VTS Transp., Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty.

239 F.Supp.3d 1350

VTS TRANSPORTATION, INC., a Florida corporation, d/b/a North County Transportation, Gasolinera, Inc., a Florida corporation d/b/a Apollo Transportation Services, Boyce Trans, Inc., a Florida corporation d/b/a A1A Airport and Limousine Service, All Transit Solutions, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, d/b/a Metro Premier Car Service and Prestige Limousines, Inc., a Florida corporation, Plaintiffs,

v.PALM BEACH COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant.

CASE NO: 9:15–CV–80560–ROSENBERG/BRANNON

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed March 8, 2017

Filed March 9, 2017

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Douglas Fredric Eaton, Eaton & Wolk, P.L., One Biscayne Tower, 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3100, Miami, FL 33131, Robert Todd Slatoff, Frank Weinberg & Black, 1875 NW Corporate Boulevard, Suite 100, Boca Raton, FL 33431, Constantina Alexandrou Mirabile, Frank, Weinberg & Black, P.L., 1800 N. Military Trail, Suite 170, Boca Raton, FL 33431, Randy Rosenblum, Freidin & Dobrinsky PA, 2 S Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3100, Miami, FL 33131

FOR THE DEFENDANT: Andrew Marcus Pelino, Palm Beach County Attorney's Office Litigation Division, 300 N Dixie Highway, Suite 359, West Palm Beach, FL 33401, Rachel Marie Fahey, Palm Beach County Attorney's Office, 300 N Dixie Hwy, Suite 359, West Palm Beach, FL 33401

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, DE 350, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, DE 333. Plaintiffs have filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, DE 359, to which Defendant has filed a Reply, DE 369. Defendant has, likewise, filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, DE 361, to which Plaintiffs have filed a Reply, DE 372. Having considered these filings and the argument heard on December 6, 2016, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This suit was filed against Defendant Palm Beach County over its decision to enter into a Temporary Operating Agreement ("TOA") with Raiser, LLC ("Raiser), which is a subsidiary of Uber Technologies, Inc. ("Uber"). DE 1. The TOA was a temporary agreement allowing Raiser to operate in Palm Beach County without complying with the ordinance governing vehicle-for-hire services ("old VFH Ordinance"). Id. Plaintiffs, three vehicle-for-hire ("VFH") companies operating in the County, challenged the TOA under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the requirements imposed under the TOA were less onerous than those imposed under the old VFH Ordinance. Id. The case is now before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[T]he [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the Court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami , 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). The substance of the relevant law dictates whether a fact is material. Id. And a genuine issue of material fact exists only if a reasonable jury could, in view of the evidence, return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. "The principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file cross-motions ..." T–Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville, Fla. , 564 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008). When presented with cross-motions, "the [C]ourt must determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

a. The Reasoning In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture Does Not Compel Summary Judgment For Defendant .

Defendant makes the threshold argument that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable class of one claim, citing to Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture , 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008).¹ In Engquist , the Supreme Court held that the class of one theory was inapplicable to decisions made by the government in its role as employer. Id. at 606, 128 S.Ct. 2146. Defendant's argument seizes on dicta suggesting that the class of one theory is similarly inapplicable to other "forms of state action ... which by their nature involve discretionary decision making based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments." Id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146. The class of one theory, the Supreme Court reasoned, would be a poor fit for such cases. It stated: "[T]he rule that ‘people should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions' is not violated when one person is treated differently than others, because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted." Id.

Defendants urge the Court to apply Engquist 's reasoning outside of the public employment context and to hold that because Plaintiffs' claim "is premised entirely on the County's discretionary decision on how to enforce its laws," the class of one theory is unavailable. DE 350 at 14. The Court declines to do so. The Court has located only one published decision in which the Eleventh Circuit has applied Engquist 's reasoning outside of the public employment context: Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc. , 541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).² In Douglas the Eleventh Circuit held that the reasoning in Engquist was equally applicable to the government-employee relationship and to the analogous government-contractor relationship. Id. at 1274. The Eleventh Circuit had "little trouble" so concluding given the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of "obvious" similarities between the government-employee relationship and the government-contractor relationship in deciding whether an independent contractor may bring a retaliation claim under § 1983 when a government entity has acted against the contractor's exercise of free speech. Id. (citing Bd. of Cty Commissioners v. Umbehr , 518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996) ).

There is no similarly obvious connection between Engquist and the facts of the instant case. Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in Engquist , there is a "crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, and the government acting as proprietor, to manage its internal operations." Engquist , 553 U.S. at 598, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (citations, quotations and brackets omitted). Here, Defendant—a government entity—was making a decision as to how Raiser ought to be regulated, an exercise of its power as lawmaker. The Court, therefore, declines to hold that the class of one theory is unavailable to Plaintiffs. Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment in light of Engquist.

b. Defendant Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause Claim .

The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. A class of one equal protection claim does not allege discrimination against a protected class or on the basis that a fundamental right was infringed. See Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty Public Transp. Comm'n , 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). To prevail on a class of one equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must show that they were treated differently from other similarly situated individuals absent a rational basis for the differential treatment. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1263–1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment both because the parties are not similarly situated and because there was a rational basis for the TOA's enactment. Plaintiffs' cross-motion argues, conversely, that the parties are similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for the TOA's enactment. The Court's holding that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment is grounded solely on the conclusion that Defendant has presented a rational basis for the TOA. The Court need not address whether the parties are similarly situated.

i. The Existence Of A Rational Basis For The TOA .

"When legislation classifies persons in such a way that they receive different treatment under the law, the degree of scrutiny the court applies depends on the basis for the classification." Gary v. City of Warner Robins, Ga. , 311 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).³ If a law treats individuals differently on the basis of a suspect classification or impinges on a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies. Leib , 558 F.3d at 1306. Otherwise, the law need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. Because Plaintiffs allege neither membership in a suspect class nor violation of a fundamental right, their claim is subject to rational basis review.

The rational-basis standard requires only that the challenged classification be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose. Haves v. City of Miami , 52 F.3d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1995). The inquiry has two steps. Id. First, the Court must identify a legitimate government purpose that the enacting body could have been pursuing. Id. Second, the Court must question the existence of a rational basis for the belief that the challenged enactment would further that legitimate government purpose. Id. The challenged enactment will fail rational basis review only if the Court cannot identify a potential legitimate government purpose or if the relationship between that purpose and the challenged enactment is so attenuated as to be ...