Vaughn v. Pittsburgh Fondue, LLC

JENNIFER VAUGHN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PITTSBURGH FONDUE, LLC, JAMES MATERESE, MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER MILLSAP, and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01104-RJC

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 14, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT J. COLVILLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, or alternatively, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No 44) filed by Defendants Pittsburgh Fondue LLC, James Materese, and Michael Christopher Millsap (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants assert that Plaintiff Jennifer Vaughn (“Plaintiff”) signed a class and collective action waiver on two separate occasions in connection with her employment with Pittsburgh Fondue, LLC ^[1] and argue that, while Plaintiff can pursue her case individually, she cannot proceed with a class or collective action complaint because she has waived her right to participate in a class or collective action and has also waived her ability to serve as a class representative. Br. in Supp. 1-2; 4, ECF No. 45. This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendants' Motion has been fully briefed, and is ripe for disposition.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

In the operative “First Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint” (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 43), Plaintiff asserts that she brings this putative class and collective action on behalf of “Tipped Employees” who work or have worked at a restaurant located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania operating under the trade name The Melting Pot Fondue Restaurant, which Plaintiff alleges is owned, operated, and/or otherwise managed or controlled by Defendants. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 43. Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendants as a server at their Station Square restaurant location in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and that she worked at this location from in or about September 2017 to February 2018, and then again from July 2018 to April 2019. Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff asserts claims arising out of Defendants' allegedly illegal pay practices, which Plaintiff avers violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), and Pennsylvania common law. Id. at ¶¶ 6-15. Plaintiff purports to bring the abovecaptioned action as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), and as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 for her claims under the PMWA and Pennsylvania common law. Id. at ¶ 95.

At this time, Defendants challenge only Plaintiff's ability to serve as a member or representative of a class or collective action. Br. in Supp. 1-2, ECF No. 45. Defendants aver that Plaintiff, “[a]s part of her employment documents, ” signed a “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver” on July 12, 2018 and subsequently signed another “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver” on October 26, 2018. Millsap Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 17-1. Defendants have submitted two substantively identical “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver[s], ” which are dated July 12, 2018 and October 26, 2018, and which seemingly bear Plaintiff's signature. See Ex. A, ECF No. 17-1; Ex. B, ECF No. 17-1. In her Brief in Opposition, Plaintiff does not challenge, in any material respect, Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff signed the “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver[s]” at issue, but rather argues that the same are unenforceable, and further argues that the Court should not grant Defendants' Motion without first permitting the development of a record with respect to the execution of these documents. See generally Br. in Opp'n, ECF No. 46.

The “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver[s]” are single-page documents that provide as follows:

Jury Waiver

Jury trails [sic] add unnecessary expense and time to a legal process that is already too expensive and slow. Your signature below indicates that you understand that as a condition of your application or employment, any lawsuit that you may bring against Pittsburgh Fondue LLC will be decided by a judge, without a jury. To the extent permitted by law, you are knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally waiving any right you may have to a trail [sic] by jury in any litigation arising out of your employment with Pittsburgh Fondue LLC

Class Action and Collective Action Waiver:

Class and Collective action lawsuits have been abused recently by trial lawyers forcing American companies to pay large settlements, not because the cases have merit or because Pittsburgh Fondue LLC violated any laws, but because the suits are too expensive to litigate and the company is left with no reasonable alternative. Class and collective action suits primarily benefit the trial lawyers and rarely accomplish any other objective. There are more effective ways to protect your individual employment related rights than through a Class or Collective action lawsuit. Your signature on this document indicates that you agree to waive any right you may have to be a member of a Class or Collective action lawsuit or a representative of a Class or Collective action lawsuit against Pittsburgh Fondue LLC

I hereby acknowledge and understand that as a condition of my employment:

• I am waiving my right to have a trial by jury to resolve any lawsuit related to my application or employment with Pittsburgh Fondue LLC;

• I am waiving my right to participate as a member of a Class or Collective action lawsuit and/or serve as a class representative of similarly situated employees in any lawsuit against Pittsburgh Fondue LLC

• If I have any questions or comments regarding this Waiver, I am encouraged to contact any member of the Human Resource department.

• I have the right to consult an attorney about this waiver prior to signing it.

Ex. A, ECF No. 17-1; Ex. B, ECF No. 17-1. Each of the “Jury & Class/Collective Action Waiver[s]” submitted by Defendants bears the signature of “Jennifer Vaughn” on the “Team Member Signature” line. Id.

Plaintiff filed her original Complaint (ECF No. 1) on August 30, 2019. A Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) was filed on October 31, 2019, and this matter was eventually transferred to the undersigned on February 4, 2020. Briefing on the first Motion to Dismiss was completed on February 21, 2020. By Court Order (ECF No. 38) dated June 16, 2020, this Court dismissed the first Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and granted Plaintiff's request for a period of jurisdictional discovery. On September 14, 2020, following the completion of this period of jurisdictional discovery and upon stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint, which removed former Defendants who were the subject of jurisdictional challenges raised in the first Motion to Dismiss. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, or, alternatively, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, along with a Brief in Support (ECF No. 45), on September 28, 2020. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 46) on October 19, 2020, and Defendants filed their Reply (ECF No. 47) on October 26, 2020.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained:

The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that “a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The court explained:

First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then

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