Waggett v. MRS BPO, LLC

620 F.Supp.3d 156

Jennifer WAGGETT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MRS BPO, LLC, Defendant.

1:22-cv-01151-NLH-EAP

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

Signed August 11, 2022

JOSEPH K. JONES, JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC, 375 PASSAIC AVENUE, SUITE 100, FAIRFIELD, NJ 07004, Attorneys for Plaintiff JENNIFER WAGGETT.

MONICA M. LITTMAN, RICHARD J. PERR, KAUFMAN DOLOWICH VOLUCK LLP, FOUR PENN CENTER, 1600 JOHN F. KENNEDY BOULEVARD, SUITE 1030, PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103, Attorneys for Defendant MRS BPO, LLC.

OPINION

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant MRS BPO, LLC ("MRS BPO" or "Defendant") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) ("Rule 12(c)"). (ECF No. 15). Jennifer Waggett ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion. (See ECF No. 18). The Court has considered the parties' written submissions and decides this motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The instant matter arises out of Plaintiff's civil action for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). At a date prior to January 13, 2022,¹ Plaintiff incurred a financial obligation to non-party GM Financial in connection with a sale or lease of a motor vehicle ("the debt"). (ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 18). Additionally, on or before January 13, 2022, GM Financial referred the debt to MRS BPO for collection. (Id. at 6, ¶ 26). At the time of GM Financial's referral of the debt to MRS BPO, the debt was in default and had been in default since August 2017. (Id. at ¶ 27-28). The statute of limitations for legal action to collect the debt expired as of August 2021.² (Id. at ¶ 33).

On or around January 13, 2022, Defendant sent a letter in connection with collection of the debt to Plaintiff ("the letter"). (Id. at ¶ 30). Upon receipt of the letter, Plaintiff read it in its entirety. (Id. at ¶ 34). The letter provided the following information:

Dear JENNIFER WAGGETT,

We recognize that a possible hardship or pitfall may have prevented you from satisfying your obligation. We are presenting three options to resolve your balance. We are not obligated to renew this offer.

Option 1: A monthly payment plan on the full balance of the account.

Option 2: You pay $1,897.20 in ONE PAYMENT to be received in this office on or before 01/29/2022.

Option 3: You make TWO PAYMENTS of $1,198.23 each. The first payment to be received in this office on or before 01/29/2022 and the second payment on or before 02/24/2022.

Payment may be made by calling 800-949-3249, mailing to the above address or by using our online payment website at . . . . When you call please let our representative know that you have received the GM FINANCIAL Option Letter.

Sincerely,

MRS BPO, LLC

(ECF No. 1 at 13 of 14, Ex. A) (website address omitted).

The letter also states "GM FINANCIAL" as the "CREDITOR" and states an "ACCOUNT BALANCE" in the amount of $4,992.61 and that "[t]ax time is a great time to put issues like this behind you. Consider using any possible tax refund you may receive to satisfy your outstanding obligation." (Id.). At the bottom of the page, the letter states: "This is an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose. This communication is from a debt collector." (Id.).

B. Procedural History

On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against Defendant with this Court, alleging violations of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading representations in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), namely § 1692(e)(2)(A), § 1692(e)(5), and § 1692(e)(10) when Defendant sent Plaintiff the letter that offered payment options for a time-barred debt. (Id. at 9, ¶¶ 54-56). On April 11, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 6).

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed on June 3, 2022. (ECF No. 15). On June 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 18). On July 11, 2022, Defendant filed a reply brief in support of its motion. (ECF No. 22). Thus, the matter is now ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), asserting that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law because the letter did not use language that could lead Plaintiff into thinking that the debt could be legally enforced, when in fact it was time-barred.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

B. Legal Standard of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial. F. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Turbe v. Gov't of V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). Under Rule 12(c), the movant must clearly establish that "no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, a court applies the same legal standards as applicable to a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) provides that a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may also be made by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428. Consequently, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v. Davidson, 666 Fed. Appx. 143, 146 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Warren Gen Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps: (1) the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) (alterations, quotations, and other citations omitted).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks " 'not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.' " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ."); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Iqbal . . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for the 'no set of facts' standard that applied to federal complaints before Twombly."). "A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

A court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must only consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice. S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). A court may consider, however, "an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, and the court does not exclude those matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

C. Analysis

a. FDCPA Standards

The FDCPA provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors. Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 400 (3d Cir. 2000)). To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a...