Velez-Herrero v. Guzman

330 F.Supp.2d 62

Ivett VELEZ-HERRERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rafael L. GUZMAN, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.02-2022(JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 13, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Carlos R. Ramirez, Esq., John F. Nevares & Assoc. PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Gloriana S. Hita-Valiente, Esq., Llovet Zurinaga & Lopez, PSC, Milagros Del Carmen Lopez-Perez, Esq., Sanchez-Betances & Sifre, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, Ivett Vélez Herrero ("Plaintiff Vélez"), Luis Alfredo Millán Rivera ("Plaintiff Millán"), and the conjugal partnership composed between them, filed the present complaint against Rafael L. Guzmán, Executive Director of the State Emergency Management and Administration of Disasters Agency ("SEMADA"), in his personal and official capacities ("Defendant Guzmán"), Ileana Rivera Gomez ("Defendant Rivera"), in her personal capacity, and Efraín Alejandro Berríos, Executive Director for the Fajardo Region of SEMADA, in his personal and official capacities ("Defendant Alejandro"); and other unknown defendants, pursuant to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, and XIV; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1994 & Supp.2003); the Puerto Rico Public Service Personnel Act, 3 L.P.R.A. § 1301, et seq. (2000) (the "Puerto Rico PSPA"); and Article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1990 & Supp.2000) ("Article 1802"). Docket Document No. 1.

Defendants Alejandro, Guzmán, and Rivera move for summary judgment. Docket Document Nos. 28, 36, 39, 47. Plaintiffs oppose the motions. Docket Document No. 45. Upon careful review of the pleadings, the submitted evidence, and applicable case law, the court denies Defendant Alejandro's motion and grants in part and denies in part Defendants Guzmán and Rivera's motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis

Unless otherwise indicated, we derive the following factual summary from the complaint and the parties' statements of facts submitted in their summary judgment and opposition motions. Docket Document Nos. 28, 36, 39, 45, 47.¹

Plaintiff Vélez is a United States citizen residing in Puerto Rico, and is married to Plaintiff Millán. Plaintiffs are affiliated with the New Progressive Party ("NPP").

Defendant Alejandro is presently the Executive Director of SEMADA's Fajardo office, and was at the time in question Interim Director of SEMADA's Humacao region office. Defendant Rivera is the former Executive Director of SEMADA. Defendant Guzmán is the current Executive Director of SEMADA. All Defendants are United States citizens and affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP").

Plaintiff Vélez began working at SEMADA in May 1995 as an Office Systems Assistant I, a career position. She presently holds the same position.

In November 2000, general elections were held in Puerto Rico, and the PDP defeated the then incumbent NPP. The newly-elected governor, Sila Calderón, appointed Defendant Rivera as SEMADA's Executive Director. Thereafter, Defendant Guzmán was appointed as Executive Director of SEMADA, apparently to replace Defendant Rivera, and Defendant Alejandro was appointed as interim director of SEMADA's Humacao region.

When Defendant Alejandro started working as interim director of the Humacao regional office, he allegedly reduced Plaintiff Vélez's responsibilities as Office Systems Assistant I. Docket Document No. 45. Myrna Vázquez Díaz ("Vázquez"), a member of the PDP, started working in February or March 2001, and took over Plaintiff Vélez' responsibilities. Docket Document No. 45. Defendant Alejandro removed Plaintiff Vélez' office equipment and transferred it to Vázquez. Plaintiff Vélez did not suffer a salary reduction. Docket Document No. 28.

On August 7, 2002, Defendant Guzmán designated Luis Island ("Island") to substitute Defendant Alejandro as Acting Director of SEMADA's Humacao office. Before leaving the Humacao office, Defendant Alejandro told Island that Plaintiff Vélez was not a person of trust to the current (PDP) administration. Docket Document No. 45, Exh. 7.

Plaintiff Vélez sent two letters to Defendant Rivera outlining the problems she was having with Defendant Alejandro. Docket Document No. 36. Exh. 5, 6. On August 7, 2002, Defendant Guzmán informed Defendant Alejandro that, in order to correct the problems with Plaintiff Vélez in Humacao, he would be transferred to Gurabo. Docket Document No. 36, Exh. 3.

Plaintiffs filed the present complaint on July 3, 2002, alleging violations of the United States Constitution, the Puerto Rico PSPA, and Article 1802. Docket Document No. 1. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Id.

On February 11, 2004, Defendant Alejandro moved for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 28. Defendants Guzmán and Rivera filed a motion for summary judgment on February 27, 2004. Docket Document No. 36. On March 19, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to both motions. Docket Document No. 45.

II.

Motion for Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 56(c)

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).

The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; however the burden "may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See id. at 331.

The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment exists "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assess the proof in order to determine the need for trial." Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)).

III. Analysis

A. Defendant Alejandro's Motion

Defendant Alejandro moves for summary judgment, averring that Plaintiff Vélez has neither established that political affiliation was a factor behind the alleged impermissible personnel transaction nor suffered an adverse employment action. Docket Document No. 28. Alternatively, Defendant Alejandro alleges he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

1. Mt. Healthy Burden-Shifting Analysis

In Mt. Healthy City School District Board v. Doyle, the United States Supreme Court established a two part burden-shifting analysis for evaluating public employees' First Amendment claims. 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In order to assert a colorable claim of political discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that his political affiliation was a "substantial or motivating" factor behind the challenged employment decision. Id. Once the plaintiff establishes the initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that he would have made the same employment decision despite the plaintiff's protected conduct. Id. When the defendant proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff may rebut the defendant's reason "by adducing evidence that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor." Padilla-Garcia v. Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 78 (1st Cir.2000).

Under Mt. Healthy, the defendant in a political discrimination case bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that his reason for the adverse employment action is credible. Id. at 78. Thus, "once the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant-employer, the plaintiff-employee will prevail unless the factfinder concludes that the defendant has produced enough evidence to establish that the plaintiff's dismissal would have occurred in any event for nondiscriminatory reasons." Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 67 (1st cir.1993).

2. Section 1983 First Amendment Claim

The First Amendment protects non-policymaking public employees from adverse employment actions based on their political opinions. See Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75-76, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990).

Defendant Alejandro argues that Plaintiff Vélez has not proven that Defendant Alejandro's motive for the alleged adverse employment action was political. Docket Document No. 28. To show that Defendant Alejandro's actions were based on political affiliation, Plaintiff Vélez has proffered the following evidence: (1) Defendant Alejandro reduced her work duties; (2) Vázquez, a PDP member, took over her duties; (3) Island's testimony that Defendant Alejandro said Plaintiff Vélez is not a person of trust to the current administration; (4) Luis Rodríguez's testimony that Plaintiff Vélez was not a person of Defendant Alejandro's trust; and (5) Defendant Guzmán's testimony that Defendant Alejandro had created a hostile work environment. Docket Document No. 45. Such evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. See Acevedo-Garcia v....