Vega v. Wetzel

1

Peter Vega, Petitioner v. John E. Wetzel, and George M. Little, Secretary of Pennsylvania D.O.C. Ms. B. Mason, Superintendent at SCI-Mahanoy Ms. L. White, Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Mahanoy, Ms. Pamela Smith, and Christina Houser, Health Care Administrators at S.C.I. Mahanoy, Respondents

No. 39 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

July 31, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: February 17, 2023.

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge.

John E Wetzel, George M. Little, Bernadette Mason, Lori White Pamela Smith, and Christina Houser (collectively, DOC) filed a preliminary objection to the pro se petition for review filed by inmate Peter Vega (Petitioner). DOC essentially argues that because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim, this Court should sustain DOC's preliminary objection and dismiss Petitioner's petition for review. We sustain in part and overrule in part DOC's preliminary objection.^[1] We order DOC to file an answer within 30 days. Petitioner may file an amended petition for review conditioned upon Petitioner's compliance with the rules.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

Petitioner requested copies of his medical records from Smith, one of the prison health care administrators. Pet. for Review, 1/28/22, ¶¶6,8. Smith denied the request, stating that Petitioner was entitled to such records only if there was "a legal case." Id. ¶ 9. Petitioner filed an inmate grievance, which the "grievance coordinator" denied, reasoning that Petitioner must be "representing himself in actual litigation" before he could receive copies. Id. ¶ 11. Petitioner alleged that the relevant DOC policy, DC-ADM 003, violates 42 Pa.C.S. § 6155 of the Medical Records Act (Records Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6151-6160. Id. ¶¶ 12, 18.^[3] Petitioner exhausted his administrative appeals, including an appeal to Mason, who was the prison superintendent. Id. ¶¶ 13-15.

Petitioner filed his petition for review in this Court. Petitioner contended that under the Records Act, "he has an absolute right" to copies of his medical records. Id. ¶ 16. In Petitioner's view, DOC's policy "should not be interpreted or applied in such a manner as to abridge" Petitioner's rights under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6155. Id. ¶ 19. Further, Petitioner averred that DOC has no penological interest that justifies denial of his right to copies of his medical records. Id. ¶ 22. Petitioner concisely requested mandamus and declaratory judgment as relief, but did not otherwise elaborate. Id. ¶ 23. Petitioner did not attach the DOC policy to his petition.

DOC filed a single preliminary objection for a demurrer on several grounds. DOC claimed Petitioner (1) has no right to mandamus relief; (2) failed to alleged sufficient personal involvement by some of the individual DOC respondents; (3) failed to sufficiently plead a violation of his rights to due process and equal protection; and (4) cannot recover as a matter of law under Sections 6151 and 6155 of the Records Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6151, 6155, and Section 802a of the Health Care Facilities Act (Facilities Act), Act of July 19,1979, PL. 130, as amended, added by the Act of July 12,1980, PL. 655, 35 PS. § 448.802a. Prelim. Objs., 4/29/22, at 3-8. Petitioner filed a response to DOC's preliminary objection and a supporting brief.

II. ISSUES

In support of its preliminary objection, DOC raises three issues. First, DOC argues that Petitioner fails to plead "sufficient personal involvement" by some of the individual defendants. DOC's Br. at 7. Second, DOC contends that Petitioner fails to state claims for equal protection and due process. Id. Third, DOC claims that Petitioner has no right to his medical records under the Records Act. Id.^[4]

III. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Involvement of Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser

Before summarizing DOC's first argument, for context, we note that Petitioner did not allege that Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser engaged in any actions purportedly aggrieving Petitioner. See generally Pet. for Rev.

In support of its first issue, DOC argues that Petitioner failed to sufficiently allege the personal involvement of Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser. In DOC's view, although Petitioner named the above individuals as respondents, he did not "make any allegations whatsoever against" those individuals. DOC's Br. at 13. DOC reasons that because Petitioner failed to plead "actionable conduct" by those individuals, they must be dismissed. Id. at 12. DOC summarily concludes, without argument, that Smith and Mason must also be dismissed from the action. Id. at 13.^[5]

In Bush v. Veach, 1 A.3d 981 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court addressed a similar issue in an analogous procedural posture. In Bush, an inmate sued various prison employees, claiming that (1) the employees violated the inmate's due process rights; (2) almost all of the employees retaliated against the inmate; and (3) the prison superintendent failed to properly supervise the actions of the employees. Bush, 1 A.3d at 983. The defendants filed preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer. Id. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections, reasoning, inter alia, that the inmate's claim against the prison superintendent failed. Id. at 984. Specifically, the trial court explained that the prison superintendent could not be held liable solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior^[6] for the employees' alleged illegal retaliatory actions against the inmate. Id. at 985-86. The inmate appealed.

The Bush Court rejected the inmate's reasoning, primarily relying on federal caselaw stating "that personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence, but the allegations must be made with appropriate particularity." Id. at 986. The Bush Court therefore affirmed the trial court, reasoning that the inmate failed to allege the superintendent's actual knowledge with specificity and particularity. Id.

Instantly, upon review of Petitioner's petition for review, we agree with DOC that Petitioner failed to allege "actionable conduct" by Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser. See generally Pet. for Rev. Like the inmate in Bush, Petitioner failed to allege any "personal direction" or "actual knowledge and acquiescence" by the above individuals. See Bush, 1 A.3d at 986. As in Bush, which sustained a demurrer because the petitioner failed to allege an individual's actual knowledge sufficiently, we similarly sustain DOC's preliminary objection regarding Wetzel, Little, White, and Houser. See id. However, DOC's skeletal argument regarding Smith and Mason fails. See DOC's Br. at 13. Because DOC fails to argue why we should sustain its preliminary objection as to Smith and Mason, we overrule DOC's preliminary objection as to those two individuals. See Bush, 1 A.3d at 986; see also Pet. for Rev. ¶¶ 8-9,13. Regardless, Petitioner alleged their involvement with an appropriate level of specificity. See Pet. for Rev. ¶¶ 8-9,13; Bush, 1 A.3d at 986.

B. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims

DOC also argues that Petitioner failed to state claims for a violation of his rights to equal protection and due process. DOC's Br. at 13.^[7] DOC tersely argues that Petitioner failed to explain how DOC's denial of Petitioner's request for his medical records violated his rights. See id. In DOC's view, Petitioner inadequately stated how he was "treated differently from similarly situated individuals" as to trigger an equal protection claim. Id. at 14. Further, DOC contends Petitioner did not identify the particular due process he believes he was entitled to receive. Id.^[8]

"Pennsylvania is a fact pleading state." Briggs v. SW Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334, 351 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a petition for review must include "material facts on which a cause of action . . . is based[.]" Pa.R.Civ.P 1019(a); Pa.R.A.P 1513(e). Under Rule 1019(a), a complaint's material facts must "apprise the defendant of the claim being asserted" and "summarize the essential facts to support the claim." Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253,1260 (Pa. 2009). "The [petition for review] need not identify specific legal theories . . . . Assertions of legal rights and obligations in a [petition for review] may be construed as conclusions of law, which have no place in a pleading." 412 N. Front St. Assocs., LP v. Spector Gaden & Rosen, PC, 151 A.3d 646, 656 (Pa. Super. 2016) (cleaned up).

For example, in order to plead a cause of action for equal protection, the petitioner must plead material facts "that he is receiving different treatment from that received by other similarly situated individuals." Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth 1998). Relatedly, a procedural due process claim requires pleading at least one of the following: inadequate notice, no opportunity to be heard, or an inability "to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case." Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 764 (Pa. 2013). Those due process elements "are implicated only by adjudications, not by state actions that are legislative in character," i.e., a procedural due process claim necessarily requires an adjudicative agency action. Sutton v. Bickell, 220 A.3d 1027, 1032 (Pa. 2019) (affirming order "sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer" and dismissing with prejudice the appellant's due process claims). In contrast, a substantive due process claim requires facts establishing a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property right or other interest. Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam 'rs, 842 A.2d 936, 946 (Pa. 2004). In the prison context, the challenged deprivation must be...