Villanueva v. Clark

JUNIOR VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT CLARK, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-610

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 6, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J.

Petitioner Junior Villanueva, who is proceeding pro se, seeks relief in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his state-court conviction was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution. Petitioner seeks habeas relief based on claims of trial court error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a Brady violation. The Petition was referred to an assigned Magistrate Judge who has issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") that the petition be denied. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. After careful, de novo review of the record, the Court determines that Petitioner has shown entitlement to relief on his claim based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his defense.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Villanueva, who is deaf and speaks only Spanish, was charged with numerous offenses involving the rape and sexual abuse of nine year old Ma. S., the daughter of his live-in girlfriend, Beysi Rivera.²

Beysi Rivera had two daughters, Ma. S. and Me. S., and a son, A.S.³ Villanueva lived with Rivera for eight months from December 2007 to August 2008.⁴ The charges against him alleged that, during this time, Villanueva would come into the room Ma. S. shared with Me. S., and sexually abuse Ma. S.⁵

Three days before trial began, the Commonwealth learned from Rivera of two witnesses who would be testifying on behalf of Villanueva.⁶ The first was N.E., a child who had lived with Rivera and her children for six months in 2006, during which time she slept in the same bedroom as Ma. S. and Me. S.⁷ The second was Yuizanet E., who was N.E.'s mother and had lived with Rivera and her children for two weeks in 2007.⁸

Three days into trial, the Commonwealth sought an in camera offer of proof regarding these two witnesses.⁹ In his offer of proof, trial counsel explained that N.E. would testify that when she lived with the victim, N.E., Ma. S., and Me. S. were all sexually abused by A.S., and that the manner of that abuse was the same as that alleged against Petitioner.¹⁰

In response to the offer of proof, the Commonwealth revealed that when it learned of the proposed testimony from Rivera, it investigated the proposed testimony, which included checking the records of the Lehigh County Children and Youth Services ("CYS").¹¹ As part ofthis investigation, the Commonwealth received a letter from CYS summarizing the information it had on file.¹² This letter confirmed that, several years earlier, a report had been made on behalf of N.E. which alleged that A.S. had inappropriately touched both her and Ma. S.¹³ The Commonwealth received this letter on the same day as the offer of proof and turned it over to the defense that same day.¹⁴

During the in camera proceedings, the Commonwealth moved to exclude the testimony from N.E. and Yuizanet about sexual abuse by A.S., arguing that it was not relevant and would confuse the jury because N.E. and Yuizanet would only specifically testify about sexual abuse occurring before the charged conduct.¹⁵ The defense explained that the evidence was relevant for four reasons. First, it allowed the defense to argue that A.S. had committed the charged conduct. Second, it provided a motive of protecting A.S. for Ma. S., Me. S., and Rivera to name Villanueva as the perpetrator. Third, it explained Ma. S.'s knowledge of the sexual conduct she recalled experiencing. Fourth, it explained the medical evidence that pointed to a possibility that Ma. S. had been sexually abused.¹⁶ The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that the evidence was not relevant and granted the Commonwealth's motion.¹⁷

Villanueva moved for a mistrial based upon an alleged Brady violation for the failure to turn over the CYS letter earlier.¹⁸ Villanueva alternatively moved for a continuance to allow himto receive the full file from CYS.¹⁹ The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial or continuance ruling that the Commonwealth only learned of the existence of the allegations several days before trial so the disclosure was timely and that, in any event, the information was not exculpatory.²⁰

Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the trial court held a competency hearing where defense counsel argued that Ma. S. was not competent to testify due to the hallucinations that she experienced at the time of the charged conduct.²¹ The trial court, however, ruled that Ma. S. was competent to testify because she "understood the difference between right and wrong . . . [and] could testify truthfully."²²

At trial, Ma. S. named Villanueva as the perpetrator of sexual abuse against her.²³ Her sister Me. S. testified about conduct including that she once saw Villanueva lying naked in the bed the sisters shared while they were asleep.²⁴ Rivera also testified on behalf of the Commonwealth, and N.E. and Yuizanet testified on behalf of the defense,²⁵ but no evidence about sexual abuse by A.S. was introduced. Villanueva did not testify. At the close of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict and Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of incarceration of 46 to 92 years.

On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court's ruling excluding testimony about A.S.'s alleged sexual abuse and denying the Brady claim. Without a response from the Commonwealth, the Superior Court sua sponte analyzed the first issue under Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law and affirmed the exclusion of the evidence.²⁶ The Superior Court also ruled that there was no Brady violation because the information was timely turned over and that it was "neither exculpatory nor admissible under the Rape Shield Law."²⁷ The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Villanueva's petition for allowance of appeal.²⁸

Petitioner then filed a timely pro se Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition.²⁹ Counsel was appointed, filed an amended petition, and represented Petitioner at an evidentiary hearing.³⁰ Relevant to this § 2254 proceeding, Petitioner alleged that: 1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court order Ma. S. to undergo a psychiatric evaluation; 2) his appellate counsel (who was also trial counsel) was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's finding that the victim was competent to testify; and 3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Petitioner about testifying at trial.³¹ The trial court denied Petitioner's PCRA petition and the Superior Court affirmed.³² The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for allowance of appeal.³³

On February 5, 2017, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court.³⁴ The Court granted Petitioner leave to file an amended petition.³⁵ Petitioner raised the following five claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's determination that Ma. S. was competent to testify; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court order a psychiatric evaluation of Ma. S.; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that A.S. had sexually abused Ma. S. in the same manner that Petitioner was alleged to have abused her; (4) the trial court failed to recognize a Brady violation based upon the letter the Commonwealth provided to Petitioner three days into his trial; and (5) trial counsel was ineffective for providing unreasonable and illogical advice to Petitioner which dissuaded him from testifying.³⁶

The Commonwealth contended that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on any of his claims.³⁷ With regard to claims one, two, four, and five, the Commonwealth argued that the state court's conclusions were reasonable and were not contrary to federal law.³⁸ With regard to claim three, the Commonwealth argued that Petitioner failed to exhaust the claim and, alternatively, that the Superior Court's ruling excluding testimony pursuant to the Rape Shield Law was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.³⁹

The R&R agreed that claim three was unexhausted and procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner's other claims were resolved reasonably by the state court.⁴⁰ Therefore, the R&R recommended that Petitioner's claims be denied without an evidentiary hearing.⁴¹

Petitioner timely filed objections to the R&R.⁴² With regard to claim three, Petitioner asserts that the claim was exhausted since he "indisputably argued to the Superior Court that the Trial Court violated his constitutional right to present evidence in the form of a witness."⁴³ With regard to claims one, two, four, and five, Petitioner argues that "the Superior Court's adjudication derived from an unreasonable application of federal law."⁴⁴

II. DISCUSSION

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "a district court shall entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus [filed on] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."⁴⁵ Where, as here, the petition is referred to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation, a district court shall conduct a de novo review of "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge."⁴⁶

Pursuant to AEDPA, if a claim was reviewed and rejected on the merits by the state courts, habeas relief is precluded unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was...