Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc.

884 F. Supp. 1287

Dean VETTER, Plaintiff, v. FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.

No. C 94-3008.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

May 1, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Professor John S. Allen and Student Interns Justin A. Teitle and Tiffany M. Ferguson of the Clinical Law Program of the University of Iowa College of Law, Iowa City, IA, for plaintiff Dean G. Vetter.

Stanley E. Craven of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, Kansas City, MO, for defendant Farmland Industries, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS
  I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................... 1293
 II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................ 1294
III. FINDINGS OF FACT .......................................................... 1296
     A. Undisputed Facts ....................................................... 1296
     B. Disputed Facts ......................................................... 1297
 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................ 1299
    A. Disparate Treatment ..................................................... 1299
       1. The analytical framework for a disparate treatment claim ............. 1300
       2. The prima facie case ................................................. 1301
       3. Vetter's prima facie case ............................................ 1302
       4. Pretext .............................................................. 1304
    B. Failure To Accommodate .................................................. 1305
       1. The analytical framework for a failure to accommodate claim .......... 1305
       2. Vetter's prima facie showing ......................................... 1305
          a.  Bona fide belief ................................................. 1306
          b.  Notice to the employer and discharge ............................. 1308
       3. Accommodation ........................................................ 1308
          a.  The two-step analysis ............................................ 1308
          b.  "Reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" .................. 1309
          c.  The employee's duty to cooperate ................................. 1310
       4. Accommodation in this case ........................................... 1311
          a.  Ames as a reasonable accommodation ............................... 1311
          b.  Fort Dodge as a reasonable accommodation ......................... 1311
  V. CONCLUSION ................................................................ 1312

The parties have characterized this case as presenting the question of whether a former employee was simply too "choosy," or whether a former employer was simply too "unreasonable," about where the former employee had to live, and the further question of whether any of this had anything to do with the former employee's religion and the loss of his job.¹ Prior to plaintiff's discharge, the employer allegedly told plaintiff's wife that "sometimes you have to choose between your religion and your job," and the court also finds that it must explore the extent to which the contours of Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination proscribes an employer from compelling an employee to make such a choice.

In this lawsuit, an adherent to the Jewish religion alleges that his discharge from his job with an agricultural products company for refusal to live within his sales territory was the result of religious discrimination in violation of federal and state antidiscrimination laws. The former employee also alleges that the employer failed to make reasonable accommodations to the former employee's religious beliefs. The agricultural products company has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the former employee's claim of disparate treatment on the basis of religion, and, furthermore, that there is nothing in the Jewish faith that required the plaintiff to live outside of his sales territory such that the employer had any obligation to make accommodations to the plaintiff's religious belief.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dean G. Vetter, who is an adherent of the Jewish faith, filed the complaint in this matter on March 8, 1994, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). The defendant is Vetter's former employer, Farmland Industries, Inc. In August of 1992, Farmland hired Vetter as a Livestock Production Specialist (LPS) responsible for a trade territory surrounding Webster City, Iowa. Vetter began his employment with Farmland in September of 1992. Vetter alleges that his difficulties with his employer only began when his employer learned that he was Jewish, and that these difficulties ultimately resulted in his termination less than one month after he began working for Farmland.

Vetter pursued administrative remedies through both the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Vetter received an administrative release, or right-to-sue letter, from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on December 22, 1993. Similarly, Vetter received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on January 6, 1994. Vetter then filed this lawsuit on March 8, 1994.

Vetter's complaint is in four counts. Counts I and III allege disparate treatment on the basis of religion resulting in his discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a), respectively. Vetter's disparate treatment claims are founded on allegations that after he informed his supervisor that he was Jewish and wished to live in Ames, Iowa, because it had an active Jewish Community, Farmland officials for the first time imposed a requirement that he live within the Webster City trade area, and ultimately terminated him for not accepting inadequate housing within that trade territory. Counts II and IV allege failure to make reasonable accommodations to Vetter's religious beliefs, also in violation of the same provisions of federal and state law, respectively. Vetter's claim of refusal to make reasonable accommodation is based on his assertion that he was willing to maintain a residence for himself in Webster City, while his family lived in Ames, but that Farmland rejected this suggestion and failed to offer any other reasonable accommodation. Vetter seeks damages, including lost past and future income and benefits, emotional distress, suffering, inconvenience, and humiliation, as well as costs and attorneys fees, and such other relief as the court deems just and proper.

Farmland answered the complaint on May 17, 1994, asserting as affirmative defenses, inter alia, that accommodation was not required on the facts stated and would have imposed an undue hardship, that Vetter failed to mitigate damages, and that Vetter was discharged for cause unrelated to his religion. Farmland asserted that all of its actions were taken in good faith for legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons.

Farmland moved for summary judgment on February 21, 1995. Farmland argues that Vetter does not have "a scintilla of evidence to support his claim of discriminatory conduct." Defendant's Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, at 3. Farmland asserts that Vetter's own deposition testimony demonstrates that he did not encounter any hostility towards his religious beliefs from Farmland officials and that, had he been able to find "suitable housing" in Webster City, he would have been willing to relocate there. Farmland asserts that the real problem here is not discrimination, but Vetter's excessive choosiness about rental housing. Farmland also argues that there is nothing about the Jewish faith that required Vetter to live in Ames, only Vetter's personal preference. Farmland contends that it was willing to allow Vetter to live in Fort Dodge, which has a synagogue, but that Vetter rejected that accommodation, because he did not think the synagogue was active enough.

Vetter argues that the evidence demonstrates that Farmland's grounds for terminating him were a pretext for religious discrimination. Vetter asserts that Farmland has given a variety of reasons for his discharge, which is evidence that the reasons given are pretextual. Vetter also argues that more than one of Farmland's LPSs lives at a greater distance from cooperatives those LPSs serve than Vetter would have been from the Webster City cooperative had he lived in Ames. He argues further that some LPSs have either been given permission to live outside of their trade areas or have been given several months to move into their trade areas, whereas he is the only LPS to be fired for not moving into his trade area, and then only one month after he was hired. Vetter also argues that he has established the elements of a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate his religion, because he has shown a genuine religious belief and negative employment decision following his notice to his employer of a conflict between that belief and job requirements. Finally, Vetter argues that Farmland cannot show undue hard ship from accommodating his religious beliefs by allowing him to live in Ames.

The court held telephonic oral arguments on Farmland's motion for summary judgment on April 21, 1995. Vetter was represented at the oral arguments by Professor John S. Allen and student interns Justin A. Teitle and Tiffany M. Ferguson of the Clinical Law Program of the University of Iowa College of Law in Iowa City, Iowa. Farmland was represented at the oral arguments by Stanley E. Craven of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne in Kansas City, Mo.² This matter is now fully submitted, and the court therefore enters the...