Waddy v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi. & Acad. for Urban Sch. Leadership

WENDI WADDY, DENISE HAYES, THORNELL HUNTER,CAROLYN KELLY, SHIRLEY SMITH, MARGARET STORY,and MARY STACK Plaintiffs, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGOand ACADEMY FOR URBAN SCHOOL LEADERSHIP, Defendants.

Case No. 10 C 6158

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

ENTER: July 24, 2014

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Thornell Hunter ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, alleges race and age discrimination against the Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("the Board") and the Academy for Urban School Leadership ("AUSL"). Plaintiff brings his various claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Board and AUSL now move for summary judgment against Plaintiff. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendants' favor on all of Plaintiff's claims.

Local Rule 56.1

In the Northern District of Illinois, motions for summary judgment are governed by Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law," consisting of numbered paragraphs andreferencing affidavits and other materials relied upon for factual support. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3). Local Rule 56.1 also requires a party opposing summary judgment to file "a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statements, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). The opposing party's response must also contain "a statement . . . of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C).

"The obligation set forth in Local Rule 56.1 is not a mere formality. Rather, it follows from the obligation imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) on the party opposing summary judgment to identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, when a nonmovant fails to abide by Local Rule 56.1, all material facts set forth in the moving party's statement are deemed admitted. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We have consistently held that a failure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission."). A litigant is obligated to comply with Local Rule 56.1 even if proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001); Gray v. Cannon, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1162, 1164-66 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

In January 2014, pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, the Board and AUSL each filed and served a separate "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment" to inform Plaintiff of his obligation to comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Local Rule 56.2. Plaintiff,however, has failed to so comply. His response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment fails to address the numbered paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statements and also fails to reference any materials supporting any facts Plaintiff may dispute. See Pl.'s Resp. Mot. 2-9. Thus, all material facts set forth in Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statements and supported by the record are deemed admitted for purposes of this motion.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Thornell Hunter is African American and was sixty-seven years old at the time this lawsuit was filed.¹ Board's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 1. Plaintiff was employed by the Board at the Charles S. Deneen Elementary School of Excellence ("Deneen"), where he worked as a security guard and coached basketball, football, and chess. AUSL's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 6.

As of February 2010, Deneen had been on probation for three consecutive years as a result of its substandard academic performance. Board's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 9-10. Under the Illinois School Code, a school on probation that "fail[s] to make adequate progress in correcting deficiencies [is] subject to the following actions by the general superintendent with the approval of the board, after opportunity for a hearing: . . . (4) Reconstitution of the attendance center and replacement and reassignment by the general superintendent of all employees of the attendance center. . . . [and] (5.5) Operating an attendance center as a contract turnaround school." 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/34-8.3(d).

On February 24, 2010, following a public hearing and a recommendation from an independent hearing officer, the Board approved Deneen for reconstitution. AUSL's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 8-10. As part of the reconstitution or "turnaround" process, all Deneenemployees, including Plaintiff, were discharged from their positions and replaced with new employees. Id. ¶ 11. In March 2010, the Board and AUSL agreed that AUSL would provide school turnaround services to Deneen. Id. ¶ 12. These turnaround services included assistance with recruitment and selection of the new employees. Id. ¶ 13.

Following the reconstitution and his consequent termination, Plaintiff tried to apply online for reappointment to his former position at Deneen. Board's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 23. But, because another Deneen employee assisting him with the application told him that the website reported the position as filled, Plaintiff did not submit an application and made no further attempts to apply, despite the availability of other application opportunities. Id.; AUSL's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 14-19, 21-22. Plaintiff does not know who was ultimately hired to fill the position he formerly held at Deneen. Board's LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 19.

On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that his termination by the Board was an act of discrimination based on race and age.² Id. ¶ 3; 3d Am. Compl., Ex. D. In December 2010, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 40.

Plaintiff now brings race-based disparate treatment claims against the Board and AUSL under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his discharge from Deneen and Defendants' failure to subsequently rehire him were discriminatory. Id. ¶¶ 94, 108, 140, 147, 173, 196. He similarly alleges age-based disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"). Id. ¶¶ 157, 182. Additionally, Plaintiff brings a disparate impact claim against the Board under Title VII, alleging that the process of reconstituting or "turning around" public schools disproportionately affects African American employees by targeting schools in low-income neighborhoods. Id. ¶ 127.

Discussion

A court must grant summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party, then no such genuine dispute exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the movant has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant bears the burden of setting forth specific facts demonstrating that there are disputed material facts that must be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In setting forth such specific facts, the nonmovant is required to "go beyond the pleadings" and support his contentions with documentary evidence. Id. at 324.

Because Plaintiff did not comply with Local Rule 56.1, the facts set forth in Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statements are deemed admitted, and hence, no genuine issue of material fact exists between the parties. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Smith, 321 F.3d at 683. Moreover,because Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims.

I. Disparate Treatment Claims

Plaintiff brings various claims for race- and age-based disparate treatment against the Board and AUSL under Title VII, the ADEA, § 1981, and § 1983. 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94, 108, 140, 147, 157, 173, 182, 196. In cases involving claims of disparate treatment in an employment action, the plaintiff must either produce direct evidence of discrimination or use the indirect, "burden-shifting" method to prove his claims. See Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 269 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 2001). Under the burden-shifting method, the plaintiff must first establish his prima facie case of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Naficy v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing a race-based disparate treatment claim under Title VII). If the plaintiff can establish his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, then the plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment only if he can produce evidence that defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 512. This analytical framework applies to disparate treatment claims regardless of whether they are brought under Title VII, the ADEA, § 1981, or § 1983. See Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2010) (addressing an age-based disparate treatment claim under the ADEA); McGowan v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d 575, 579 (7th...