Velazquez-Ortiz v. Negron-Fernandez

174 F.Supp.3d 653

Villanueva Velazquez–Ortiz, Plaintiff(s),

v.Jose Negron–Fernandez, former Secretary of the P.R. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and his conjugal partnership; Superintendent Vazquez, Superintendent of the Bayamon 705 Correctional Facility, and his conjugal partnership; Richard Doe; and Susan Doe, all in their personal and individual capacities; and Insurance Carriers A and B, Defendant(s).

Civil No. 15–1164 (DRD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 31, 2016

Guillermo J. Ramos–Luina, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff(s).

Idza Diaz–Rivera, P.R. Department of Justice–Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendant(s).

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court are the following motions, to wit: (a) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Defendants Jose Negron Fernandez, et. al., Docket No. 11, and (b) Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 14. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Villanueva Velazquez Ortiz (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a former correctional officer, was incarcerated in the Bayamon 705 Correctional Facility on June 17, 2013 for civil contempt associated with a child support debt. Docket No. 1, at page 2, ¶ 2.1. Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff had requested disability benefits to the Social Security Administration. Docket No. 1, at page 3, ¶ 3.1; Docket No. 11, at page 1. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's disability request by letter dated July 2, 2013, mailed to his postal address in the free community. Id.

Subsequently, on or about October 29, 2013, Plaintiff's mother mailed several medical records of Plaintiff's various physical and mental conditions to the prison where Plaintiff was confined. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.3. Plaintiff allegedly needed these documents in order to file an appeal with the Social Security Administration. Id. Prison officials, purportedly following the policies and procedures established by Defendants Jose Negron Fernandez (hereinafter “Defendant Negron” or “Negron”), who was the Secretary of Corrections and Rehabilitation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico at the time of Plaintiff's incarceration, and Superintendent Vazquez (hereinafter “Defendant Vazquez”), Superintendent of the Bayamon 705 prison facility, allegedly refused the documents and returned them by mail to Plaintiff's mother. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.3–3.4.

Later, in late February of 2014, Plaintiff's brother visited Plaintiff in prison and attempted to deliver the documents personally to Plaintiff. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.4. However, due to instructions purportedly given by Defendant Vazquez and the lack of proper procedures implemented by Defendant Negron, Plaintiff's brother was not allowed to enter the documents to prison or leave them there for Plaintiff. Id.

Aside from the pleading request before the Social Security Administration, Plaintiff also filed a motion pro se with the Puerto Rico First Instance Court, requesting a reduction in his monthly child support payments after his incarceration. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.6. The First Instance Court referred the motion to an Examiner, who on January 29, 2014, issued a Report and Recommendation denying Plaintiff's request. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.7. Later, through an order dated February 13, 2014, the First Instance Court adopted the Examiner's recommendation, and, on or about February 19, 2014, notified Plaintiff of its denial by mail. Id.

Plaintiff then filed a pro se request for reconsideration with the First Instance Court. Docket No. 1, at page 4, ¶ 3.7. He also requested assistance with the research and drafting of other motions that he wished to file with the First Instance Court to either obtain a reduction in child support payments or his early release from prison. Docket No. 1, at pages 4–5, ¶ 3.7. To that end, on February 27, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an internal grievance within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter “DCR”) administrative claims procedure, requesting that he be “urgently” visited by DCR paralegals, as provided by Paragraph 19 of the Settlement Accord approved by the court in the Morales Feliciano Litigation on December 13, 2012, Civil No. 79–004, Docket No. 10196 (hereinafter “Settlement Accord”). Docket No. 1, at page 5, ¶ 3.8.¹

On March 25, 2014, prison officials responded to Plaintiff's internal grievance, stating that the paralegals were not available at that time. Docket No. 1, at page 5, ¶ 3.9. On May 15, 2014, Plaintiff was released from prison, and eventually filed the instant complaint on February 23, 2015. Docket No. 1, at page 2, ¶ 2.1. The complaint states a violation of Plaintiff's federally protected right of access to court, in contravention of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. It also includes supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. The defendants, all of whom were sued in their personal and individual capacities only, are Defendants Negron and Vazquez, their spouses and conjugal partnerships, as well as two unnamed prison officials and employees of the DCR identified as Richard Roe and Susan Doe, and Insurance carriers A and B.² Docket No. 17.

On August 11, 2015, Defendant Negron, represented by the Puerto Rico Department of Justice, filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Docket No. 11. Defendant Negron raised four arguments in the motion: (a) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C § 1983 ; (b) failure to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment; (c) failure to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (d) failure to state a claim for denial to access to courts. On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, stating that Plaintiff had sufficiently plead a claim for deprivation of his right to access to courts. Docket No. 14.

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss Standard under Rule 12(b)(6)

Dismissal of pleading for failure to state a claim upon relief can be granted.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions.” See Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (“in order to ‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868. “Context based” means that a Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (concluding that plaintiff's complaint was factually insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements). First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Yet we need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.

Thus, “[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief.” Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show [n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as any “obvious alternative explanation.” Id. at 679–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “A plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Ocasio–Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12, (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

The United States...