Vigil v. Laurence

524 F.Supp.3d 1120

Daniel James VIGIL, Plaintiff,

v.Teddy L. LAURENCE, in his individual capacity; Physician Health Partners, Inc. d/b/a Correctional Health Partners, LLC a Colorado corporation; Roger Castillo, in his individual capacity; Linda Paro, in her individual capacity; Daphne Miller, in her individual capacity; John/Jane Doe(s), in his or her individual and official capacity ; Rick Raemisch, in his individual and official capacity ; Sean Foster, in his individual and official capacity ; Susan Tiona, in her individual and official capacity ; Dayna Johnson, in her individual and official capacity ; Renae Jordan, in her individual and official capacity ; Michelle Brodeur, in her individual and official capacity ; Vanessa Carson, in her individual and official capacity ; Nicole Blatnick, in her individual and official capacity ; and Deborah Borrego, in her individual capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-cv-1499-WJM-NRN

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed March 8, 2021

Brenna Lee Wolcott, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Elizabeth Scott Wylie, Luke W. Mecklenburg, Ciera Alyse Gonzalez, Timothy Philip Scalo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Ann C. Tousignant Stanton, Ann Marie Luvera, Colorado Department of Law, Denver, CO, for Defendants Dayna Johnson, Teddy(I) L. Laurence, Linda (I) Paro, Daphne(I) Miller, Sean(I) Foster, Deborah (I) Borrego, Ranae Jordan, Nicole Blatnick, Rick Raemisch.

Andrew David Ringel, Edmund Martin Kennedy, Hall & Evans LLC, Denver, CO, for Defendants Physician Health Partners, Inc., Roger (I) Castillo.

Ann C. Tousignant Stanton, Colorado Department of Law, Denver, CO, for Defendants Michelle Brodeur, Vanessa Carson, Susan Tiona.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)

William J. Martínez, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff Daniel Vigil's Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Motions"). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants Correctional Health Partners ("CHP") and Roger Castillo's (collectively, "CHP Defendants") Motion and grants in part Defendants Deborah Borrego, Sean Foster, Teddy Laurence, Daphne Miller, and Linda Paro's (collectively, "CDOC Defendants") Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Vigil's Third Amended Complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the purpose of resolving the Motions to Dismiss. See Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).

Vigil is currently incarcerated at Buena Vista Correctional Facility ("BVCF"), a facility of the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). (ECF No. 155 ¶ 1.) CHP is a third-party healthcare administrator which reviews and approves requests for medical care for individuals incarcerated in CDOC facilities. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Roger Castillo served as director of CHP during the relevant period. (Id. ¶ 4.) Vigil brings this action against, inter alia , CHP, Castillo, Borrego, Foster, Laurence, Miller, and Paro.¹ (Id. ¶¶ 2–7, 14.)

This action arises out of events subsequent to the fracture of Vigil's arm in November 2016, which occurred at Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility ("AVCF"), where Vigil was incarcerated prior to his transfer to BVCF. (Id. ¶ 29.) Vigil alleges that after fracturing his right arm by tripping and falling on pavement, he did not receive proper medical treatment for his injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 93–181.) Specifically, he alleges that CHP Defendants denied or delayed responding to his requests for medical care, and that CDOC Defendants similarly failed to timely respond to his treatment requests or provide adequate follow-up care for his injury. (Id. ¶¶ 93–181.)

Vigil alleges that the delays and denials of treatment prevented his fractured arm from healing properly. (Id. ¶¶ 93–181.) Vigil underwent invasive surgery on June 15, 2018, more than 18 months after his initial injury. (Id. ¶ 89.) The surgery involved the extraction of bone from his hip and grafting into his arm to correct the break. (Id. ) Vigil expects that he will never recover full range of motion of his right arm. (Id. ¶ 81.)

Vigil alleges that Defendants’ actions amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 93–181.) He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 93–181.)

Vigil initiated this action on June 15, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Vigil filed his Third Amended Complaint on June 23, 2020, which is the operative complaint. (ECF No. 155.) CHP Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on May 21, 2020.² (ECF No. 142.) CDOC Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 6, 2020. (ECF No. 160.) The Motions to Dismiss are fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 162, 169, 171 & 172.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim in a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires the Court to "assume the truth of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such a motion, the dispositive inquiry is "whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Granting a motion to dismiss "is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice." Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statute of Limitations

Vigil's § 1983 claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-80-102(1)(g). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (2014) (creating a two-year limitation period for "[a]ll actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute"); Blake v. Dickason , 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 to a § 1983 claim).

i. CHP Defendants

CHP Defendants argue that Vigil's claims against them are time-barred, as the underlying events occurred more than two years prior to the filing of his Second Amended Complaint on March 16, 2020, which first named them as defendants. (ECF No. 142 at 7–9.)

CHP Defendants argue that Vigil's claims against CHP stemming from all but one alleged instance are also time-barred. (ECF No. 142 at 8–9.) Vigil alleges several instances of CHP's improper delays and denials of medical appointments and referrals between December 2016 and November 2017. (ECF No. 155 ¶¶ 38, 77, 87.) Vigil also alleges that Castillo, the director of CHP, improperly denied Vigil's request for a follow-up appointment on February 9, 2017 and Vigil's request for surgery on August 20, 2017. (ECF No. 155 ¶¶ 48, 77.) As these events occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint on March 16, 2020, CHP argues that these allegations cannot form the basis for Vigil's claims. (ECF No. 142 at 8–9.)

Vigil does not dispute that his allegations against CHP and Castillo accrued more than two years prior to the filing of his Second Amended Complaint, but argues that the relation-back doctrine preserves his claims. (ECF No. 162 at 7.) He argues that the Second and Third Amended Complaints relate back to the filing of his initial Complaint in 2018. (Id. ) Vigil posits that he attempted to identify CHP and Castillo as "CDOC Prison Medical Contractors," which constituted a misnomer. (Id. at 8.)

An amended complaint naming a new party to an action relates back to the filing of an original complaint if the party to be brought in

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). Further, the amendment must assert a claim arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. Id. 15(c)(1)(B).

Vigil's claims against CHP and Castillo arise out of the same underlying facts: the delay and denial of medical treatment. (ECF No. 155 ¶¶ 93–181.) The relation-back inquiry therefore turns on whether CHP and Castillo had notice that they may be implicated in this action.

The Tenth Circuit has held that the plaintiff's designation of an unknown defendant in an initial complaint is not a formal defect, and "later amendment that specifically names that defendant does not relate back to the original complaint." Garrett v. Fleming , 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that "as a matter of law, a plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the intended defendant's identity is not a ‘mistake concerning the identity of the proper party’ "). Vigil argues, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A. , 560 U.S. 538, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (2010), abrogated the Tenth Circuit's decision in Garrett . (ECF No. 162 at 7–8.)

In Krupski , the plaintiff sued a corporation for her injury on a cruise ship, and later discovered that a different entity owned the ship where her injury took place. Krupski , 560 U.S. at 544, 130 S.Ct. 2485. The Krupski plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to implicate the new entity, which argued that her claims were time-barred. Id. The...