Vélez-Acevedo v. Centro De Cáncer De La Universidad De P.R.

GRENDALIZ VÉLEZ-ACEVEDO, ET AL. Plaintiffs v. CENTRO DE CÁNCER DE LA UNIVERSIDADDE PUERTO RICO, ET AL. Defendants

CIV. NO.: 19-1560 (SCC)

UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

July 2, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Grendaliz Vélez-Acevedo ("Plaintiff Vélez-Acevedo"), her husband Hector Aponte-Benejan, and the conjugal partnership composed by them, (collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed this suit against Defendants Centro de Cáncer de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, also known as the Comprehensive Cancer Center of the University of Puerto Rico ("Co-Defendant CCUPR" or "CCUPR"), the CCUPR's interim Executive Director, Luis Clavell-Rodríguez ("Clavell-Rodríguez"), and the CCUPR's Chief Financial Officer, José Dávila-Pérez ("Dávila-Pérez"),¹ in their official and individual capacities. Docket No. 17 at 3-4. Plaintiffs also included the Individual Co-Defendants' spouses, Mary Pou de Clavell and Mayra Seguinot, and their respective conjugal partnerships as parties to the instant suit. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiffs' suit advances several claims under federal and state law.² See id.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. See Docket No. 23. Plaintiffs opposed the same ("Opposition"). See Docket No. 27. And a Reply, see Docket No. 33, and Sur-reply followed, see Docket No. 38. After considering the parties' submissions, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 23.

I. Background

According to the allegations set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, while Plaintiff Vélez-Acevedo was an employee at the CCUPR, Co-Defendant CCUPR discriminated against her because of her sex and retaliated against her for collaborating with state and federal agencies regarding purported administrative and financial irregularities at the CCUPR. Docket No. 17 at 20-22. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff Vélez-Acevedo's Fourteenth Amendment rights by unlawfully demoting and discharging her from her career position as Director of Finance at the CCUPR. Id. at 23-24. Plaintiff Vélez-Acevedo now seeks monetary redress under Title VII for sex discrimination and retaliation, and under Section 1983 for violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 29-30.

In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also bring forth several claims against Defendants under Puerto Rico law. Namely, a whistleblower retaliation claim, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29, § 194 et seq. ("Law No. 115"); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1881 et seq ("Law No. 2"); a breach of contract claim, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3373; a sex discrimination and retaliation claim, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq. ("Law No. 100"); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 1321 et seq. ("Law No. 69"), and a tort claim under Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 ("Article 1802"). Id. at 25-28. The Second Amended Complaint also includes a request for injunctive relief in order for Plaintiff Vélez-Acevedo to be reinstated to her former position as Director of Finance at the CCUPR. Id. at 28-29.

Defendants move to partially dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Docket No. 23. Specifically, Defendants move to dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ("Rule 12(b)(1)"), Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim because the CCUPR is allegedly an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 9. Similarly, the Individual Co-Defendants invoke the sovereign immunity afforded to state officials as the basis for dismissal of Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim against them in their official capacities. Id. at 31.

Defendants also move to dismiss additional claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Law No. 100 claim should be dismissed given that, Co-Defendant CCUPR does not satisfy the definition of an employer under said law. Id. at 33-34. Additionally, the Individual Co-Defendants request that Plaintiffs' Title VII and Law No. 115 claims against them be dismissed because there is no individual employee liability under the same. Id. at 35-36. Lastly, Defendants seek to dismiss all the claims directed against the Individual Co-Defendants' spouses and their conjugal partnerships. Id. at 36-38.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that after Puerto Rico v. Sánchez-Valle, 136 S.Ct. 1863 (2016), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth") is no longer a sovereign state protected by the Eleventh Amendment's immunity. Docket No. 27 at 12. In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that, in light of the two-prong test set forth in Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc. v. Puerto Rico & Caribbean Cardiovascular Center Corp., 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003), Co-Defendant CCUPR is not an arm of the state. Docket No. 27 at 12-18. Plaintiffs also argue that, Co-Defendant CCUPR is an employer under Law No. 100 because it operates as a private entity. Id. at 24. Furthermore, Plaintiffs posit that the Individual Co-Defendants' spouses and conjugal partnership should remain as parties to this suit as they are necessary to ensure that the judgment is properly executed. Id. at 26.

Defendants filed a Reply further briefing their sovereign immunity defense and generally addressing Plaintiffs' Opposition. Docket No. 33. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Sur-reply restating their original arguments that the sovereign immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to Puerto Rico and that Co-Defendant CCUPR is not an arm of the state. Docket No. 38 at 6-10.

II. Standard of Review

A defendant may challenge a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001). A sovereign immunity challenge may be brought under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. In ruling upon such a motion, the Court "must construe the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210-1211 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995)). The Court may also consider any evidence the parties submit. See Martínez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Aversa, 99 F.3d at 1210)).

Additionally, Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing a motion to dismiss, the Court must employ a two-step approach. Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Committee, 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). First, the Court must isolate and ignore the statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions. Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2011)). Then, in step two, the Court must take all well-pleaded facts as true and see if they set forth a plausible claim for relief. Id. The complaint plausibly narrates a claim if it allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

III. Analysis

A. Sovereign Immunity

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the First Circuit has consistently held that the Commonwealth is afforded the sovereign immunity enjoyed by states under the Eleventh Amendment. See Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 831 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2016); Díaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); Ramírez v. Puerto Rico Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983). The Sánchez-Valle case did not alter this long-established precedent. In Sánchez-Valle, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the United States and the Commonwealth were "separate sovereigns" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and whether they could both prosecute a defendant for the same offense without violating that provision. 136 S.Ct. at 1867-1868. The Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico was not a separate sovereign from the Federal Government for double jeopardy purposes only, given that under said context "the ultimate source of Puerto Rico's prosecutorial power is the Federal Government." Id. at 1876. In view of the limited scope under which the Sánchez-Valle decision was rendered, this Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs' proposition to reevaluate well-settled First Circuit precedent regarding the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity status.³ Having decided that the Commonwealth enjoys the sovereign immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court turns to whether Co-Defendant CCUPR is an arm of the state that can benefit from the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.

1. Whether the CCUPR Can Claim the Sovereign Immunity Afforded to the UPR

Defendants propose that the CCUPR is an arm of the statein view of its relationship with the University of Puerto Rico ("UPR") which enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity because it is an arm of the state.⁴ See Docket No. 23 at 9. The nature and confines of the relationship between Co-Defendant CCUPR and the UPR are defined in the CCUPR's Enabling Act ("CCUPR Enabling Act"), see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, §§ 3365-3379. Notably, the CCUPR's Enabling Act provides that, Co-Defendant CCUPR "shall be affiliated, through agreements, to the [UPR.]" Id. at § 3365. The CCUPR's Enabling Act further instructs that Co-Defendant CCUPR shall enter into agreements with the UPR in order to integrate research and educational efforts related to cancer. Id. at § 3368(a). It also states that three out of the nine members of the CCUPR's Board of Directors (the "Board") are members of the UPR.⁵ Id. at § 3369(b)(1).

However, these legislative mandates do not entail that Co-Defendant CCUPR is a part of the UPR and is therefore shielded by its immunity. The...