Vazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth.

JANET VÁZQUEZ-VELÁZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUERTO RICO HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 15-1727 (MEL)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

August 9, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge

I. Procedural Background

The plaintiffs here are sixty-nine employees of the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) (“Plaintiff Employees”) as well as their spouses and conjugal partnerships (collectively “Plaintiffs”). ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 6, 13-14. The defendants are PRHTA and PRHTA's Executive Director (collectively “Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 7-8. On August 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated their rights of procedural due process and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 5, 37-44. In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs also alleged that their rights were violated by Defendants under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Contract Clause in Article 1 Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged several claims in the amended complaint under Puerto Rico law statutes including Title 29, Annotated Laws of Puerto Rico, Section 250, et seq. (“Law 180”), Title 29, Annotated Laws of Puerto Rico, Section 146, et seq. (“Law 100”), and Title 31, Annotated Laws of Puerto Rico Section 5141 (“Article 1802”). Id. at 21, 45.

On September 10, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss requesting that Plaintiffs' claims in the amended complaint be dismissed. ECF No. 28. Defendants' request in its motion to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part on January 14, 2016. ECF No. 56. Regarding Plaintiff Employees' spouses' and the conjugal partnerships' Sections 1983 claims, Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted and consequently their substantive due process, procedural due process, takings clause, Contract Clause, and equal protection claims were dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff Employees' substantive due process, takings clause, and equal protection claims were also dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 22. Defendants' motion to dismiss was denied as to Plaintiff Employees' procedural due process claim. Id. Defendants' request that Plaintiff Employees' Contract Clause claim be dismissed was denied without prejudice. Id. Because Defendants did not make any specific argument as to Plaintiffs' claims under Law 100, Law 180, and Article 1802, those claims remained active. Id.

On January 26, 2021, Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Law 100 were dismissed with prejudice in view that Plaintiffs informed that they voluntarily “desist with prejudice as to any claim pursuant to Law 100.” ECF Nos. 152, 155. On February 17, 2021, Plaintiffs' claims under Law 180 were also dismissed with prejudice in light that Plaintiffs moved to “voluntarily desist all claims under [Law 180], consenting to dismissal with prejudice as to said allegations.” ECF Nos. 162, 170.

A pretrial and settlement videoconference was held on February 25, 2021. ECF No. 172. After listening to the arguments of the attorneys of record at said conference, a deadline to file cross-motions for summary judgment was set for April 26, 2021. Id. at 2. Pending before the court are Plaintiffs' and Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff Employees' remaining Section 1983 claims alleging Defendants violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Clause and Contract Clause, and Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Article 1802. ECF Nos. 183, 188. A joint stipulation of facts and exhibits was filed on May 24, 2021. ECF No. 189. Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2021. ECF No. 191. On June 7, 2021, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 192. A reply was filed by Plaintiffs on July 13, 2021 and a surreply was filed by Defendants on July 16, 2021. ECF Nos. 205, 209.

II. Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment “is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is granted when the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant presents a properly focused motion “averring ‘an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case[, ]' [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine' and ‘material.'” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)). For issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, the party cannot merely “rely on an absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts [in the record] that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The party need not, however, “rely only on uncontradicted evidence . . . . So long as the [party]'s evidence is both cognizable and sufficiently strong to support a verdict in her favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine which version of the facts is most compelling.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court “must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115. There is “no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood.” Greenburg v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). The court may, however, safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment standard, but instead simply ‘require us to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed.'” Wells Real Estate Inv. Trust II, Inc. v. Chardon/Hato Rey Partnerships, S.E., 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Adria Int'l Group, Inc., v. Ferré Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001)). “Although it is well-settled that the court must decide each motion for summary judgment on its own merits, this does not mean that ‘each motion must be considered in a vacuum. Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are filed simultaneously, or nearly so, the district court ordinarily should consider the two motions at the same time,' applying the same standards to each motion.” Id. (citing P.R. American Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 2010)).

III. Uncontested Material Facts

Plaintiff Employees are current or former employees of PRHTA and are professionals or administrators. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶¶ 1, 5. The rest of the plaintiffs are the respective spouses of the Plaintiff Employees. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 29. PRHTA is a public corporation created by law, with faculty to sue and be sued. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 2. The regional offices of PRHTA are located in the municipalities of Manatí (“North Region”), Mayagüez (“West Region”), Ponce (“South Region”), Humacao (“East Region”) and San Juan (“Metro Region”). ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 3. Each Regional Office is directed by a Regional Director who holds a trust position. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 4. Under the Regional Office, there are Project Supervisors and Project Administrators. ECF No. 188-2, at 1, ¶ 1; ECF No. 193-1, at 1, ¶ 1.

Among the Plaintiff Employees, there are fifty-four PRHTA current or former employees with career appointments as Engineers in Training, Engineer I, Engineer II, Engineer III, Engineer IV or Chiefs of Brigade that at all times pertinent to this complaint served as Project Administrators. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 25. The Project Administrators serve as the direct link between the PRHTA and the private contractors that build its construction projects. ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 26. Among the Project Administrators' main duties is the inspection of the construction project to make sure that the private contractor builds in accordance with the plans and specifications under the construction contract. ECF No 189-1, at 1, ¶ 27. There are also fifteen engineers that serve as Project Supervisors among the Plaintiff Employees at the filing of the complaint. ECF No. 188-2, at 2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 189-1, at 1, ¶ 7; ECF No. 193-1, at 1, ¶ 4. A Project Supervisor may supervise multiple Project Administrators in one or more...