Walden v. Gen. Elec. Int'l

MICHAEL L. WALDEN PLAINTIFF v. GENERAL ELECTRIC INTERNATIONAL,INC. A/K/A GENERAL ELECTRIC A/K/A GE AVIATIONAnd COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:19-CV-00159-JHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY OWENSBORO DIVISION

April 6, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant General Electric's (GE) and Communication Workers of America's (CWA) Motion to Dismiss. [DN 7, DN 8]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, GE's motion is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. CWA's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Walden works at a GE facility, where he is a member of the CWA union. [DN 1 ¶¶ 9-10]. CWA has a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) with GE that governs Walden's employment. [Id. at ¶ 14]. At 63 years old, Walden applied for a promotion to the Tool and Die Maker position. [Id. at ¶ 11]. Walden alleges that he passed a test that he was required to take for the position. [Id. at ¶ 13]. He further alleges that the CBA requires that Walden be promoted, as the most senior applicant who was qualified, to receive the position. [Id. at ¶ 14]. Walden, however, was not promoted. [Id. at ¶ 15]. He alleges that, instead, a younger candidate with less seniority was promoted. [Id.]. Walden sued GE and CWA alleging age discrimination, hostile work environment, and a violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). [DN 1].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), a court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs," League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), "accept all well-pled factual allegations as true," id., and determine whether the "complaint . . . states a plausible claim for relief," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Under this standard, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for its entitlement to relief, which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when it "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls short if it pleads facts "merely consistent with a defendant's liability" or if the alleged facts do not "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. Instead, "a complaint must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 677 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

GE makes three arguments: (1) § 301 of the LMRA preempts Walden's state age discrimination claim, (2) Walden failed to sufficiently plead his § 301 claim, and (3) Walden failed to sufficiently plead his federal age discrimination claim. [DN 7-1 at 1-2, DN 15 at 3-4]. CWA argues that Walden failed to sufficiently plead that it violated its duty of fair representation. [DN 8-1 at 2]. The Court will consider each of these arguments.

A. Documents Outside the Pleadings

The Court must first determine whether to consider the items that GE relies on outside the Complaint. If "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court" when ruling upon a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules require that "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). This Rule does not require the Court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment every time the Court reviews documents that are not attached to the complaint. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999). "[W]hen a document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim . . . [,] the defendant may submit an authentic copy [of the document] to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss, and the court's consideration of the document does not require conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment." Id. (quotation omitted); see Stein v. HHGREGG, Inc., 873 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2017) ("[A] court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.").

GE attached the EEOC Charge of Discrimination to its motion. [DN 7-2]. The EEOC Charge is referred to in the Complaint and is central to claims regarding discrimination in the Complaint. [DN 1 ¶ 3]; see Schultz v. Hydro-Gear Ltd., No. 5:12-CV-10, 2012 WL 3527068, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2012) (holding that a plaintiff's charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC is a "public record[] which may be considered by the Court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss"). Thus, the EEOC Charge will be considered by the Court.

GE also attached to its Reply an exhibit from its position statement submitted to the EEOC. [DN 15-1]. The document itself does not appear to be connected to an EEOC file. The documenthas no date on it, no score, and does not indicate what a passing score is. [Id.]. Furthermore, the exhibit was not attached until GE submitted its reply. As a result, Walden has not had a chance to respond to the document. The Court will not consider the exhibit attached to GE's Reply. As such, the Court declines to convert the motion to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. Section 301 of the LMRA

Section 301 of the LMRA authorizes district courts to hear "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by [CBAs], and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a [CBA]." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (internal citation omitted).

1. Preemption

GE argues that § 301 of the LMRA preempts Walden's Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) age discrimination claim. [DN 15 at 3-4]. To determine whether a plaintiff's claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, the Sixth Circuit uses a two-step test:

First, courts must determine whether resolving the state-law claim would require interpretation of the terms of the [labor contract]. If so, the claim is preempted. Second, courts must ascertain whether the rights claimed by the plaintiff were created by the [labor contract], or instead by state law. If the rights were created by the [labor contract], the claim is preempted. In short, if a state-law claim fails either of these two requirements, it is preempted by § 301.

Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

In the first step, "[i]f the plaintiff can prove all of the elements of his claim without the necessity of contract interpretation, then his claim is independent of the labor agreement." DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "[N]either a tangential relationship to the CBA, nor the defendant's assertion of the contract as an affirmative defense will turn an otherwise independent claim into a claim dependent on the labor contract." Id.

Beginning with the first step of the test, to determine whether Walden's KCRA claim requires interpretation of the CBA, the Court must look to the elements of age discrimination under Kentucky law. "Claims brought under the KCRA are 'analyzed in the same manner'" as claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may prove his claim through direct or circumstantial evidence. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Walden appears to allege age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. [See DN 1]. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, Walden must show that: "(1) [he] is a member of the protected class; (2) [he] applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3) [he] was considered for and was denied the promotion; and (4) other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions at the time the plaintiff's request for promotion was denied." Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 812-13 (citations omitted).

Here, to determine whether Walden was qualified for the position that he applied for, the CBA would need to be interpreted. Indeed, Walden alleges that "the CWA's [CBA] with [GE] provided that [he], as the most senior applicant with the minimum qualifying criteria, was required to receive the promotion." [DN 1 ¶ 14]. He also says, "[GE] breached the [CBA] with CWA by not promoting [him] to the position of Tool and Die Maker in December 2018 or anytimethereafter." [Id. at ¶ 18]. Walden's claim "is not merely one in which he asserts that [GE] violated his rights under the statute," his allegation requires examining the CBA because he alleges that per the CBA he was required to receive the...