Vuyanich v. Borough

TIMOTHY E. VUYANICH et al., Plaintiffs, v. SMITHON BOROUGH et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-1342 WSS

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

April 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Timothy E. Vuyanich and Carol L. Vuyanich brought this action asserting claims against several Defendants, public and private, relating to the involuntary clean-up of vehicles and other personal property from their land. (ECF No. 1). The Court previously considered motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Smithton Borough and South Huntingdon Township (“Defendant municipalities”) and, on April 1 2020, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the entire case with prejudice due to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (ECF Nos. 47 and 48). All of the other Defendants' motions-including a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant Harry F. Thompson's Garage (“Thompson's Garage”)-were dismissed as moot, (Id.). Plaintiffs appealed and, on July 27, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to bar Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF Nos. 54 and 55). On August 28, 2021, the Court reopened the case. (ECF No. 55).

Defendant Jarvis Auto and Truck Salvage (“Jarvis Salvage”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 60). On January 24, 2022, the Court granted the motion and dismissed the § 1983 claims lodged against Jarvis Salvage at Counts II and III. The Court chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Jarvis Salvage at Counts V and VI and it dismissed those claims without prejudice, and it also dismissed the claim for punitive damages against Jarvis Salvage contained in Count VIL (ECF Nos. 70 and 71). The dismissal at Counts II and III was without prejudice to amend to the extent that Plaintiffs could plead additional facts that would plausibly bring Jarvis Salvage's conduct into the definition of state action outlined in Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). An amended complaint was not filed, and Jarvis Salvage was terminated as a party in this matter on February 15, 2022. Discovery has commenced, and it is set to close on November 23, 2022. (ECF No. 84).

Thompson's Garage filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and a supporting brief. (ECF Nos. 73 and 74). Briefing is complete and the motion is ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion. (ECF No. 72).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Timothy E. Vuyanich (“Tim”) and his mother, Plaintiff Carol L. Vuyanich (“Carol”), reside at 303 Third Street, Smithton, Pennsylvania 15479 (“the property”). (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-2). The property intersects with the territory of two different municipalities in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania: South Huntingdon Township (“South Huntingdon”) and Smithton Borough (“Smithton”). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12, 22). Both municipalities are entitled to enforce local ordinances as to the property. (Id. ¶ 28).

On July 17, 2018, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the District Attorney's Office for Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, brought seven criminal charges against Tim for abandoning vehicles and garbage on his property in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6504, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3712, and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6502. (Id. ¶ 36). See Docket at 2, Commonwealth v. Vuyanich, CP-65-CR-0003869-2018 (Ct. Com. Pls., Westmoreland Cnty., Pa. Mar. 5, 2020).

On June 18, 2019, the Honorable Christopher A. Feliciani of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County held a status conference on Tim's criminal case. (ECF No. 1-14). Tim was present and represented by Westmoreland County Public Defender Alan Manderino. (Id.). The case was continued in the hope that Tim would cooperate in the cleanup of his property and that the case might be dismissed. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 76; ECF No. 1-14). Judge Feliciani ordered that Tim had twenty days to remove personal items from the abandoned vehicles on the property or any other property he wanted to retain before the Borough would begin the cleanup process. (Id.) Judge Feliciani stated:

They've been trying to get it cleaned up for months, if not longer. So I'm thinking 20 days. You guys hold off for 20 days. Whatever he needs to get out of his vehicles, he needs to do within the next 20 days. Otherwise on day 21, the borough is going to be authorized to go in and start removing vehicles, or whatever else is on the property.

The defendant is granted 20 days from today's date to remove any personal items that he wants from the vehicles on his property or any other property that he wants to retain. After 20 days expires, the borough will be authorized to go in and start the clean up [sic] process.

(ECF No. 1-14, pp. 5-6) (emphasis added). The written order issued by Judge Feliciani stated in pertinent part, “Def. has 20 days to remove his personal items from property.” (ECF No. 1-15).

On or about July 9, 2019, after the twenty-day period set forth in Judge Feliciani's order expired, the cleanup process commenced. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 91). Smithton Police Department (“SPD”) Chief Michael R. Natale (“Natale”), SPD Patrolman Ralph D. Marsico Jr. (“Marsico”), and South Huntingdon Supervisors Eddie Troup (“Troup”), Matthew Jennewine (“Jennewine”), and Richard Gates (“Gates”) entered Plaintiffs' property between July 9, 2019 and September 27, 2019, to begin clearing the land. To aid in the cleanup, Smithton hired Dale H. Cooper, a contractor, to help remove abandoned vehicles and clear other materials from the land. (Id. ¶¶ 41 -52). Cooper, in turn, contracted with Thompson's Garage, a tow truck operating subcontractor, to assist in the cleanup. (Id. ¶ 99). Thompson's Garage towed a 1997 Oldsmobile Silhouette from the property. (Id. ¶ 99). It charged Plaintiffs $150.00 for towing, which Plaintiffs paid. When told by Thompson's Garage that they would be charged a $55.00 daily storage fee, Plaintiffs gave the Oldsmobile to Thompson's Garage because they wanted to avoid the fee and did not want it to be towed again if they brought it back to their property or the adjacent public road. (Id. ¶¶ 100-01).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (“Rule 12(c)”), once the pleadings are closed, but within such time as to not delay trial, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. A party may use a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as a vehicle for raising several of the defenses enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (“Rule 12b”). Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). The standard of review is identical to that of a motion to dismiss under Rulel2(b)(6).^[1] Turbe-, see also Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). The only difference is that, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court reviews not only the complaint, but also the answer and written instruments attached to the pleadings. Iseley v. Talaber, No. 5-cv-444, 2008 WL 906508, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008) (citation omitted). The court should consider the allegations in the pleadings, the exhibits attached thereto, matters of public record, and “undisputedly authentic” documents if a plaintiffs claims are based on such documents. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 256 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (providing that a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment). However, because a Rule 12(c) “motion calls for an assessment of the merits of the case at an embryonic stage, the court must view the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom” in the nonmonvant's favor. R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).

When a Rule 12(c) motion is not used to raise Rule 12(b) defenses, judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is not appropriate “‘unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huis Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Kruzits v. Okuma Machine Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1994)). Motions under Rule 12(c), that are not used to raise certain 12(b) defenses, require a determination on the merits of the case and “should be granted only where it is clear that the merits of the controversy can be fairly and fully decided in such a summary manner.” In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F.Supp.2d 357, 358 (W.D. Pa. 2006).

III. ANALYSIS

Thompson's Garage seeks judgment on the pleadings as to the federal claims raised against it in Counts II and III, the state claims against it in Counts V and VI, and the claim for punitive damages raised against it at Count VIL As to the federal claims, Thompson's Garage asserts that it cannot be liable under § 1983 because it is not a state actor. In the alternative, it argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plead plausible constitutional violations. Thompson's Garage urges the Court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. (ECF No. 74). At this juncture, the Court can make the determination that Plaintiffs claims at Counts II and III are precluded as a matter of law based upon the pleadings alone. They will be...