Vasquez v. Walmart Inc.

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JOSE VASQUEZ Plaintiff, v. WALMART INC., WAL-MART, WALMART REALTY COMPANY, COACH DOE, and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-01142-JLT-BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

March 6, 2024

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING AS ABANDONED REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 5)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jose Vasquez filed a complaint in Madera County Superior Court against Walmart Inc., Walmart, Wal-Mart Realty Company (Defendant) alleging general negligence and premises liability. (Doc. 1.) In addition to Walmart Inc., Plaintiff named Coach Doe and Doe Defendants 1-100 as co-defendants. (Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff's complaint identified Coach Doe and Doe Defendants 1 - 50 as “agents or employees of the named defendants” that “acted within the scope of the agency or employment” and Doe Defendants 51-100 as “persons whose capacities are unknown.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff explained that “Defendants have failed to adequately disclose information and thus the true names and identities of Does 1 through 100 are unknown to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each such Defendant is in some way responsible and liable for the events of happenings alleged in this Complaint.” (Id. at 6.)

Defendant removed the action to federal court pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Defendant argued the amount controversy was satisfied based on Plaintiff's “Statement of Damages” (Doc.1-2)^[1] in which Plaintiff asserted “total damages of not less than $5,000,000.00,” (Id. at 3) and complete diversity existed between Defendant, a corporation incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Arkansas, and Plaintiff, a Fresno, California resident and California citizen. (Id. at 5.) Regarding co-defendants Coach Doe and Does 1-100, Defendant argued § 1441(b)(1) requires the “citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded” for removal purposes. (Id. at 6.)

On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand alleging removal was improper because complete diversity does not exist between the parties. (Doc. 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff argued that “Coach Doe is a California resident and proper party to [the] suit.” (Id. at 4.) Therefore, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff explained that at the time Defendant removed this action “it was aware the Complaint include[d] allegations against all Defendants, including Doe Defendants who managed and operated the premises in question” (Id.) and “intentionally . . . withheld[] the name and address of Coach Doe, who was . . . involved in the incident and [a witness] to Plaintiff's injuries.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also moved for leave to file its first amended complaint pursuant Federal Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2), and relatedly requested “an order for [Defendant] to produce the legal name of Coach Doe” so that Plaintiff may identify the Does within the complaint. (Id. at 10.)

On September 12, 2023, Defendant filed its Opposition alleging Plaintiff's motion “is substantively without merit, as at the time of removal, there was (and continues to be) complete diversity between the proper parties. ” (Doc. 9 at 7 (emphasis in original).) Defendant argued that Plaintiff “made no definitive factual allegations as to Coach Doe” and merely “presumes Coach Doe was a California resident at the time of filing.” (Id.) Therefore, “Coach Doe was fraudulently joined for the sole and improper purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction.” (Id.)

On December 15, 2023, this Court imposed a January 26, 2024, deadline for Plaintiff “to identify and name any fictitious defendants by way of an amended complaint.”^[2] (See Doc. 13.) Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand and motion to leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Removal

A defendant may remove a state court case to federal court if the case is within the federal court's original subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A state court action is within the Court's original subject matter jurisdiction if either plaintiff and defendant are diverse in citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (diversity jurisdiction); or the state court action presents a federal question (federal question jurisdiction). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

B. Federal Diversity Jurisdiction

For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).

Generally, “[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)], the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). Despite the plain language of § 1441(b)(1), the statute has been construed a general rule. The courts in the Ninth Circuit are split and have not “conclusively addressed the appropriate treatment of fictitiously named defendants described with sufficient particularity to provide a clue as to their actual identity.” Sandoval v. Republic Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 1989528, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2018); see also Metcalf v. Walmart, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-1630-AWI-BAK, 2022 WL 856030, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (citing Rojas v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, Inc., 538 F.Supp.3d 1008, 1023 (S.D. Cal. 2021)). Some courts have held that § 1441(b)(1) “language is absolute and forbids consideration of the citizenship of any fictitiously named defendants.” Rojas, 538 F.Supp.3d at 1023. While other courts have held that “the citizenship of fictitiously named defendants may be considered if the ‘description of the fictitiously named defendants or their activities is specific enough to suggest their identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action.'” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., 475 F.Supp.3d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Gardiner Fam., LLC v. Crimson Res. Mgmt. Corp., 147 F.Supp.3d 1029, 1036 (E.D. Cal. 2015)). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

Within his motion for remand, Plaintiff included a request for leave to amend his complaint for the purpose of providing additional information about a Doe Defendant. (Doc. 5 at 10-11.) Though Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 137(c), which requires counsel to attach a proposed amended complaint when seeking leave to amend, the Court determined “any such amendment of the pleadings may impact the Court's jurisdictional analysis” and extended the parties' joint proposed deadline, December 23, 2023, (see Doc. 10) to January 26, 2024. (Doc. 13.) However, Plaintiff failed to file any proposed amended complaint or otherwise indicate why he needs additional time to formulate a response to the Court. Therefore, the Court will treat the motion to amend as having been abandoned.

B. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff asserts the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction because doe-defendants, specifically Coach Doe is a California resident and citizen; therefore, complete diversity does not exist between the parties. Plaintiff argues that the Court should consider Coach Doe's citizenship because at the time of removal Defendant was aware of the allegations against Defendant's doeemployee, intentionally withheld doe-employee's identity, and with “unclean hands” removed the action to avoid discovery.

Defendant asserts that at the time of removal, it “did not have any information as to the identity of Coach Doe, let alone Coach Doe's domicile”^[3] and argues § 1441(b)(1) requires the Court “to completely disregard” the citizenship of unnamed parties.” (Doc. 9 at 10.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's complaint did not contain a definite clue as to Coach Doe's identity. Specifically, the complaint “failed to provide a first name to identify the at-issue Doe Defendant that Defendant allegedly employed on the date in question” and “based on the bare bones allegations,” Defendant “cannot reasonably or accurately guess which of its managers or supervisors Plaintiff refers to.” (Id.) Defendant further argues that the Court should ignore Plaintiff's “unsupported allegation” that “a person's place of employment . . . certainly or even likely implicate their citizenship status, especially in a state as diverse as California comprised of out-of-state colleges students, immigrants from different countries and multinationals.” (Id.)

1. § 1441(b)(1)

A review of the caselaw interpreting § 1441(b)(1) and doe defendants reveals that Defendant's characterization of the law is overly simplistic. See Barnes v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 19-7977-DMG (JPRx), 2019 WL 6608735, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Gardiner, 147 F.Supp.3d at 1035-36 (The “seemingly incompatible Ninth Circuit decisions, a congressional amendment of section 1441(b)(1), and the subsequent vacatur of another series of Ninth Circuit decisions has made circuit authority governing whether courts may consider the citizenship of fictitious defendants for removal jurisdiction purposes ‘unworkable and riddled with exceptions.'” (Emphasis added.)

Despite Section 1441(b)'s plain language: “in determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a). . . the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious...