Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson

1

2024 Vt Super 111802

Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Dale Johnson et al.

No. 22-CV-04227

Superior Court of Vermont, Environmental Division

November 18, 2024

DECISION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Samuel Hoar, Jr. Superior Court Judge

Plaintiff Vermont Mutual Insurance Company (VMIC) seeks a declaration of rights concerning its obligations to defend and indemnify Defendant Dale Johnson against a tort claim brought by Defendant Ashley Stone. In the underlying tort suit, Ms Stone claims that while she was driving on Vermont Route 118 Mr. Johnson negligently operated his 1975 Ford Utility Tractor, causing a collision that injured her. Mr. Johnson and his wife have both auto and homeowners insurance with VMIC. While the parties agree in their motion papers that the auto policy provides no coverage, they disagree on coverage under the homeowners policy. They have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on this question.

This is the rare coverage case in which the court need not concern itself with the rules of policy interpretation. Instead, all agree that the coverage question here depends entirely on whether Vermont law required that Mr. Johnson's tractor be registered prior to any operation on the highway. That question, in turn, depends on whether the tractor qualifies as a "farm tractor" under 23 V.S.A. § 4(68) if it does, Mr. Johnson has insurance; if not, he doesn't.^[1] Thus, the question here is one of statutory construction.

The touchstone of statutory interpretation is legislative intent. To gauge this intent, we begin with an evaluation of the plain language of the statute. "If the intent of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the statute because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous we implement the statute according to that plain language." "As a corollary of this principle, we resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only if the plain language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous." If required to look beyond the plain language, "we must examine and consider fairly, not just isolated sentences or phrases, but the whole and every part of the statute, together with other statutes standing in pari materia with it, as parts of a unified statutory system."

Burnett v. Home Improvement Co. of Vermont, 2024 VT 41, ¶ 9. "That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context is well settled." Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 730, 732 (Md. 1986).

Vermont's motor vehicle registration statutes appear at 23 V.S.A. §§ 301-518. Generally applicable definitions appear at 23 V.S.A. § 4. Section 301(b) provides: "Residents . . . shall annually register motor vehicles owned or leased for a period of more than 30 days and operated by them, unless currently registered in Vermont." Subsection (e) further provides: "An individual shall not operate a motor vehicle nor draw a trailer or semi-trailer on any highway unless the vehicle is registered as provided in this chapter." "Farm tractors" are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle." See 23 V.S.A. § 4(21) (" 'Motor vehicle' includes all vehicles propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power, except farm tractors, vehicles running only upon stationary rails or tracks, motorized highway building equipment, road making appliances, snowmobiles, tracked vehicles, motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles, or electric personal assistive mobility devices." (emphasis added)). "Farm tractor" is expressly defined:

"Farm tractor" means a traveling power plant or a self-propelled device that functions as part of crop production, harvesting, feeding, or livestock management or is used for drawing a farm trailer as defined in subdivision (69) of this section. "Farm tractor" also means a self-propelled vehicle designed to perform single-purpose functions, such as land preparation, crop protection, or harvesting. The term "farm tractor" shall not include a "motor truck" as defined in subdivision (20) of this section.

23 V.S.A. § 4(68) (emphasis added). "Tractor" is separately defined to "include a motor vehicle designed or used primarily as a traveling power plant or for drawing other vehicles, and not so constructed as to carry any load other than a part of the weight of the vehicles and load so drawn, excepting, however, motorized highway building equipment." 23 V.S.A. § 4(39). Tractors other than farm tractors are subject to registration. See, e.g., 23 V.S.A. § 369. "Farm tractors," however, are not subject to registration. Section 370(a) expressly provides: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to registration fees for motor vehicles or trailers, farm tractors and farm trailers may be operated on the highway without being subject to a registration fee."

There is no dispute that Mr. Johnson's tractor is a "traveling power plant or a self-propelled device" for purposes of 23 V.S.A. § 4(68). The statutory question then would appear to be whether it "functions as part of crop production, harvesting, feeding, or livestock management." VMIC argues that § 4(68) contemplates a professional farmer conducting a fulltime commercial farming operation. VMIC argues that the definition of farmer at 32 V.S.A. § 3752(7) circumscribes the farming uses described in 23 V.S.A. § 4(68).

Mr. Johnson's uncontested affidavit and deposition testimony establish the character of his uses of the tractor. Mr. Johnson and his wife both have fulltime nonfarm employment. They are not professional farmers and they do not operate a commercial farming enterprise generating significant income. At their residence, Mr. Johnson uses the tractor to tend to a combined total of approximately 3,700 square feet of garden, to prune and harvest apples from 40-50 apple trees, and for activities necessary to the care and maintenance of 40 laying hens and 12 ducks, whose eggs the Johnsons sell to the public. Mr. Johnson also uses the tractor to haul firewood and for incidental home uses, such as plowing, grading, and earth moving. At the time of the collision, Mr. Johnson was towing a truck with "frozen" brakes across the street from his driveway, where he was going to attempt to unfreeze them.

The court begins, as it must, with the plain language of 23 V.S.A. § 4(68). The definition limits the concept of farm tractor by the uses to which the conveyance is put: "crop production, harvesting, feeding, or livestock management or is used for drawing a farm trailer." These are not statutorily defined expressions. "Words that are not defined within a statute are given their plain and ordinary meaning, which may be obtained by resorting to dictionary definitions." Franks v. Town of Essex, 2013 VT 84, ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 595. Yet one need not resort to a dictionary in this case. The undisputed uses to which Mr. Johnson puts his tractor plainly include the statutory uses at § 4(68). And nothing on the face of the statute says that those must be the sole uses to which the tractor is put, or that a tractor must be used only by a professional farmer conducting a substantial commercial farming operation.

Nothing in the related statutes appears to suggest any ambiguity here. VMIC points to the definition of "tractor"; it argues that "farm tractor" is a subset of "tractor," and there is some ambiguity related to distinguishing whether Mr. Johnson's is one or the other. "Tractor" is defined as "a motor vehicle designed or used primarily as a traveling power plant or for drawing other vehicles, and not so constructed as to carry any load other than a part of the weight of the vehicles and load so drawn, excepting, however, motorized highway building equipment." 23 V.S.A. § 4(39). Assuming without deciding that farm tractor is merely a subset of tractor, the question nevertheless necessarily turns to the uses to which the asserted farm tractor is put because that is the very distinction between the terms. Here it is clear that the tractor is put to statutory farm tractor uses.

VMIC argues that the definition of farm tractor in Title 23 is limited by the definition of farmer at 32 V.S.A. § 3752(7). No doubt the legislature could have done that, but it did not. Nor is there any other basis for construing these provisions together. Section 3752 is part of the property tax statutes that apply in the context of Vermont's Agricultural Land and Managed Forestland Use Value Appraisal Program. 32 V.S.A. §§ 3750-3776. Statutes are construed together when they are in pari materia. "Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they deal with the same subject matter or have the same objective or purpose." Bd. of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Libr., Inc. v. Lab. Rels. Bd., 162 Vt. 571, 574 (1994); see also In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 346 (1972) ("Statutes in pari materia are to be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system."). The definition of farmer at 32 V.S.A. § 3752(7) has no bearing on the meaning of farm tractor at 23 V.S.A. § 4(68). If the legislature wanted to connect the concepts, it knew how to do so. Cf. 23 V.S.A. § 4(70) (incorporating the definition of farmer at 32 V.S.A. § 3752(7) into the definition of "agricultural custom service vehicle").

To the extent that § 4(68) depends on the broadly stated but undefined uses to which the conveyance is put without including other obvious limits on its breadth, it no doubt operates as an expansive registration exemption. Breadth alone, however, does not demonstrate ambiguity or absurdity. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ("As we have said before, the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It...