VHS of Mich., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

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VHS OF MICHIGAN, INC., doing business as DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, and MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY and CURRENTLY UNNAMED ASSIGNEE OF THE MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 365479

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 20, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 22-002236-NF

Before: YATES, P.J., and BORRELLO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendants Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF) and Currently Unnamed Assignee of the MAIPF under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact).^[1] For the reasons set forth in this opinion we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of medical treatment plaintiff provided to Michael Dantzler after Dantzler was injured in a motor vehicle accident on February 28, 2021. According to Dantzler, he was self-employed as a "street mechanic" and worked out of his home. Dantzler alleged that a frequent customer named Dee dropped off a 2014 Dodge Charger and the keys to the vehicle at Dantzler's home for repairs on February 26, 2021. Dantzler repaired the vehicle on February 27, 2021. Later that evening, two neighborhood children asked Dantzler to take them for a ride in the Charger. Although Dantzler had consumed alcohol earlier that evening and did not have a valid driver's license, Dantzler agreed to take the children for a ride in the Charger. Just after midnight on February 28, 2021, while driving the children in the Charger, Dantzler crashed into a parked vehicle. He was injured and lost consciousness following the crash. Dantzler was taken by ambulance to plaintiff's hospital, Detroit Medical Center Sinai-Grace Hospital, where he received treatment for his injuries. It was later determined that the vehicle Dantzler was operating when the accident occurred had been stolen from its owner, Anthony Martin, in October or November 2020. Dantzler and Martin did not know each other.

Plaintiff filed this action to recover PIP benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for the medical treatment and services it provided to Dantzler for his injuries from the accident.

As relevant to this appeal, defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant argued that plaintiff's claim was precluded by MCL 500.3113(a), which provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if, at the time of the accident, the person willingly operated a vehicle that was taken unlawfully and the person knew or should have known that the vehicle was unlawfully taken. Defendant argued that Dantzler unlawfully took the Charger because he was operating the vehicle without a license and while under the influence of alcohol above the legal limit when the accident occurred and, additionally, because he knew that he did not have permission to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident. Because plaintiff's claim was predicated on Dantzler's right to recovery of PIP benefits and if he was precluded from recovery under MCL 500.3113(a), plaintiff's claim was also precluded.

After hearing oral argument on defendant's motion, the trial court ruled that Dantzler unlawfully took the Charger within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a) when Dantzler operated the Charger while under the influence of alcohol in the early morning hours of February 28, 2021. The trial court, therefore, granted defendant's motion for summary disposition on the basis that MCL 500.3113(a) precluded plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo." Parise v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 295 Mich.App. 25, 27; 811 N.W.2d 98 (2011). Summary disposition is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." MCR 2.116(C)(10). "In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial." Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich.App. 132, 139; 832 N.W.2d 266 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Id. at 139-140 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Questions involving statutory interpretation present issues of law that this Court review's de novo. Parise, 295 Mich.App. at 27.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by determining that Dantzler unlawfully took the Charger within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a) and granting summary disposition in defendant's favor, thereby precluding plaintiff from recovering PIP benefits for its treatment of Dantzler's injuries. Plaintiff argues that the exclusion from PIP benefits contained in MCL 500.3113(a) requires an unlawful taking, not merely an unlawful use, for the exclusion to apply. Further, plaintiff argues that the relevant inquiry for determining whether an unlawful taking occurred must focus on how the person gained possession of the vehicle rather than how the vehicle was used after obtaining possession. Plaintiff maintains that Dee, the ostensible owner of the Charger, voluntarily gave Dantzler possession of the vehicle for purposes of making repairs and that Dantzler's subsequent use of the vehicle while it was in his possession, even if his use was not authorized, could not somehow transform Dantzler's possession of the vehicle into an unlawful taking for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a).

Resolution of this issue involves statutory interpretation. Our task when construing a statute is to discern the Legislature's intent, and we begin with the statutory language. Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich. 303, 311; 831 N.W.2d 223 (2013). "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted." Id.

"The no-fault act permits an insurer to avoid coverage of PIP benefits under certain enumerated circumstances, such as those listed in MCL 500.3113." Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich.App. 1, 9; 972 N.W.2d 860 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In relevant part, MCL 500.3113 provides as follows:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

(a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. [MCL 500.3113(a).]

The exclusion in this statutory provision "applies to any person (1) 'willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle' that (2) was unlawfully taken by someone, and (3) the person seeking benefits 'knew or should have known' that the motor vehicle was taken unlawfully." Ahmed, 337 Mich.App. at 10. Hence, "a person who willingly operates or willingly uses a motor vehicle that someone took unlawfully is disqualified from eligibility for benefits if the person 'knew or should have known' that the taking of the motor vehicle was unlawful; stated differently, such a person is disqualified from eligibility for benefits unless the person had no reason to know that the taking was unlawful." Id. at 23 (emphasis added)." 'The first level of inquiry when applying MCL 500.3113(a) always concerns whether the taking of a vehicle was unlawful, and if the taking was lawful, the inquiry ends because the statute is inapplicable.'" Id. at 19, quoting Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich.App. 738, 747; 896 N.W.2d 32 (2016).

In Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich. 503, 515-517; 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012), our Supreme Court construed MCL 500.3113(a) and specifically ascertained the Legislature's intended meaning of the phrase "taken unlawfully." The Court held:

In determining the Legislature's intended meaning of the phrase "taken unlawfully," we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the phrase. The word "unlawful" commonly means "not lawful; contrary to law; illegal," and the word "take" is commonly understood as "to get into one's hands or possession by voluntary action." When the words are considered together, the plain meaning of the phrase "taken unlawfully" readily embraces a situation in which an individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law.

The Michigan Penal Code contains several statutes that prohibit "takings," including two that prohibit "joyriding," MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414. MCL 750.413 states that "[a]ny person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away . . . any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony ...." Similarly, MCL 750.414 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without intent to steal the same, or who is a party to such unauthorized taking or using, is guilty of a misdemeanor ...." Thus, both joyriding statutes make it unlawful to take any motor vehicle without

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