Vincent v. Commonwealth

1

DAVID VINCENT APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

No. 2022-CA-0989-MR

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 9, 2023

APPEAL FROM METCALFE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JOHN T. ALEXANDER JUDGE ACTION NO. 17-CR-00051

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Dupree

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron, Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

OPINION

ECKERLE, JUDGE:

David Anthony Vincent ("Vincent") appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a warrantless search and seizure. Because we hold that the initial seizure was supported by at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and the subsequent search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm the Trial Court's order denying the motion.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a traffic stop and a subsequent vehicular search resulting in the discovery of substantial quantities of drugs. It began on June 18, 2017, with a phone call to Officer David Robertson, who was on patrol with the Edmonton Police Department. The call emanated from a person ("Informant") whom Officer Robertson knew by name and with whom he had previously interacted while attending to Informant's domestic issues. Informant was acquainted with drug use as her husband used methamphetamine and, unrelated to this case, perished by suicide after the instant events occurred.

On the date in question, Informant called Officer Robertson directly and stated that there were two people "acting strangely and odd" inside the local Five Star store. Informant believed the male was acting "nervous" and "fidgety" inside the store, and Informant "thought he was on something." Informant told Officer Robertson that when the couple went outside, the female "climbed up on the bumper" and was jumping up and down. "Maybe they were on something" or they were "maybe high," Informant told Officer Robertson. Informant did not state that she personally knew either the male or the female. Informant told Officer Robertson that the couple was getting into a big car at the end of the pumps.

Officer Robertson arrived soon thereafter and stopped in the parking lot of the Chinese restaurant across the street from the Five Star. He did not see anyone outside of a vehicle, but he did notice what appeared to be two people in a car at the end of the pumps. He noticed some of the front-facing lights were red, which he had heard violated a newly passed law.^[1] As he would later discover, it was not at that time unlawful to have such lights; instead, a new law prohibiting such lights in certain circumstances had in fact been passed, but did not go into effect for another 11 days. When the car exited the station, he followed it for approximately one quarter mile. He did not observe any erratic driving or suspicious behavior. Officer Robertson then pulled the car over for the supposed traffic violation, intending on giving the occupants a warning for the red lights.

Following the stop, Officer Robertson asked for identification and discovered Vincent's license was suspended. His female passenger, Erica Johnson ("Johnson"), had an active warrant in Indiana. Officer Robertson arrested Vincent and Johnson and asked if there was anything illegal in the car. Johnson indicated that in her purse she had needles from a needle exchange in Jefferson County, and Vincent stated that there were one and a half pills of Lortab under or beside the driver's seat. Having secured Vincent and Johnson in cruisers, Officer Robertson proceeded to search the vehicle for the Lortab.

While in the vehicle, Officer Robertson smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle's console. After searching the console, Officer Robertson found a pipe with marijuana. He also found a small baggie of a white crystalline substance under the driver's seat. Officer Robertson then searched the remainder of the vehicle and found a baseball-sized bag of more than 55 grams of methamphetamine in the trunk. Officer Robertson stated that Vincent admitted the bag in the trunk was his.

Officer Robertson did not charge Vincent with driving under the influence. Vincent was later indicted for: one count of trafficking in a controlled substance, first degree (methamphetamine), more than two grams, first offense (KRS^[2] 218A.1412); one count of drug paraphernalia - buy/possess (KRS 218A.500(2)); one count of prescription controlled substance not in a proper container, first offense (KRS 218A.210); one count of possession of marijuana (KRS 218A.1422); one count of operating on a suspended or revoked operator's license (KRS 186.620); and one count of improper equipment (KRS 189.020).

Vincent moved to suppress the evidence Officer Robertson found during his search of the vehicle as fruits of an illegal search and seizure.

Following an evidentiary hearing at which Officer Robertson was the only witness, the Trial Court denied the motion to suppress, making alternative conclusions that Officer Robertson's mistake of law regarding the red lights on the car was reasonable and justified the traffic stop, or the information received from Informant constituted a reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop. The Trial Court also found the vehicular search was lawful pursuant to the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.

Vincent then entered a conditional plea to the first five charges, with the sixth being dismissed, and received an agreed, total, five-year sentence of imprisonment. Vincent was finally sentenced accordingly on July 15, 2022. He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. The Trial Court's order is discussed in more detail below.

ANALYSIS

A warrantless stop for a suspected violation of a traffic law may implicate the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S.Ct 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-59, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405-08, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)); Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Ky. 2013). Indeed, all traffic stops, even those with limited purposes and brief detentions, are considered seizures of the driver. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The touchstone of the search and seizure analysis is reasonableness from an objective standard, as the subjective motivations of the officer in effectuating a stop for a traffic violation are not relevant. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (citing United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999), and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). When the stop is for a traffic violation, the seizure is reasonable if the officer "'has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d at 258). Such probable cause arises when an officer witnesses a person commit a traffic violation. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d at 258.

Additionally, for investigatory purposes, when an officer stops a person or detains him beyond the time necessary to accomplish the purpose for a traffic stop, that seizure is reasonable if the officer's observations lead to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d at 259 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

The reasonable suspicion analysis is a lesser standard than probable cause and requires only "'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped' of breaking the law." Heien, 574 U.S. at 60, 135 S.Ct. at 536 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-88, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014)).

Appellate review of a motion to suppress involves a two-step analysis: first, we review the Trial Court's factual findings under the clear error standard, where findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence; and, second, we conduct a de novo review the application of the law to the facts. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015).

Here, the Trial Court's factual findings are interwoven with its legal conclusions rather than stated separately. Regarding the facts underlying the initial seizure, Vincent does not claim the Trial Court's Order contains any erroneous factual findings. We have reviewed the Order in total and find that the factual findings align with those presented above in our summary. Thus, the factual findings are conclusive for our review, and we proceed to a de novo review of the two justifications for the seizure.

I. The mistake of law was objectively reasonable and supported the traffic stop.

The Trial Court first concluded under the probable cause analysis that the traffic stop was not unreasonable because it was based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law. There is no disagreement that Officer Robertson witnessed the front of the car and saw red lights. Furthermore, it is without reasonable dispute that Officer Robertson made a mistake of law when effectuating the traffic stop, as the traffic law requiring white or amber front-facing lights was just shy of becoming effective. Indeed, the 2017 Kentucky General Assembly amended KRS 189.040 with House Bill 74, adding subsection 14, which prohibits, in certain circumstances front-facing vehicular lights that are not white or amber in color. The Governor signed the Bill on March 21, 2017. ...