Vitale v. Kowal, 27469.

923 A.2d 778

101 Conn.App. 691

Frederick VITALE, Administrator (Estate of Trevor B. Vitale), v. Steven KOWAL et al.

No. 27469.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 12, 2007.

Decided June 12, 2007.

Norman J. Voog, Ridgefield, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

John M. Rowan, Fairfield, for the appellee (defendant Kevin Gonzalez).

FLYNN, C.J.

The plaintiff, Frederick Vitale, on his own behalf and as administrator of the estate of Trevor Vitale, his deceased son,¹ appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Kevin Gonzalez² in this action for monetary damages, which the plaintiff claims were incurred as a result of Trevor Vitale's losing control of and crashing his automobile, tragically resulting in his death, after allegedly consuming alcohol with the defendant and Steven Kowal. The claims against the defendant sound in negligence and recklessness. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant after concluding that the defendant owed no legal duty to Trevor Vitale. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court, viewing the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the defendant, set forth the following facts. "The [plaintiff's] claim for damages arises out of an automobile accident which . . . occurred in the early morning hours, on September 5, 2000, on Interstate Route 84 in Southington. On that date, the plaintiff's decedent, Trevor Vitale, while intoxicated, allegedly lost control of the automobile he was operating, ran off the highway, crashed and was killed. The accident occurred a short time after Trevor Vitale, who was nineteen years old, and . . . Steven Kowal and the defendant had been drinking beer in a dormitory room at Central Connecticut State University (Central)."

The court further found: "Steven Kowal, age nineteen, and Trevor Vitale, age nineteen, were close friends, having attended and graduated from high school together. [The defendant], age twenty, was also a friend of Trevor Vitale and Steven Kowal. Steven Kowal and [the defendant] were to be roommates at Central for the year commencing in September, 2000. [The defendant], who was a freshman, had moved into the room before Steven Kowal. On September 4, 2000, during the afternoon, Steven Kowal arrived at the room with his father, Michael Kowal. The Kowals moved Steven Kowal's belongings into the room. One of the items was a small refrigerator owned by Steven Kowal. There was no alcohol in the room at that time. Michael Kowal left the room in the late afternoon and did not return. Shortly after his father left, Steven Kowal went down to his car and removed a thirty can package of beer from the trunk, which beer he had purchased previously. Michael Kowal did not know that Steven Kowal had the beer in his trunk. Steven Kowal then carried the beer up to his room and put it in his refrigerator. Steven Kowal and [the defendant] began to drink the beer that was in the refrigerator. Trevor Vitale, having been invited previously by Steven Kowal, arrived at the room during the evening. [The defendant] did not invite Trevor Vitale to the room, nor did he know that Steven Kowal had invited him. Thereafter, all three drank the beer that was in the refrigerator. Steven Kowal and [the defendant] did not assist Trevor Vitale in removing any beer from the refrigerator and did not physically hand over any beer to Trevor Vitale. When any one of the three wished to have another beer, he would get up and remove it from the refrigerator. The only beer in the room was the beer purchased by Steven Kowal. Central had a rule prohibiting alcohol from being in the dormitory where Steven Kowal and [the defendant] were living. Trevor Vitale became intoxicated as a result of drinking the beer that was in the refrigerator. Trevor Vitale left the room close to midnight and, while driving his car on Interstate Route 84, ran off the road as a result of his intoxication and was killed."

In considering the merits of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, the court held: "[T]he evidence before the court is that [the defendant] did not invite Trevor Vitale to the room and did not know that Steven Kowal had invited him, that he did not own the beer or the refrigerator, that he did not purchase or bring any alcohol into the dormitory room, that he did not put the beer in the refrigerator, that he did not serve or give any beer to Trevor Vitale, and there is no evidence that he actively encouraged Trevor Vitale to drink the beer. [The defendant] was not the social host on that occasion. Under the facts presented, [the defendant] owed no legal duty, as claimed by the plaintiff in the fifth and sixth counts, to Trevor Vitale, and cannot be held liable for the damages claimed in the revised complaint." On this basis, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment after concluding that the defendant owed no legal duty to Trevor Vitale. The plaintiff argues that there were issues of material fact in dispute and that this case was inappropriate for summary judgment. He argues that although the court found that the plaintiff had provided no evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant had provided any alcohol to the decedent, such a factual determination should have been left for the jury. Additionally, as to the court's determination that the defendant owed no legal duty to the decedent, the plaintiff argues that, even if the defendant did not provide alcohol to Trevor Vitale, because the dormitory room, at least in part, was under the control of the defendant and the defendant actively participated in the evening events, he did owe a legal duty to the decedent as a social host. We conclude that, on the basis of the state of the law as it existed in 2000, the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.³

"The law governing summary judgment and the accompanying standard of review are well settled. Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case. . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. . . .

"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden, the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . .

"It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 17-45 and 17-46, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [T]ypically, [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred. . . . Moreover, [t]o establish the existence of a material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing summary judgment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue. . . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief. . . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .

"An important exception exists, however, to the general rule that a party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition, and that exception has been articulated in our jurisprudence with less frequency than has the general rule. On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment, the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint. . . . It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial. . . . Accordingly, [w]hen documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn. App. 221, 227-30, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006). On appeal, our review of the court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary. Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).

The plaintiff's claims against the defendant sounded in negligence and recklessness. More specifically, the plaintiff alleged in count five of the complaint that the defendant negligently and carelessly provided alcohol and a safe place to consume alcohol to Trevor Vitale, which ultimately resulted in his untimely death after he lost control of his automobile. In count six, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided a safe place for Trevor Vitale to consume alcohol, participated in drinking activities with Trevor...