Vincent Gillespie & Another 1 v. City of Northampton.2

460 Mass. 148

950 N.E.2d 377

Vincent GILLESPIE & another 1

v.CITY OF NORTHAMPTON.2

SJC–10791.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

Submitted March 10, 2011.Decided July 14, 2011.

William C. Newman, Northampton, for the plaintiffs.William W. Porter, Assistant Attorney General, for the interveners.John Holevoet, of Wisconsin, for National Motorists Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, & DUFFLY, JJ.CORDY, J.

In this case, brought pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, and G.L. c. 231A, we are asked to decide whether the imposition of $275 in filing fees to obtain judicial review of a final decision of a municipal parking clerk regarding a parking citation offends the Massachusetts Constitution. Vincent Gillespie and Edward Hamel, the plaintiffs, each dispute the validity of parking citations received in the city of Northampton. They appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court that the statutory scheme that imposes such fees for review of a municipal parking clerk's adjudication of the citation, following an in-person administrative hearing, is consonant with the principles of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm.

1. Background. On July 19, 2005, Gillespie received two citations for parking in a prohibited zone in Northampton. He received the second citation after removing the first from his windshield and walking to the Northampton parking office to protest. Each citation carried a maximum penalty of fifteen dollars. That same day, Gillespie filed a written challenge to both citations. A hearing officer designated by the Northampton parking clerk sent him a letter upholding the validity of the first citation because his “vehicle was parked in violation of the prohibited zone ordinance.” The second citation was dismissed as duplicative because it was issued less than one hour after the first.

On October 29, 2005, Hamel stopped his vehicle in front of a bakery on Main Street in Northampton and waited for his wife who was inside. A parking officer issued him a citation, with a fine of one hundred dollars, for parking illegally in a handicapped parking space. Like Gillespie, he filed a written challenge. A hearing officer sent him a letter rejecting the challenge. At the time, Northampton did not afford persons challenging a citation the right to an in-person hearing before the parking clerk or a designated hearing officer.

2. Statutory framework. Municipalities may choose to enforce any “rule, regulation, order, ordinance or by-law regulating the parking of motor vehicles” according to two similar administrative frameworks as set forth in G.L. c. 90, §§ 20A ³ and 20A 1/2. Northampton has elected to establish the procedures in G.L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2 ( § 20A 1/2).⁴ The provision begins with a familiar protocol: “It shall be the duty of every police officer who takes cognizance of a [parking] violation ... forthwith to give the offender a notice, which shall be in tag form ... to appear before the parking clerk of the city or town wherein the violation occurred....” Each “tag form” notice, or as it is commonly called, a parking ticket or parking citation, must state the specific violation charged, as well as the established fine, and must provide an explanation of the procedures for both paying the fine and challenging the citation's validity. G.L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2. The statute prescribes a maximum fine of one hundred dollars for certain enumerated parking violations, such as parking within a bus stop. Fines for all other violations “shall not exceed $50.” Id.

The alleged offender may then appear to pay the fine in person, or may mail payment of the fine to the municipality's parking clerk. Id. Payment of the fine shall “operate as a final disposition of the case.” Id. An alleged parking offender may contest the citation in two ways. First, he may send to the parking clerk “a signed statement explaining his objections” and any supporting evidentiary material. G.L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2. The parking clerk, or a designee of the clerk, referred to as a “hearing officer,” reviews the written challenge and notifies the alleged offender of the disposition of that review by mail. Id. Second, after denial of a written challenge, or without first lodging a written challenge, an alleged offender is entitled to a live, in-person administrative hearing.⁵ Id. “Said hearing shall be informal [and] the rules of evidence shall not apply.” Id. The citation is admissible in the hearing, and is “deemed prima facie evidence ... as to the facts contained therein.” Id.

Either a written denial or the denial of challenge following a hearing is considered an appealable final decision of the parking clerk, and subject to judicial review under the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14. Proceedings for judicial review pursuant G.L. c. 30A, § 14, are instituted in the Superior Court.⁶ By statute, litigants must pay a minimum of $275 in filing fees to institute a civil action in the Superior Court. See G.L. c. 262, §§ 4A, 4C. These fees form the heart of Gillespie's challenge to § 20A 1/2.⁷ Plaintiffs who submit an “affidavit of indigency and request for waiver” are relieved from payment of the fees after an adjudication of indigency by a clerk of the court under G.L. c. 261, §§ 27B, 27C.⁸

On July 28, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the Superior Court seeking declaratory judgment that (1) Northampton violated § 20A 1/2 by not affording a live hearing before a parking clerk or designated hearing officer; and (2) the procedural framework of § 20A 1/2, namely the imposition of $275 in filing fees and the designation of the Superior Court as the forum for judicial review, is so cost prohibitive that it effectively denies aggrieved parking offenders access to the courts.⁹ This, the plaintiffs argue, is violative of the guarantees of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers found in arts. 1, 10, 11, and 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as the access to justice principles protected by art. 11, which includes the right to be free from having to “purchase” justice.¹⁰ The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The judge ruled that Northampton contravened § 20A 1/2 by failing to grant in-person hearings. Northampton does not appeal from that judgment.¹¹ On the constitutional challenge, the judge granted summary judgment in favor of Northampton. The plaintiffs appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

3. Discussion. The plaintiffs launch a broad facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 20A 1/2 and the attendant filing fees it imposes for judicial review. We note at the outset that it is well settled that a “statute is presumed to be constitutional and every rational presumption in favor of the statute's validity is made.” Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 441 Mass. 188, 193, 804 N.E.2d 894 (2004), citing St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 416 Mass. 698, 702–704, 626 N.E.2d 857 (1993). The challenging party bears the burden of demonstrating “beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no ‘conceivable grounds' which could support its validity.” Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 576, 574 N.E.2d 978 (1991), quoting Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 84, 478 N.E.2d 930 (1985). While there is a considerable measure of conceptual overlap in the due process, equal protection, and access to justice principles the plaintiffs invoke, we are obliged to treat each constitutional claim as analytically distinct. See Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 648–654, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). We address each in turn.

a. Due process. The plaintiffs raise both substantive and procedural due process challenges to § 20A 1/2.

i. Substantive due process. Where a statute unjustifiably burdens the exercise of a fundamental right protected by art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the standard of review we apply is strict judicial scrutiny.¹² See Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). A fundamental right is one that is “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’ Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 [97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531] (1977) ] (plurality opinion) ... and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Under strict scrutiny review, a challenged statute may only survive when it is “narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest.” Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673, 611 N.E.2d 204 (1993). See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 660–661, 774 N.E.2d 1052, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189, 123 S.Ct. 1259, 154 L.Ed.2d 1022 (2003). All other statutes that do not collide with a fundamental right are subject to a “rational basis” standard of judicial review. See Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, supra. Under the rational basis standard, a statute is constitutionally sound if it is reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid State interest. See id.

The plaintiffs argue that judicial review of an adjudicatory decision made by an administrative body is a “venerable right” grounded in the Massachusetts Constitution and rendered “illusory” by the imposition in § 20A 1/2 of filing fees far in excess of the challenged fine. Without conceding that the statutory scheme does not implicate a fundamental right to court access, the plaintiffs argue that even under a rational basis standard of review, § 20A 1/2 bears no cognizable relationship to a valid State interest.

While the plaintiffs are well within reason to...