Velasco v. Comm'r of Corr.

214 Conn.App. 831

282 A.3d 517

Victor VELASCO

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 44505

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 4, 2022

Officially released September 6, 2022

J. Christopher Llinas, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Susan M. Campbell, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Moll, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

CLARK, J.

Following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Victor Velasco, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29. The court concluded that a certain "Settlement Agreement and Release" the petitioner had entered into with the state of Connecticut in 2018 (settlement agreement) barred the petitioner's habeas petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the settlement agreement is unenforceable because the terms of the release provision are unconscionable. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner was charged with the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-54c and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (3). See State v. Velasco , 253 Conn. 210, 212–13, 751 A.2d 800 (2000). He also was charged under General Statutes § 53-202k with committing robbery in the first degree with a firearm. See id., at 213, 751 A.2d 800. In 1998, following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on the first two counts. Id. "The trial court rendered judgment and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of sixty years on the felony murder conviction, execution suspended after fifty years, and a twenty year concurrent term of imprisonment on the conspiracy conviction. The trial court then determined, from the evidence presented at trial, that the defendant had used a firearm in violation of § 53-202k. Accordingly, the trial court also imposed a five year sentence to run consecutively with the other sentences for the conviction under § 53-202k." Id. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court vacated the § 53-202k sentence enhancement but affirmed the court's judgment in all other respects; id., at 249, 751 A.2d 800 ; resulting in a sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment, execution suspended after fifty years, and five years of probation. See id., at 217, 751 A.2d 800.

Since the petitioner's conviction, he has filed numerous petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.¹ In addition, he has filed numerous lawsuits against the state of Connecticut alleging violations of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Velasco v. Hall , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-5040120-S; Velasco v. Bennett , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-5040121-S. Pertinent to this appeal, the petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against prison officials at Corrigan Correctional Center alleging violations of his constitutional rights based, inter alia, on his conditions of confinement during his incarceration stemming from his designation as a gang member (federal case). See Velasco v. Halpin , United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11CV463 (JCH), 2017 WL 5574299 (D. Conn. November 20, 2017).² The parties ultimately settled that case via the settlement agreement executed on April 4, 2018. The settlement agreement, which the petitioner entered into while the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus was pending in the Superior Court, includes a general release that provides in relevant part: "The [petitioner] ... for and in consideration of the fulfillment of the obligation of the State of Connecticut described above, and other valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does herewith forever discharge and release ... the State of Connecticut and each of its current or former officers, agents, servants, employees, successors, legal representatives and assigns, from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, claims, controversies, damages and demands of every nature and kind, including attorneys fees and costs, monetary and equitable relief, whether known or unknown, which he had or now has or may hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the date of this agreement, including any acts arising out of, or in any way related to the incidents or circumstances which formed the basis for the [federal case], including such actions as may have been or may in the future have been brought in the federal courts, courts of the State of Connecticut or any other state or forum, any state or federal administrative agency, or before the Claims Commissioner pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-141, et. seq. This release shall include but is not limited to causes of action alleging violations of [the petitioner's] state and/or federal constitutional rights, his rights arising under the statutes and laws of the United States, the State of Connecticut or any other state, any other source of rights that may exist, and such causes of action as may be available under the common law."

Prior to commencing his federal case and entering into the settlement agreement, the petitioner had filed the instant habeas petition on November 17, 2014. He subsequently amended the petition on November 9, 2017; February 27, 2019; and October 4, 2019. The operative petition contains four counts, alleging (1) ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and prior habeas counsel, (2) ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel for his direct appeal, (3) a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights arising from the state charging him with felony murder after he waived his right to a probable cause hearing, and (4) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the petitioner's criminal trial due to the petitioner's procedurally defective waiver of his right to a probable cause hearing.

On March 19, 2020, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner's habeas petition on the basis that the settlement agreement from the federal case released "the state of Connecticut from all constitutional claims from the beginning of the world until the writing of the settlement agreement, April 4, 2018."³ In response, the petitioner argued, inter alia, that the settlement agreement was intended to settle only the federal case and that the agreement's terms were ambiguous.

The petitioner filed a supplemental objection dated June 26, 2020, in which he reiterated some of his contract interpretation arguments and further argued that interpreting the settlement agreement to bar his instant habeas petition would be unconscionable.⁴ On September 9, 2020, the court, Oliver, J. , held remote arguments on the motion to dismiss.⁵ During that proceeding, it came to the court's attention that the respondent never received a copy of the petitioner's supplemental objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the respondent was permitted to file a reply to the petitioner's supplemental objection. The respondent filed his reply brief on October 1, 2020, arguing that the terms of the settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous and encompass the petitioner's habeas petition.

On December 2, 2020, the habeas court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, concluding that "[t]he terms of the settlement agreement and release are clear and unambiguous and unquestionably encompass the instant matter." The habeas court subsequently granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.

In his principal brief on appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas court erred when it dismissed his habeas petition. He contends that the settlement agreement on which the court based its decision is unconscionable due to the unequal bargaining positions of the parties and because the general release contained within the settlement agreement is unreasonable in its breadth and scope. The respondent counters that the settlement agreement is not unconscionable as it relates to the instant habeas petition because the petitioner was represented by counsel at the time he negotiated and entered into the agreement and was well aware of the implication of the release. The respondent also argues that the settlement agreement is not in any way one-sided, as the petitioner received significant benefits. We agree with the respondent.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. "[W]hen a habeas court considers a motion to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, [t]he evidence offered by the [petitioner] is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the petitioner], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the petitioner's] favor. ... It is equally well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to a complaint in a civil action ... [and it] is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction , 326 Conn. 772, 780–81, 167 A.3d 952 (2017). "The conclusions reached by the trial court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review. ... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing court] must determine whether they are legally and logically correct ... and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woods v. Commissioner of Correction , 197 Conn. App. 597, 607, 232...