Waisanen v. Superior Twp.

305 Mich.App. 719

854 N.W.2d 213

WAISANEN

v.SUPERIOR TOWNSHIP.

Docket No. 311200.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 13, 2014, at Marquette.

Decided June 24, 2014, at 9:10 a.m.

Moher & Cannello, PC, Sault Ste. Marie (by Steven J. Cannello ), for plaintiff.

Bauckham, Sparks, Lohrstorfer, Thall & Seeber, PC, Kalamazoo (by John K. Lohrstorfer ), for defendant.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ.

Opinion

BOONSTRA, J.

In this action to quiet title, defendant appeals as of right the order of the circuit court, entered following a bench trial, quieting title in plaintiff's¹ favor. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1971, Kenneth Waisanen purchased property in the Jordan Beach subdivision. The parcel abuts First Street, a lake-access roadway dedicated to public use. At the time Waisanen purchased the property, it contained a break wall. In 1981, Waisanen constructed an addition to his home on the property. In 2008, defendant conducted a survey of lake-access roadways in the subdivision. According to the 2008 survey and unbeknownst to Waisanen, the break wall encroached approximately 10 feet onto First Street, and the addition encroached approximately 3 feet onto First Street. Following the survey, plaintiff filed an action to quiet title to the portion of First Street that included Waisanen's break wall and addition. Defendant counterclaimed for possession of that same portion of First Street. The circuit court granted plaintiff's request to quiet title in his favor, finding that plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had acquired title through acquiescence. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred with respect to both theories.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo actions to quiet title, Sackett v. Atyeo, 217 Mich.App. 676, 680, 552 N.W.2d 536 (1996), as well as a trial court's conclusions of law following a bench trial, Walters v. Snyder, 239 Mich.App. 453, 456, 608 N.W.2d 97 (2000). We review for clear error a trial court's findings of fact during a bench trial. Walters, 239 Mich.App. at 456, 608 N.W.2d 97.

Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review de novo. Mason v. City of Menominee, 282 Mich.App. 525, 527–528, 766 N.W.2d 888 (2009).

III. APPLICABILITY OF MCL 600.5821(2)

As a threshold matter, resolution of defendant's appeal requires that we determine whether MCL 600.5821(2) bars a party's claims when, as here, the plaintiff has brought a claim to quiet title and the defendant municipality has counterclaimed for possession of the property. We conclude that it does not.

MCL 600.5821 provides in relevant part as follows:

(1) Actions for the recovery of any land where the state is a party are not subject to the periods of limitations, or laches. However, a person who could have asserted claim to title by adverse possession for more than 15 years is entitled to seek any other equitable relief in an action to determine title to the land.

(2) Actions brought by any municipal corporations for the recovery of the possession of any public highway, street, alley, or any other public ground are not subject to the periods of limitations.

It is undisputed that defendant is a “municipal corporation.” See MCL 41.2 ; Smith v. Scio Twp., 173 Mich.App. 381, 388, 433 N.W.2d 855 (1988). Therefore it is the applicability of MCL 600.5821(2) that is at issue here.

In considering this question, it is useful to review three prior decisions of this Court, although none is dispositive of the precise issue presented in this case. In Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Canton Charter Twp., 269 Mich.App. 365, 711 N.W.2d 391 (2006), this Court considered the plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the defendant township on the grounds that MCL 600.5821(2) barred the plaintiff's claim for adverse possession. The plaintiff had brought suit for adverse possession of township property on which it had placed billboards; the defendant raised MCL 600.5821(2) as an affirmative defense. Id. at 367, 711 N.W.2d 391. It does not appear that the defendant township filed a counterclaim.

Notably, Canton Charter Twp. did not consider the threshold issue of whether MCL 600.5821(2) applies in the first instance when a municipality is a defendant in an action brought by a plaintiff for adverse possession. Although that was the circumstance presented in that case, the Court instead noted that it was “undisputed that MCL 600.5821(2) precludes a party from claiming adverse possession against a municipal corporation” and stated that the “sole issue” before it was whether the disputed property qualified as “public ground” within the meaning of that term in the statutory subsection. Id. at 370, 711 N.W.2d 391. The Court then adopted a broad definition of “public ground” as referring to “ ‘publicly owned property open to the public for common use’....” Id. at 375, 711 N.W.2d 391 (citation omitted). On that basis, the Court affirmed the trial court's award of summary disposition to the defendant township on the plaintiff's adverse possession claim.

In Mason, 282 Mich.App. 525, 766 N.W.2d 888, this Court considered a municipal defendant's appeal of an order of the trial court quieting title to a disputed parcel of real property in favor of the plaintiffs on the basis of acquiescence. The plaintiffs had brought an action to quiet title to the property. Id. at 526, 766 N.W.2d 888. It does not appear that the defendant municipality raised a counterclaim; instead, the defendant raised the defense that MCL 600.5821(2) shielded it from claims to property based on the theory of acquiescence. Id. at 527, 766 N.W.2d 888. This Court disagreed, stating:

While subsection 1 [of MCL 600.5821 ] applies to “[a]ctions for the recovery of any land where the state is a party,” subsection 2 applies to “[a]ctions brought by any municipal corporations....” It is evident from the language employed in subsection 1 that the Legislature could have made subsection 2 applicable in all cases brought by or against a municipality. The Legislature, however, chose not to do so. Further, interpreting subsection 2 to apply to any case in which a municipality is a party would render the words “brought by” in subsection 2 nugatory. Finally, an acquiescence claim involves a limitations period. Kipka v. Fountain, 198 Mich.App. 435, 438–439, 499 N.W.2d 363 (1993). The term “periods of limitations” in MCL 600.5821(2) renders that provision applicable to claims asserting acquiescence for the statutory period. Thus, because the language of MCL 600.5821(2) prevents a private landowner from acquiring property from a municipality by acquiescence only if the municipality brings an action to recover the property, it does not preclude plaintiffs' claim. [Id. at 528–529, 766 N.W.2d 888 (second and third alterations in original).]

In a concurring opinion in Mason, Judge Beckering noted that this interpretation of MCL 600.5821(2) carried the potential, perhaps unrecognized by the Legislature, for “inconsistent outcomes, depending on which party beats the other to the courthouse, given [the Legislature's] chosen language in MCL 600.5821(2).” Id. at 533, 766 N.W.2d 888 (Beckering, J., concurring). Nonetheless, she concluded that “the plain language of the statute does not apply in situations where the municipal corporation did not bring the action, which is the present case.” Id. at 534, 766 N.W.2d 888. Judge Beckering noted that “[a]t first blush, this Court's opinion in [Canton Charter Twp. ] appears to conflict with the idea that MCL 600.5821(2) applies only to actions brought by a municipality,” but the parties in Canton Charter Twp. had not “raise[d] the issue that [was] before” the Court in Mason and the Court remained “bound to interpret the plain language set forth by the Legislature in MCL 600.5821(2).” Id. at 536–537, 766 N.W.2d 888. Judge Beckering declined to address any distinctions between adverse possession and acquiescence given the inapplicability of MCL 600.5821 (2). Id. at 536 n. 1, 766 N.W.2d 888.

Finally, in Beach v. Lima Twp., 283 Mich.App. 504, 770 N.W.2d 386 (2009), aff'd 489 Mich. 99, 802 N.W.2d 1 (2011), this Court considered a defendant township's appeal of the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the plaintiffs on the basis that the plaintiffs had acquired title to the disputed property by adverse possession. The plaintiffs had brought an action to quiet title, to which the defendant had counterclaimed, also to quiet title. Id. at 507, 770 N.W.2d 386. This Court noted both Canton Charter Twp. and Mason in considering the defendant's claim that MCL 600.5821(2) rendered it immune to the plaintiff's adverse possession claim, but ultimately concluded that the property at issue was not “public grounds” and that MCL 600.5821(2) was therefore inapplicable. Id. at 523, 770 N.W.2d 386.

Neither Canton Charter Twp. nor Mason nor Beach is on all fours with the instant case. In all three of those cases, as here, the municipality was named as a defendant. However, whereas the instant case presents both adverse possession and acquiescence theories, Canton Charter Twp. and Beach presented adverse possession theories only, while Mason presented only a claim of acquiescence. Further, while the municipal defendant in Beach filed a counterclaim, as did defendant in this case, the municipal defendants in Canton Charter Twp. and Mason did not.

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly relied on Beach, since the sole and dispositive issue in that case was whether the property at issue was “public grounds.” On that point, we agree with defendant; Beach simply did not decide the issue that is before us, i.e., whether MCL 600.5821(2) applies in the first instance, regardless of whether property is public grounds, when the municipality is a defendant to a claim for adverse possession or acquiescence and has filed a counterclaim for...