Waholek v. Pa. Parole Bd., Civil Action No. 20-1894

ANDREW J. WAHOLEK, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD; and MARK CABONEY Hearing Examiner, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-1894

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 22, 2021

District Judge Robert J. Colville

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF Nos. 5 and 10

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Andrew J. Waholek ("Plaintiff") alleges in his complaint that he was denied parole unlawfully by Defendants the Pennsylvania Parole Board and Mark Caboney ("Defendants"). He seeks monetary damages, release, and other injunctive relief. ECF No. 10. For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that the claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the complaint be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. It is further recommended that, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to raise claims under state tort law, they be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate. It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 5, be denied.

II. REPORT

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer ("SCI-Mercer") in Mercer, Pennsylvania. The Clerk's Office received Plaintiff's complaint along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") on December 7, 2020. See ECF Nos. 1 and 2.

This case initially was assigned to Chief Magistrate Judge Cynthia Eddy. Based on the relief sought by Plaintiff in the complaint -i.e., release from custody - Plaintiff was ordered to clarify whether his intention was to proceed with a civil rights lawsuit or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 4. On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff responded by confirming that he intended to pursue a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 6 at 2.

This case was transferred to the undersigned on January 5, 2021. After the deficiencies with Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP were addressed, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 5, 2021. ECF No. 9.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, at various hearings throughout 2020, Defendants recommended denial of parole to Plaintiff, and denied parole to Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff's alleged entitlement to status under the Pennsylvania Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive ("RRRI") statute. ECF No 10 at 2-6; see also 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4506. Plaintiff asserts that this denial of parole violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ECF No. 10 at 2. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants, as well as an injunction against Defendant Pennsylvania Parole Board to release Plaintiff on parole. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also seeks a court order that Defendant Caboney undergo 120 hours of unpaid training. Id. Along with his complaint, Plaintiff submitted a brief in which he argues that he has a vested interest in release under state law unless evidence of his risk is established by the Pennsylvania Parole Board. ECF No. 11 at 1.

While his motion to proceed IFP was pending, Plaintiff also filed what the undersigned interprets to be a motion for preliminary injunction, in which he seeks an order compellingDefendant Pennsylvania Parole Board to follow the RRRI statute, 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4501-12. If Plaintiff is not granted parole for some reason, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant Pennsylvania Parole Board to show cause. ECF No. 5.

B. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 F. App'x 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

C. Analysis

1. Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court determined that civil rights law was not meant to provide a means for collaterally challenging the validity of a conviction through the pursuit of money damages. In so concluding, the Supreme Court announced the following rule:

[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 486-87.

In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks release from confinement, compensation for allegedly unlawful confinement, and an injunction forcing Defendant Caboney to undergo training due tohis allegedly unlawful recommendation not to grant parole to Plaintiff. ECF No. 10 at 2-7. As such, regardless of the form of the relief that Plaintiff seeks, his claims necessarily implicate the validity of his confinement. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[f]ew things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than the allegedly improper denial of parole."). See also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006); Cibula v. Fox, 2013 WL 3871637, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2013), aff'd, 570 F. App'x. 129 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts the position that he is entitled to parole for his existing sentence because he has achieved RRRI status under Pennsylvania law.¹ ECF No. 10 at 3-4. Because Plaintiff's federal claims necessarily call into question the validity of his sentence and continued detention, they are barred by the doctrine of Heck, and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

"It is well-settled that when a state prisoner is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action[,]" no matter what type of relief he is seeking. Williams, 453 F.3d at 177; cf. Kloss v. SCI-Albion, No. 15-cv-282, 2017 WL 2790648 *5 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2017) (claim for RRRI reinstatement sounds in habeas corpus because it affects the duration of confinement, not the conditions thereof). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge his confinement, he must do so through a habeas petition.

2. Claims under state law

It is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff attempts to raise state-law tort claims against Defendants. ECF No. 10 at 7 (asserting damages due to "loss of wages" and "negligence.") To the extent that any such claims are raised, and out of an abundance of caution, it is respectfully recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (supplemental jurisdiction may be declined if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."). Plaintiff's claims under state law, to the extent that they exist, should be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.

3. Leave to amend

Given the futility of any amendment, dismissal of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims should be with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal should not be made with prejudice with respect to plaintiff's right to raise a separately filed habeas corpus claim, to the extent that relief under habeas remains available to him, or to the refiling of his potential state law claims in state court.

4. Preliminary injunction

Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 5, should be denied. "[T]he grant of injunctive relief is an 'extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.'" AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: "'(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that grantingpreliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.'" Ball v. Beard, 396 F. App'x 826, 827 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp, 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). "In order to support a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show both a likelihood of success on the merits and a probability of irreparable harm." Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quote and citation omitted).

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Accordingly, his motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 5, should be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, it respectfully is recommended that Plaintiff's claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

It further is recommended that, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to raise claims under state tort law, they be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.

It further is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 5, be denied.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges...