Vuyanich v. Borough

TIMOTHY E. VUYANICH et al., Plaintiffs, v. SMITHON BOROUGH et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-1342 WSS

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

January 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Timothy E. Vuyanich and Carol L. Vuyanich brought this action asserting claims against several Defendants, public and private, relating to the involuntary clean-up of vehicles and other personal property from their land. (ECF No. 1). The Court previously considered motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Smithton Borough and South Huntingdon Township (“Defendant municipalities”) and, on April 1 2020, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the entire case with prejudice due to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (ECF Nos. 47 and 48). All of the other Defendants' motions-including that filed by Defendant Jarvis Auto and Truck Salvage (“Jarvis Salvage”)-were dismissed as moot. (Id.) Plaintiffs appealed and, on July 27, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded bolding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to bar Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF Nos. 54 and 55). On August 28, 2021, the Court reopened the case. (ECF No. 55).

Jarvis Salvage filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6), arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs' claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail because it is not a state actor and no plausible constitutional violations were asserted against it; and, (2) the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state tort claims. (ECF No. 60). The Court agrees. It will grant Jarvis Salvage's motion and dismiss the §1983 claims lodged against it in Counts II and III. Further, it will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Jarvis Salvage, Counts V and VI, and they will be dismissed without prejudice as well as the claim for punitive damages against Jarvis Salvage contained in Count VII.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Timothy E. Vuyanich (“Tim”) and his mother, Plaintiff Carol L. Vuyanich (“Carol”), reside at 303 Third Street, Smithton, Pennsylvania 15479 (“the property”). (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-2). The property intersects with the territory of two different municipalities in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania: South Huntingdon Township (“South Huntingdon”) and Smithton Borough (“Smithton”). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12, 22). Both municipalities are entitled to enforce local ordinances as to the property. (Id. ¶ 28).

On July 17, 2018, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the District Attorney's Office for Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, brought seven criminal charges against Tim for abandoning vehicles and garbage on his property in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6504, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3712, and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6502. (Id. ¶ 36). See Docket at 2, Commonwealth v. Vuyanich, CP-65-CR-0003869-2018 (Ct. Com. Pls., Westmoreland Cnty., Pa. Mar. 5, 2020).

On June 18, 2019, the Honorable Christopher A. Feliciani of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County held a status conference on Tim's criminal case. (ECF No. 1-14). Tim was present and represented by Westmoreland County Public Defender Alan Manderino. (Id.). The case was continued in the hope that Tim would cooperate in the cleanup of his property and that the case might be dismissed. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 76; ECF No. 1-14). Judge Feliciani ordered that Tim had twenty days to remove personal items from the abandoned vehicles on the property or any other property he wanted to retain before the Borough would begin the cleanup process. (Id.). Judge Felicity stated:

They've been trying to get it cleaned up for months, if not longer. So I'm thinking 20 days. You guys hold off for 20 days. Whatever he needs to get out of his vehicles, he needs to do within the next 20 days. Otherwise on day 21, the borough is going to be authorized to go in and start removing vehicles, or whatever else is on the property.

The defendant is granted 20 days from today's date to remove any personal items that he wants from the vehicles on his property or any other property that he wants to retain. After 20 days expires, the borough will be authorized to go in and start the clean up [sic] process.

(ECF No. 1-14, pp. 5-6) (emphasis added). The written order issued by Judge Feliciani stated in pertinent part, “Def. has 20 days to remove his personal items from property.” (ECF No. 1-15).

On or about July 9, 2019, after the twenty-day period set forth in Judge Feliciani's order expired, the cleanup process commenced. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 91). Smithton Police Department (“SPD”) Chief Michael R. Natale (“Natale”), SPD Patrolman Ralph D. Marsico Jr. (“Marsico”), and South Huntingdon Supervisors Eddie Troup (“Troup”), Matthew Jennewine (“Jennewine”), and Richard Gates (“Gates”) entered Plaintiffs' property between July 9, 2019 and September 27, 2019, to begin clearing the land. To aid in the cleanup, Smithton hired Dale H. Cooper, a contractor, to help remove abandoned vehicles and clear other materials from the land. (Id. ¶¶ 4152). Cooper, in turn, contracted with Jarvis Salvage, a tow truck operating subcontractor to assist in the cleanup. (Id. ¶ 103). Jarvis Salvage towed Chevrolet vans and an Oldsmobile sedan from the property. (Id. ¶¶ 105-106).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3dCir. 1993). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009); see also DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2008). Although this Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true, it is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if the complaint's well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not entitle a plaintiff to relief. Id. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Jarvis Salvage moves to dismiss the federal claims raised against it in Counts II and III, the state claims against it in Counts V and VI, and the claim for punitive damages raised against it at Count VII. As to the federal claims, Jarvis Salvage asserts that it cannot be liable under § 1983 because it is not a state actor. In the alternative, it argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plead plausible constitutional violations. As to the state law claims, because the claims under § 1983 fail, Jarvis Salvage urges the Court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. (ECF No. 62).

A. Plaintiffs cannot maintain their claims against Jarvis Salvage under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Jarvis Salvage is not a state actor AND WAS NOT ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAW.

“Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].'” Halsey v. Pieiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he suffered “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and that “the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). § 1983 applies to the conduct of state actors. In general, it does not apply to the conduct of private parties. However, a private party may incur liability under § 1983 if it was acting under the color of state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).

“Although a private person may cause a deprivation of [a constitutional] right, he may be subjected to liability under § 1983 only when he does so under color of law.” Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted). In Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001), the Supreme Court held that “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” (citation omitted). The inquiry into whether a...