff objected and then filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 22-23. Defendants then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss all claims aside from^[4] the state law negligence and negligent supervision claims. Dkt. No. 28. The Court heard oral argument on September 13, 2023. Dkt. No. 37.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” See Madhu v. Socure Inc., No. 1:22-CV-682 (GHW), 2023 WL 6214807, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2023) citing Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir. 2019) quoting Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC, 872 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2017).

Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' ... it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me' accusation.” Id. citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. quoting Twombly, supra at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. citing Iqbal, supra at 678. A claim is “facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. citing Twombly, supra. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 6 citing Iqbal, supra.

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” Id. citing DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).

A court “may also consider documents that are ‘integral to' the complaint.” Id. For a document to be considered “integral,” the Complaint “must rely heavily upon its terms and effects.” See Madhu, supra, citing DiFolco. As “no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of” the Enrollment Contract or the Code of Conduct, both documents are in the record (Dkt. Nos. 20-1 and 36-1), and the Amended Complaint relies “heavily” upon the contract and code in asserting the breach of contract claim, the Court finds that those two documents are “integral” to the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, they will be considered in deciding this Motion. See generally Madhu citing DiFolco supra, and Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006)(“even if a document is ‘integral' to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 alleging the deprivation of services she claims she is entitled to under “federal and state law, including under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. and N.Y. Education Law Article 89.” Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 51. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” DiPizio v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 745 Fed. App'x 385, 388 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

Crucial to this case, both sides agree that the Defendant is a “private school.” Dkt. Nos. 23 at ¶10 (“Reece was and is an approved New York State Private School.”); 28 at 8 (“The Reece School is a private Section 853 School, meaning that it is a school for special needs children ranging from severe behavior issues to developmental delays.”).

On the one hand, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]f the Fourteenth Amendment” and the protections embodied in § 1983 are “not to be displaced,” their “ambit cannot be a simple line between States and people operating outside formally governmental organizations.” See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). But on the other hand, the “cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment [and § 1983] scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.” Id. The task of the Court is to ensure that § 1983's standards are only “invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 at 1004 (1982)(emphasis in original); see also Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 2014)(requiring a showing that the “allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State.”); Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012).

There is “no single test to identify state actions and state actors.” See Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009). But three main tests have emerged. The first test, the “compulsion test” asks whether “the entity acts pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state.” See Sybalski...