Wagner v. N. Berks Reg'l Police Dep't, 5:17-cv-3786

JONATHAN WAGNER, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN BERKS REGIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT;LEESPORT BOROUGH; MAIDENCREEK TOWNSHIP; ONTELAUNEE TOWNSHIP; andPOLICE OFFICER RICHARD B. HORNER, Defendants.

No. 5:17-cv-3786

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 10, 2018

OPINION

Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8—Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Wagner filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania common law against Defendants Richard B. Horner, a police officer, and Horner's employers, Northern Berks Regional Police Department, Leesport Borough, Maidencreek Township and/or Ontelaunee Township (Municipal Defendants). Wagner alleges that Horner maliciously prosecuted him by filing a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause for charges which were later barred from prosecution by double jeopardy and compulsory joinder and seeks to hold the Municipal Defendants accountable for Horner's actions. The Amended Complaint alleges three counts: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Wagner's Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution against Horner; (2) a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to Pennsylvania law against Horner; and (3) a Monell claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Municipal Defendants. See id. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss ¶ 19, ECF No. 8. This Court grants Defendants' Motion and dismisses the Amended Complaint because Horner had probable cause to arrest Wagner and is entitled to qualified immunity. Because Wagner's claims against Horner fail, this Court dismisses Wagner's Monell claim against the Municipal Defendants as well.

II. BACKGROUND

The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. In January 2013, Horner observed Wagner and an accomplice, Ellis Garman, taking packages from a porch. See Amended Complaint ¶ 12, ECF No. 7. Horner arrested Wagner and charged him with one count of Theft by Unlawful Taking, one count of Receiving Stolen Property, and two counts of Conspiracy. See id.; see also 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), 903(a)(1). The subsequent investigation concluded in February 2013 and revealed nineteen packages in a van owned by Garman. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. On March 26, 2013, Wagner pled guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property. See id.

In January 2014, Horner filed a second criminal complaint against Wagner for twelve counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking, twelve counts of Receiving Stolen Property and twenty-four counts of Criminal Conspiracy stemming from the same incident in January 2013. See id. ¶ 18, Ex. A.; see also 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), 903(a)(1). In support of the criminal complaint, Horner signed an affidavit of probable cause (Affidavit) stating that probable cause for the arrest was based on the nineteen packages found in the van and a confession from Garman taken on May 8, 2013. See id. ¶¶ 19-21, Ex. A. The Affidavit does not mention the disposition of the original prosecution. See id. Ex. A. Wagner was arrested and subsequently incarcerated for six months. See id. ¶ 22. In September 2015, Wagner's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. § 110(1)(ii), which bars subsequent prosecution for "any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution . . . ." 18 Pa. C.S. § 110(1)(ii); see Am. Compl. ¶ 25, Ex. C. The Honorable Stephen B. Lieberman of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and discharging Wagner. See Am. Compl. ¶ 25, Ex. C. Horner was at all material times employed by the Municipal Defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶ 6.

The Amended Complaint asserts that: (1) the evidence that Horner relied upon for the Affidavit was based "exclusively on information obtained during the 2013 arrest;" (2) Horner was "on notice" that he could not initiate subsequent criminal proceedings charging Wagner; and (3) Horner initiated the criminal proceedings with knowledge that the charges were brought in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 109-10. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29, 40.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if "the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense"). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Count One of the Amended Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-36. Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under the color of law, deprives another of his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both (1) "a deprivation of a federally protected right" and (2) that the "deprivation was committed by one acting under color of state law." Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). Wagner alleges that Horner violated his constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-36. Count Two alleges a Pennsylvania common law claim of malicious prosecution. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-44. Count Three alleges a Monell claim against the Municipal Defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-51.

A. Malicious Prosecution under Pennsylvania Law and § 1983

To prove malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show that "the defendant . . . instituted proceedings against the plaintiff . . . without probable cause, . . . with malice, and . . . the proceedings must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff." Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 951 (Pa. 1988). Malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a constitutional violation in addition to the elements of the common law tort. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1998), as amended (Dec. 7, 1998). To prove malicious prosecution on a Fourth Amendment theory under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). A claim of malicious prosecution fails if the plaintiff cannot satisfy every element. See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff failed to establish every element which was fatal to the claim).

B. Wagner has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution because Horner had probable cause to initiate proceedings against him.

This Court does not address whether Horner initiated a criminal proceeding against Wagner¹ and whether a dismissal on the basis of double jeopardy satisfies the favorable termination element, because Horner had probable cause to arrest Wagner at the beginning of his second criminal case; therefore, Wagner cannot prevail on his federal or state malicious prosecution claims. See Trunzo v. Mayer, 658 F. App'x 654, 657 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that a malicious prosecution claim cannot succeed as a matter of law if probable cause existed); Toribio v. Spece, 558 F. App'x 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendants on malicious prosecution claim where there was "ample probable cause" for plaintiff's arrest).

In a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving want of probable cause. See Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 371 Pa. 308, 314 (1952) (citing Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa. 87 (1946)). The Supreme Court's definition of probable cause requires that under "the-totality-of-the-circumstances" there is a "fair probability" that the accused committed the offense. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Accordingly, the Third Circuit finds probable cause when "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). Pennsylvania courts similarly state that "[p]robable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion...