Vega v. Aviles

1

JOHN M.G. VEGA, Plaintiff, v. OSCAR AVILES, NURSE WINT, Defendants.

Civ. No. 23-651 (KM) (ESK)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

February 28, 2023

OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff John M.G. Vega, a pretrial detainee at Hudson County Jail (the “Jail”), seeks to commence a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from his alleged exposure to the COVID-19 virus at the Jail. DE 1. Vega also moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). DE 1-2. For the reasons below Vega's motion to proceed IFP is granted, but his complaint is dismissed without prejudice on initial screening.

A IFP

A prisoner seeking to file a civil action IFP must submit an affidavit, including a statement of all assets, stating that the prisoner is unable to pay the fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The prisoner also must submit a certified copy of his inmate trust fund account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Here, Vega has complied with the PLRA's requirements and demonstrated indigence. DE 1-1. Accordingly, IFP status is appropriate, and Vega's IFP motion is granted.

B. Factual Allegations^[1]

Having granted IFP status, I am obligated to screen the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) & 1915(e)(2)(B). For screening purposes, as on a motion to dismiss, I accept the well-pleaded, plausible allegations in the amended complaint as true. The complaint alleges as follows.

In January 2022, Vega was sent to “the Integrity House Drug Program in the Jail.” DE 1 at 8. “Inmates were catching this deadly virus in a alarming rate” and “were being sent from [Vega's] unit[,] E-5-N[,] to a COVID-19 unit for infected inmates.” Id. Vega does not state how long he had been detained as of January 2022.

“Around the middle of 2022,” Vega “started to feel the worst flu-like symptoms” he had ever felt. Id. His head “hurt so bad” and his “bones felt like they were on fire.” Id. He “continuously complained to Nurse Wint about how [he] was feeling and that day by day got worse.” Id. Nurse Wint “gave [him] Tylenol” and “told him to go lay down-that what [he] was feeling would soon pass.” Id. But instead “these symptoms along with [his] breathing . . . being affected” caused him “the worst pain.” Id. “All [he] could do was endure this torture.” Id. He asked for help, “but to no avail.” Id. He “complained for days with no positive results.” Id.

In October 2022, Vega “requested medical care on the Jail kiosk with no response.” Id. at 9. “[S]everal times [he] had symptoms.” Id. On November 2, 2022, he “wrote a grievance which was forwarded to medical on November 4, 2022 by Lt. Butter and still to date no response.” Id. “This whole time of [his] suffering [he] did it on [his] own-with no help for medical or jail officials[.] [He] just had to endure.” Id.

“SGI Castro was the SGI [he] saw the most” and to whom he “complained repeatedly.” Id. When Vega asked, “Why does the warden allow us to suffer in these units when we're clearly sick?” Castro responded, “The Director is clearly capable of maintaining the Jail during this pandemic.” Id. at 8-9. When Vega further asked: “New Jersey mandated strict restriction for society as a whole but hospitals and institutions are held to higher standards, so why do y'all house us the way you do[?]” Castro replied, “The Director of [the] Jail is responsible, capable fully of adhering to the New Jersey State mandate.” Id. at 9.

The defendants named in the complaint are Oscar Aviles and Nurse Wint. DE 1 at 4. Vega seeks to hold Aviles liable because, as director of the Jail, “he is the head of [the] facility and what he says go!” Id. Vega asserts that “the State issued strict mandates for hospitals and institutions which [Aviles] did not adhere to clearly by every other day inmates on were being taking to COVID-19 tier.” Id. In his request for relief, Vega asserts that he “would like [the] Jail to fix the major medical care problems that exist between inmates and medical and the Jail[,] also a monetary demand of 50.000.” Id. at 6.

C. Standard of Review

As noted above, district courts are required to review complaints in civil actions filed by prisoners, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and to dismiss any case that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) & 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir. 2022). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

D. Section 1983

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Id. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A supervisor may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of subordinates under § 1983. See, e.g., Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). Thus, to adequately plead a plausible § 1983 claim against Aviles, Vega must plead facts which, if proven, would show that Aviles was personally involved in the alleged wrongs. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). This can generally be done in one of two ways. First, Aviles can be liable if he enacted a policy, practice, or custom that was the “moving force” behind an alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010). Second, Aviles may be held liable if he “participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.” A.M ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Knowledge, for these purposes, means “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents.” C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).

E. Analysis

1. Conditions of Confinement

Construing Vega's complaint liberally, he appears to assert claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement on the basis of exposure to the COVID-19 virus and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs on the grounds that he was ill and did not receive adequate treatment.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords protections to pretrial detainees “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); see also Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003), and is violated when a pretrial detainee is subjected to punishment that is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. See Hubbardv. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “For the conditions of confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, they must deny the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'” Betts, 621 F.3d at 256 (quoting Farmer, 511...