Villafranca v. Pompeo

486 F.Supp.3d 1078

Denisse VILLAFRANCA, Plaintiff,

v.Michael R. POMPEO, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-178

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Brownsville Division.

Signed September 14, 2020

Cathy Jean Potter, Law Firm of Cathy J. Potter PLLC, Harlingen, TX, for Plaintiff.

Victor M. Mercado-Santana, Pro Hac Vice, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER AND OPINION

Fernando Rodriguez, Jr., United States District Judge

In November 2018, Plaintiff Denisse Villafranca filed a complaint (Doc. 1) seeking a declaratory judgment that she is a United States citizen, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1503(a) permits a plaintiff to file a declaratory judgment action in a district court of the United States "for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence".

In January, Defendant Michael R. Pompeo, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of State, filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33), asserting that Villafranca does not meet the residency requirement found in Section 1503(a). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant the Motion and deny the Complaint without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R&R, Doc. 60) Both Villafranca and the Government filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Villafranca Objs., Doc. 66; Def. Objs., Doc. 61)

The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Motion, the briefing of the parties, the record in this case, and the applicable law. The Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation reaches the correct conclusion, but also that some of the objections should be sustained. The Court adopts in part and declines in part the Report and Recommendation, and incorporates the adopted portions into this Order and Opinion.

I. Background

Villafranca alleges that she was born in Brownsville, Texas, in November 1977 and is a natural born citizen of the United States. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 2) She also has a Mexican birth certificate. The original Mexican birth certificate was registered in August 1977 and reflected a June 1977 birth in Tamaulipas, Mexico. (Mex. Birth Certificate, Doc. 2, 21) In 2012, Villafranca successfully petitioned the Mexican authorities to amend that birth certificate to reflect a November 1977 birth in Brownsville. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 12)

Villafranca testified that she lived in Brownsville from May 2010 until "around 2012 or 2013," when she moved to Tijuana, Mexico, where she worked for her late husband's aluminum manufacturing business. (Villafranca Dep., Doc. 33-8, 10:12–10:18, 12:7–12:19) That business has a "representation office" named California Plating, L.L.C. in San Diego, California. (Id. at 12:9) The representation office is used to facilitate business with United States-based clients who "only work with U.S.-based businesses," although the actual manufacturing occurs in Mexico. (Id. at 12:10–12:11)

In November 2014, the State Department revoked Villafranca's passport, finding that she was actually born in Mexico, based upon her original Mexican birth certificate. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 16)

On October 30, 2018, Villafranca entered the United States from Mexico at the Gateway Bridge in Brownsville, Texas. (U.S. Encounter List, Doc. 33-3, 4) This was the first time she had actually entered the United States since November 2014. (Id. ) At the time that she entered the United States in 2018, Villafranca possessed a Mexican driver's license issued in April 2017 and valid through November 2021, as well as a Mexican voter identification card issued in 2017 and effective through 2027. (Mex. Driver's License, Doc. 33-4; Mex. Voter ID, Doc. 33-5) Both documents listed an address in Tijuana, Mexico. In contrast, Villafranca's Texas driver's license and Texas voter registration card, both of which indicate a Brownsville address, had expired in 2017. (Tex. Driver's License, Doc. 43, 31; Tex. Voter ID, Doc. 43, 32)

Villafranca affies that when she initiated this action, she resided at her "family home" in Brownsville, Texas. (Villafranca Aff., Doc. 43, 27 ¶ 6) Her name is on the cable TV and internet accounts for the apartment. (Cable and Internet Bills, Doc. 43, 51–66; Doc. 43-1, 1–33) And in late 2018, she also used the Brownsville address for a cellular telephone account. (Phone Bills, Doc. 43-1, 34–57)

On November 2, 2018, Villafranca filed her Complaint.¹ (Doc. 31) Two months later, in January, she returned to Tijuana, Mexico. (Villafranca Aff., Doc. 43, 28 ¶ 10) Since then, other than being temporarily paroled into the United States to be deposed for this case, she has remained in Mexico. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–14)

On January 27, 2020, the Defendant filed this Motion, arguing that Villafranca lives in Mexico and that when she initiated this action, she did not reside or claim a residence in the Southern District of Texas, precluding jurisdiction with this Court. (Doc. 33)

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a trial court must dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the Court is without the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The party seeking the federal forum bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). That party bears the burden of establishing facts supporting jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp. , 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009).

In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the Court may consider: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). "[A]ll questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness [are] determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao , 418 F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also Burr v. Transohio Sav. , No. 95-20144, 1995 WL 798590, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) ("The relevant date for determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is the date on which the complaint is filed".).

When "factual issues determinative of jurisdiction are intertwined with or identical to factual issues determinative of the merits," a court is required "to assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits." Worldwide Parking, Inc. v. New Orleans City , 123 F. App'x 606, 608 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ). Villafranca argues that this principle applies and warrants denial of the Motion. (Response, Doc. 46, 6-8) The Court disagrees. As to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) ’s residency requirement, the Court must determine whether Villafranca resided or claimed a residence within this District at the time she filed this lawsuit in late 2018. That inquiry is wholly different from the central issue on the merits—i.e. , whether she was born in Brownsville in 1977. As a result, the factual issues determinative of jurisdiction are not intertwined with the factual issues determinative of the merits.

B. Defining "Resides or Claims a Residence"

Under Section 1503(a), "a person who is within the United States [who] claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and [who] is denied such right or privilege" on the grounds that she is not a national of the United States, may file a declaratory judgment action asking the Court to adjudicate her citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). This provision mandates that the action "shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence." Id. The requirement is jurisdictional. Flores v. Pompeo , 936 F.3d 273, 276 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019).

The parties’ dispute centers on the meaning of the statutory phrase, "resides or claims a residence." The parties agree, and the Court finds, that the phrase is disjunctive, as indicated by the coordinating conjunction "or". See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141, 200 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (explaining that "or" is "almost always disjunctive"). (See also Def. Suppl. Brief, Doc. 52, 5–6; Pl.’s Suppl. Brief, Doc. 55, 7) As a result, Villafranca must establish that she either "resides" or "claims a residence" in the Southern District of Texas. More specifically, she must show that she did so at the time she filed her Complaint.²

The parties’ agreement ends, however, as to the meaning of the key terms.

"When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain language used by the drafters [and] each part or section of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole." United States v. Uvalle-Patricio , 478 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 2007) ; see also United States v. Maturino , 887 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 2018) ("Text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process."). The Court assumes that Congress meant the statute's words "to express their ordinary meaning." United States v. Kaluza , 780 F.3d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 2015). "[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." United States v. Lauderdale Cty., Miss. , 914 F.3d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court first looks at the defined words in the statute, as typically, "[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words". Nguyen v. Am. Commercial Lines L.L.C. , 805 F.3d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burgess v. United States , 553 U.S. 124, 129, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) ). In the INA, Congress defined "residence" as "the place of general abode; the...