Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon

87 F.4th 383

Fredrick WAID, appointed co-special administrator of the Estate of Robert Anderson Jr.;Jennifer Anderson, as co-special administrator of the Estate of Robert Anderson Jr.;Jennifer Anderson, individually; M. R. A., a minor, through parent and guardian Jennifer Anderson;S. G. A., a minor, through parent and guardian Jennifer Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LYON; Timothy Wright; Brett Willey, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15382

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022 Pasadena, California

Filed November 21, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00435-LRH-CSD

Dale K. Galipo (argued) and Eric Valenzuela, Law Offices of Dale K. Galipo, Woodland Hills, California; Peter Goldstein, Law Offices of Peter Goldstein, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Katherine F. Parks (argued) and Christine R. Hotchkin, Thorndal Armstrong PC, Reno, Nevada, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Ryan D. Nelson, and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Berzon

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson's estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the § 1983 claims. We affirm.

I

The events leading to Anderson's death began with a 911 call. The caller—who did not request emergency medical care or report any weapons—sought help with a domestic violence incident. Officers Wright and Willey responded, and both wore body cameras that recorded the encounter with Anderson.

Once they arrived at Anderson's home, Wright knocked on the door and announced himself. The Andersons' two minor children, both distressed, exited the house and spoke to Wright in the front yard. They told Wright that their parents were fighting and that their mother needed an ambulance. Wright called for medics. The Andersons' son stated that there were no weapons in the house other than a BB gun.

Wright walked back to the front door, leaving the children behind. Willey joined Wright on the porch in front of the door. Wright recounted what the children had told him and explained that Anderson was "throwing [Jennifer Anderson] around." The officers then entered the home, with Wright entering first and again announcing himself. Willey, directly behind Wright, drew his weapon and pointed it forward as he entered.

As the officers entered the kitchen, Anderson, out of view, shouted, "Fuck you, punks." Willey, with his gun still drawn, moved past Wright toward a hallway to the left of the kitchen, saw Anderson at the other end of the hallway, and told him to get on the ground. Wright, now behind Willey, also drew and pointed his gun in front of him.

Anderson ignored the commands and ran down the short hallway toward the officers. Willey fired three shots in quick succession at Anderson as Anderson crossed the threshold between the short hallway and the kitchen. Wright fired his weapon twice. Anderson fell to the ground and began to bleed from his chest as Willey continued to shout at him, "Get on the ground!" Willey reported the shots and that the suspect was down. Anderson, who had been shot five times, died from his injuries.

Plaintiffs sued the officers for (1) violating the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force; (2) violating the Fourth Amendment through denying medical care; and (3) violating the Fourteenth Amendment through unwarranted state interference with the familial relationship between Anderson and his wife and children. They also brought three state-law claims against the officers and the County. The district court granted qualified immunity to defendants on all constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appeal only the grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the officers.

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and "entitle[ment] to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In qualified immunity cases, as in other cases, 'we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.' " Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014)).

III

Qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). It protects government officials "unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time.' " District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)). We may address either prong first, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-42, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), and "may exercise our discretion to resolve a case only on the second ground when no clearly established law shows that the officers' conduct was unconstitutional," O'Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2021).

A

As to plaintiffs' excessive-force claim, we find the clearly established prong dispositive. A right is clearly established when it is "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). The Supreme Court "do[es] not require a case directly on point"; it requires "existing precedent" to "place[ ] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. "Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that 'it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.' " Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (alteration omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

Cases "cast at a high level of generality" are unlikely to establish rights with the requisite specificity. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam). While a case addressing general principles may clearly establish a right "in an obvious case," id., such obvious cases are "rare," Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64, 138 S.Ct. 577. Instead, a clearly established right usually requires "controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority." Id. at 63, 138 S.Ct. 577 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741-42, 131 S.Ct. 2074). Plaintiffs must either explain why their case is obvious under existing general principles or, more commonly, show specific cases that control or reflect a consensus of non-binding authorities in similar situations. See Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2023) (plaintiff bears the burden to show that a right is clearly established).

Plaintiffs argue that granting qualified immunity was improper because genuine disputes of material fact remain, including whether Anderson was reaching for the officers' weapons when he was shot. While we cannot resolve genuine factual disputes at summary judgment, we can nonetheless evaluate an assertion of qualified immunity "by assuming that the version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving party is correct." Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000)).

We first conclude that the facts do not show an obvious violation of Anderson's constitutional rights, even when viewed in plaintiffs' favor.

Those few cases in which courts have found obvious constitutional violations are instructive. In one case, Hope, a prison inmate, was chained to a "hitching post" for seven hours as punishment, during which he was forced to be shirtless in the hot sun, given water only "once or twice," and provided no bathroom breaks. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-35, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Although the Supreme Court found that controlling circuit authority clearly established the Eighth Amendment violation, it noted that "[a]rguably, the violation was so obvious that [the Court's] Eighth Amendment cases gave respondents fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution." Id. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508. The Court explained that "[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should have provided respondents with some notice that their alleged conduct violated Hope's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 745, 122 S.Ct. 2508.

We have noted that "this obviousness principle, an exception to the specific-case requirement, is especially problematic in the Fourth-Amendment context." Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 912 (9th Cir. 2017). This is so because a categorical statement that conduct obviously violates the Fourth Amendment "is particularly...