Vontz v. Winger

1

NICHOLAS VONTZ, Plaintiff, v. J. WINGER et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-378

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 22, 2023

OPINION

Sally J. Berens United States Magistrate Judge

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1 PageID12.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims. Because those are the only claims raised against Defendant Winger, Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Winger will be dismissed. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Nuttall and Fiero relating to those Defendants labeling Plaintiff as a “rat” remain in the case.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan, during January of 2023. Plaintiff sues LRF Assistant Deputy Warden J. Winger and LRF Corrections Officers Kyle Nuttall and Juan Fiero.

Plaintiff alleges that he has assisted many other inmates in pursuing civil complaints against MDOC personnel, including Defendants. On January 15, 2023, Defendant Nuttall called Plaintiff to the officers' station and asked whether Plaintiff had assisted Prisoner Dukuly in the preparation of a lawsuit against Nuttall. Plaintiff replied that he had.

Later that day, upon returning to his cell, Plaintiff discovered legal papers he was preparing for other inmates were spread out on his bunk. The documents included papers complaining about misconduct of each of the Defendants. Plaintiff theorizes that Defendant Fiero had conducted the search.

Three days later, Plaintiff was subjected to a strip search. He claims that Fiero informed Plaintiff that Fiero was going to “make [Plaintiff's] life a living hell.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff was then placed into the day room while Defendants Nuttall and Fiero conducted a cell search. When Plaintiff returned to his cell, he discovered that documents were mixed up and covers of his books were damaged.

On January 22, 2023, another inmate approached Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that there was a “hit” on Plaintiff with a payoff of $3,000.00. The purported reason for the hit was that Plaintiff had been giving information to the officers. Plaintiff does not say who offered the payoff and does not identify the other inmate.

The next day Plaintiff was working in the day room. Another inmate entered the day room and assaulted Plaintiff. Plaintiff restrained his attacker in a choke hold. Plaintiff claims that unidentified officers within 20 feet took no action while Plaintiff held the attacker. Eventually- after four minutes according to Plaintiff-officers took Plaintiff to segregation. Plaintiff was moved from that unit.

On January 25, 2023, while Plaintiff waited in chow line, an unidentified corrections officer announced clearly and loudly that Plaintiff was a rat. That night, Plaintiff was told he was being transferred, and an unidentified inmate informed Plaintiff that Defendants Nuttall and Fiero were telling other inmates that Plaintiff was a “rat.”

Plaintiff was transferred to URF.

Plaintiff contends that Nuttall and Fiero violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment when they endangered him by labeling him a “rat.” Plaintiff contends that Nuttall and Fiero labeled him as a “rat” and messed up his legal papers and damaged his books in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Further, Plaintiff claims that Nuttall and Fiero must have shared with Winger that Plaintiff was helping another inmate with a lawsuit against Winger and, for that reason, Winger arranged for Plaintiff's transfer to URF in retaliation.

Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief and an injunction compelling Plaintiff's transfer to a facility near his home.

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting...