Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC v. Srmof II 2012-1 Trust

LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. SRMOF II 2012-1 TRUST, US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,as Trustee, et al., Defendants.JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Intervenor.

Case No.: 2:13-cv-02194-GMN-VCF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

February 26, 2018

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 64), filed by Defendant SRMOF II 2012-1 Trust, U.S. Bank Trust National Association ("SRMOF"). Plaintiff Las Vegas Development Group, LLC ("LVDG") filed a Response, (ECF No. 66), and SRMOF filed a Reply, (ECF No. 68).

Also pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 65), filed by Intervenor JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A ("Chase"). LVDG filed a Response, (ECF No. 67), and Chase filed a Reply, (ECF No. 70). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS SRMOF's Motion and GRANTS Chase's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the non-judicial foreclosure on real property located at 5259 Aurora Beam, Las Vegas, Nevada (the "Property"). (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 6, ECF No. 10). On April 16, 2008, Margarette Healy obtained a loan from Pulte Mortgage LLC, secured by a deed of trust ("DOT") on the Property recorded on April 21, 2008. (See Note, Ex. A. to Chase's Mot. Summ. J. ("MSJ") 2-3, ECF No. 65-1); (Deed of Trust, Ex. 1 to SRMOF's MSJ 11-21, ECF No. 64).¹ SRMOF subsequently became the beneficiary of the DOT by way of a series of assignments recorded with the Clark County Recorder on February 17, 2012; September 13, 2013; and November 13, 2013. (See Assignments of Deeds of Trust, Exs. 2-4 to SRMOF's MSJ 23-31).

On November 15, 2011, Hacienda North HOA ("HOA") purchased the Property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale and recorded a trustee's deed upon sale on November 16, 2011. (Ex. 6 to SRMOF's MSJ 38-39). LVDG purchased the Property through a quitclaim deed from HOA and recorded its interest on November 23, 2011. (Quitclaim Deed, Ex. 5 to SRMOF's MSJ 33-34). On January 10, 2014, SRMOF purchased the Property through a foreclosure sale pursuant to the DOT, and subsequently recorded its interest on January 22, 2014. (Trustee's Deed Upon Sale, Ex. 7 to SRMOF's MSJ 43-44). On August 10, 2015, SRMOF recorded the conveyance of its interest in the Property to Chase. (See Quitclaim Deed, Ex. 8 to SRMOF's MSJ 48-51); (Quitclaim Deed, Ex. F to Chase's MSJ, ECF No. 65-6).

Pursuant to the foreclosure sale and subsequent sales of the Property, LVDG filed its SAC on February 14, 2014. (ECF No. 10). The SAC alleges the following causes of action: (1) quiet title; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) equitable mortgage; (4) injunctive relief; (5) slander of title; (6) conversion; (7) wrongful foreclosure; and (8) rescission. (SAC ¶¶ 59-154).

On June 2, 2015, LVDG and SRMOF filed a joint motion to permit Chase to intervene in the action. (ECF No. 38). The parties' motion asserted that "Chase claims a property interest in the real property at issue herein," and, accordingly, "permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is warranted." (Id. 2:1-3). In the alternative, the parties averred that Chase has "the rightto intervene and protect its claimed interest in the property at issue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)." (Id. 2:4-6). On June 3, 2015, the Court granted the parties' motion. (ECF No. 40). Chase subsequently filed an answer to LVDG's SAC on June 10, 2015, (ECF No. 41), and an Amended Answer on December 2, 2015. (ECF No. 44).

In light of this, on January 5, 2016, SRMOF filed a motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss all of LVDG's claims because it had transferred its interest in the Property to Chase. (See Mot. to Dismiss 6:22-28, 7:14-21, ECF No. 48). On August 18, 2016, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff's claims asserted against SRMOF for quiet title, injunctive relief, unjust enrichment, equitable mortgage, wrongful foreclosure, conversion, and rescission. (See Order 8:15-17, ECF No. 59). The Court, however, denied SRMOF's motion for slander of title. (Id. 8:18-19).

In the instant Motions, SRMOF now seeks summary judgment on the slander of title claim, (see SRMOF's MSJ, ECF No. 64), and Chase moves for summary judgment on the quiet title claim. (See Chase's MSJ, ECF No. 65).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. "Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). Aprincipal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must gobeyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

II. DISCUSSION

SRMOF seeks summary judgment on LVDG's claim for slander of title because it asserts the claim "is based entirely on the premise that the Deed of Trust was extinguished by the HOA foreclosure," which runs contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bourne Valley. (SRMOF's MSJ 8:20-21). Additionally, Chase moves for summary judgment on LVDG's quiet title claim because it asserts that its interest was not extinguished in the Property pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 116.3116. (Chase's MSJ 4:13-17).

As a threshold matter, although the Court previously dismissed the quiet title claim against SRMOF, and the SAC did not assert the claim against Chase, Chase is permitted to bring the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim here. Specifically, the Court granted SRMOF's motion to dismiss LVDG's quiet title claim that was asserted only against SRMOF, which Chase acknowledges in its Motion. (See Order 4:22-5:5, ECF No. 59); (see also SAC ¶¶ 59-76); (Chase's MSJ 4:13-14 n.2). Nonetheless, "an intervenor is admitted to the proceeding as it stands, and in respect of the pending issues, but is not permitted to enlarge those issues or compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding." United States v. Blue Lake Power, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 498 (1944)). Chase therefore is admitted to the proceeding in light of its interest in the Property.

Moreover, while Chase has not explicitly asserted a counterclaim for quiet title or declaratory relief, Chase's Amended Answer, (ECF No. 44), provides an affirmative defense that states "LVDG takes title, if any, to the Property subordinate in time and right to [Chase's] interests, rights, liens, and claims in the Property." (Id. 13:17-19). Chase's Amended Answer additionally contains a prayer for relief seeking a "judicial determination that [Chase's] ownership interest . . . is superior to [LVDG's]...