Vecchiarino v. Potter

309 A.3d 322

223 Conn.App. 676

Theodore VECCHIARINO

v.Edward B. POTTER, Temporary Executor (Estate of Matthew R. Isenburg), et al.

(AC 45758)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 5, 2023

Officially Released February 13, 2024

Elizabeth Isenburg, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Christoher J. Cahill, with whom, on the brief, was Patrick M. Fahey, Hartford, for the appellee (Danielle P. Ferracci, successor temporary administrator of the estate of Matthew R. Isenburg).

Prescott, Elgo and Bishop, Js.^*

PRESCOTT, J.

₆₇₉Matthew R. Isenburg (decedent) died on November 14, 2016, at the age of eighty-nine. In the underlying probate proceedings involving a contest to his will dated March 13, 2014, the beneficiaries named in the contested will and the decedent’s heirs-at-law, who were omitted as beneficiaries from the will, resolved their dispute regarding its validity by entering into a mutual distribution, release, and settlement agreement (settlement agreement) that subsequently was approved by the Superior Court. In this appeal from the judgments of the Superior Court approving the settlement agreement, the defendant Elizabeth Isenburg, a former romantic partner of the decedent, who is neither a named beneficiary under the contested will nor an heir-at-law of the decedent,¹ claims that she is a "[person] interested in the estate" pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-434 (c)² and that the court should not have approved the settlement agreement without her participation in it.³ We are not persuaded by her claim ₆₈₀and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In 2013, the defendant initiated a civil action against the decedent, who was still living at the time, following the breakup of their relationship (civil action). In that action, she asserted that the decedent had made gifts and promises to her that entitled her to recover $6,000,000 in cash, real property, and certain personalty from the decedent. Following a trial, the court rejected most of her claims, awarding only limited relief. She subsequently appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Isenburg v. Isenburg, 178 Conn. App. 805, 177 A.3d 583 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 916, 180 A.3d 963 (2018).

After the decedent died in August, 2016, the plaintiff, Theodore Vecchiarino, a business partner of the decedent, petitioned the Probate Court for the district of Saybrook to admit the decedent’s March 13, 2014 will. The plaintiff also sought to be appointed as the administrator of the estate. In addition to the plaintiff, the decedent named in the will as beneficiaries Steven Mossberg, a long-time business associate of the decedent; Sharon Goffe, the decedent’s live-in companion and caretaker; and others.⁴ The will, however, omitted as beneficiaries any of the decedent’s heirs-at-law.

After the petition to admit the will was filed, certain of the decedent’s heirs-at-law objected to its admission and to the appointment of the plaintiff as the administrator of the decedent’s estate.⁵ These heirs-at-law asserted in ₆₈₁their objection that the March 13, 2014 will was invalid because of undue influence and that the plaintiff had misused the decedent’s funds and breached his fiduciary obligation while serving as the decedent’s attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney executed by the decedent on December 20, 2012. The Probate Court appointed Edward B. Potter to be the temporary administrator of the decedent’s estate.⁶ The Probate Court conducted multiple evidentiary hearings on these claims.

On December 26, 2016, while her appeal to this court from the judgment in the civil action was still pending, the defendant filed an appearance on her own behalf in the Probate Court and asserted that she was a creditor of the decedent’s estate on the basis of her claims that she unsuccessfully had brought against him in her civil action (creditor claims). Although she had been named as a beneficiary in prior wills executed by the decedent in 2003 and 2010 prior to the termination of their romantic relationship, the defendant did not petition the Probate Court to admit any of these wills as the valid and operative will of the decedent.

On December 19, 2017, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in the defendant’s civil action brought against the decedent. Isenburg v. Isenburg, supra, 178 Conn. App. at 820, 177 A.3d 583. Our Supreme Court subsequently denied her petition for certification to appeal, thereby ending her attempts to recover against the decedent directly. See Isenburg v. Isenburg, 328 Conn. 916, 180 A.3d 963 (2018).

On July 27, 2018, the Probate Court issued a written decree in which it concluded that the decedent had been unduly influenced in executing the contested will and that, therefore, it should not be admitted to probate. It also found that certain transfers that the plaintiff made ₆₈₂pursuant to the power of attorney were void and must be returned to the decedent’s estate. The plaintiff and Goffe filed separate appeals to the Superior Court challenging this decree.⁷ These actions subsequently were consolidated.

On January 15, 2020, the Probate Court issued a written decree denying the defendant’s creditor claims on the ground that they were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because they had been asserted unsuccessfully (or could have been asserted) in her civil action against the decedent while he was still alive. The defendant nominally appealed that decree to the Superior Court. See Isenburg v. Vecchiarino, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-20-5012822-S (February 21, 2020). Instead of reasserting those creditor claims, however, the defendant raised different claims against the plaintiff and others, alleging that they had interfered with agreements between her and the decedent. That appeal ultimately was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it did not seek review of the decree from which the defendant appealed and, thus, was beyond the scope of a proper probate appeal.

On June 1, 2022, in the underlying consolidated probate appeals, Attorney Danielle P. Ferrucci, as temporary administrator of the decedent’s estate, filed identical motions for approval of the settlement agreement that had been executed by all the various parties interested in the decedent’s estate as named beneficiaries under the challenged will or as heirs-at-law. The defendant did not ₆₈₃participate in the settlement negotiations or join the settlement agreement that formed the basis of the motions.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties, among other things, agreed that the decedent’s March 3, 2014 will would not be admitted to probate and that the estate would be administered as intestate. The plaintiff and Goffe agreed to make payments to the estate in exchange for the withdrawal of certain monetary claims against them. They also agreed that they would waive any interest in the estate. Finally, the agreement set forth the distribution and division of the estate to the heirs-at-law in various percentages.

[1] The self-represented defendant objected to the motions for approval of the settlement agreement because she was not a party to it. The precise grounds of her objection are difficult to discern, but it appears that she asserted three primary grounds as to why the settlement agreement should not be approved without her participation. First, she relied on the fact that she appeared and participated as an interested party in the underlying probate proceedings. Second, she appeared to claim that certain assets of the decedent fraudulently were transferred into the estate and should not be treated as assets of the estate but, in fact, belonged to her. Finally, she appeared to contend that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation⁸ applied and that she is a named beneficiary under a prior will. On the basis of these contentions, she argued that she is a "[person] interested in the estate" pursuant to § 45a-434 (c) and that the settlement agreement cannot be approved in the absence of her participation and consent to it.

[2–4] ₆₈₄On August 17, 2022, the Superior Court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, approved the settlement agreement over the objection of the defendant.⁹ In a memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the defendant’s mere participation in the underlying Probate Court proceedings did not, by itself, give rise to an interest in the estate within the meaning of § 45a-434 (c).¹⁰ The court also reasoned that the defendant never challenged the admission of the May 13, 2014 will nor did she seek to admit for probate any earlier will under which she could claim an interest as a beneficiary. Under these circumstances, the court found that the defendant’s status as a potential beneficiary of the decedent’s estate was too remote to bring her within the scope of "persons interested in the estate" for purposes of settlement in accordance with § 45a-434 (c). The court concluded: "In these probate appeals, the circle of possible ‘persons interested in the estate’ are the beneficiaries under the decedent’s March 13, 2014 will, the parties who appealed the Probate ₆₈₅Court decision related to that will—notably, also beneficiaries under that will—and the decedent’s heirs-at-law. All of those parties, and the successor temporary administrator, have agreed to the mutual distribution of the decedent’s estate. [The defendant] is an outsider to the mutual distribution proceedings." The court, accordingly, granted the motions for approval of the settlement agreement. This appeal followed.

[5, 6] The sole claim raised by the defendant on appeal is that the Superior Court improperly granted the motions for approval of the settlement agreement because she was among the "persons interested in the estate" for purposes of § 45a-434 (c)...