Vaughan v. Harvard Industries, Inc.

926 F. Supp. 1340

Andy VAUGHAN, Plaintiff, v. HARVARD INDUSTRIES, INC., and Hayes-Albion Corporation, Defendants.

No. 94-2936.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

May 10, 1996.

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Arnold Goldin, Law Offices of Arnold Goldin, Memphis, TN, Sandra Isom, Dowden & Zdancewicz, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Richard T. Dawson, Harvard Industries, Inc., Tampa, Florida, Jonathan E. Kaplan, Kiesewetter, Kaplan & Schwimmer, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

McCALLA, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 31, 1996. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Andy Vaughan brought this action against employer Harvard Industries and Hayes-Albion Corporation, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and wrongful retaliatory discharge for filing of a worker's compensation claim.¹ Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing four grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA; (2) the ADA does not require defendants to provide plaintiff with alternative employment as an accommodation; (3) plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of worker's compensation retaliatory discharge; and (4) plaintiff's separation was for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. The Court finds that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, and failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful retaliatory discharge.

I. BACKGROUND

Drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, the non-moving party, and accepting his factual allegations as true for purposes of this discussion, the facts of this case are as follows.

On June 22, 1981, at age seventeen, plaintiff was employed by defendant Hayes-Albion Corporation at its production facility, and on December 10, 1993, plaintiff was terminated. On March 27, 1992, plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury. At that time, plaintiff was employed as a lead die cast setup man. On April 9, 1992, plaintiff sought medical treatment, and in accordance with doctor's instructions, plaintiff was off work from that date until May 4, 1992. During this period, plaintiff received approximately $262.20 per month in temporary total disability worker's compensation benefits (TTD). Plaintiff returned to work without restrictions, but in August, ceased work, again pursuant to doctor's instructions, received additional medical treatment, and resumed receipt of TTD benefits. On January 11, 1993, plaintiff returned to work without restrictions, but complained of back pain and upon instructions from his doctor, did not work from January 12-15, 1993. On January 19, 1993, plaintiff requested additional time off for medical reasons from Bob Ennis, Harvard's Human Resource Manager. Pursuant to this request, plaintiff was placed on voluntary layoff status, for which he received unemployment benefits. During this period, plaintiff sought additional medical treatment, and was placed on temporary disability status again. As a consequence, plaintiff ceased receipt of unemployment benefits, and received TTD payments.

On January 25, 1993, Ray Edwards was placed into the second shift lead man position, and continued in this position after plaintiff resumed his former position of lead die cast setup man. On June 28, 1993, plaintiff returned to work with medical restrictions of a thirty pound repetitive lift limit, and a five to ten minute break every hour. With the approval of his supervisors, plaintiff also ceased to perform any tasks that caused him pain. On September 7, 1993, plaintiff again took time off from work, and on October 11, 1993, plaintiff returned to work with a work release, with a twenty pound lifting and thirty minute standing restriction from his doctor. The release indicated that these restrictions were permanent, and that plaintiff could not do the job he performed previously, but would need to do less than before.

Upon plaintiff's return to work, Ennis told plaintiff that the company had no position available, that plaintiff was "too big of a risk," and thus, in lieu of reinstating plaintiff, the company would continue paying worker's compensation benefits to plaintiff. On December 9, 1993, plaintiff received a worker's compensation settlement of $70,932, representing a sixty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. At deposition, plaintiff testified that he had difficulty holding his thirty pound baby, standing for longer than thirty minutes at a time and changing a die, the latter involving pushing and pulling, stress to his back, and numbness in his leg. Plaintiff also testified, and states in his response to defendants' summary judgment motion, that he can perform all the essential functions listed in the job description for die cast setup, with the exception of lifting, bolting, and adjusting.² Plaintiff testified that, while working as a lead die cast setup man, he was required to perform all of the duties detailed in the job description, in addition to the supervisory requirements of the lead position.

Upon returning to work with restrictions, plaintiff was placed in a temporary light duty position. This position was created for plaintiff, and included only the inspecting and adjusting duties, and not any of the other essential functions of the job. During the period from October through December 1993, defendants had no openings with plaintiff's restrictions; further, defendants have never created a light duty position for any employee.

Plaintiff's separation notice, dated December 14, 1993, states as reason for separation "lack of work." Specifically, it states, "off on work related injury. Release to light duty. No light duty work available." (Ex. 4.)

On June 1, 1994, Ennis submitted a position statement to the EEOC, addressing plaintiff's EEO claim of discrimination and retaliation:

From 12/10/03 to 4/19/94 we never heard from Vaughan. He made no effort to report for work and his own behavior confirmed that he in fact voluntarily quit. Harvard Industries accommodated Vaughan's restrictions. He claimed he could not perform the light duty or special assignment work made available to him in accordance with his own doctor's stated restrictions, as it was hurting his back. He then voluntarily quit by failing to report for work and made no effort to further discuss his situation.... If Vaughan wanted to work within his restrictions he could have continued working at Harvard Industries. He made no request for additional accommodation and quit our company.

(Ex. 3.)

Following his separation from defendants, plaintiff has worked as a security guard and hung vinyl siding. Plaintiff only worked for a short time in the latter position due to his injury. Plaintiff currently drives a cement truck. Plaintiff testified that his back causes him pain after about one hour of driving a car. Plaintiff's current duties as a cement truck driver include waiting for a load to be ordered, driving a manual shift truck, filling his water barrel with a hose, obtaining the ticket, hooking up extension chutes which weigh about thirty pounds, standing or sitting in the truck while concrete is poured, operating levers, washing off the chutes, and climbing up the ladder on the truck. Plaintiff uses the rails to accomplish the latter; he has some difficulty with his leg and back when using the clutch in the truck extensively and lifting the chutes off the truck.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). So long as the movant has met its initial burden of "demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, and the nonmoving party is unable to make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir. 1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986).

Pursuant to Rule 56(e), when confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In essence, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's ADA Claim

The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., prohibits employment discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a violation under the ADA, three elements must be satisfied: (1) plaintiff must have a "disability"; (2) plaintiff must be "qualified" for the position; and (3) defendant's...