Waldo v. District of Columbia

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Delores Waldo brings five claims-a survival action, wrongful death, negligence, and two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims-against the District of Columbia on behalf of her deceased brother, James Anthony, who committed suicide while detained by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff's opposition to the motion included a proposed amended complaint, which this court ordered stricken from the record, as Plaintiff had not sought leave of the court to amend her complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff properly filed a motion for leave to amend, adding new information and a John Doe MPD officer as a new defendant. She also filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, putting two motions before the court: Plaintiff's motion to dismiss and her motion for leave to amend the complaint. ECF Nos. 3, 9. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2017, MPD officers detained Plaintiff's brother, James Anthony. ECF No. 9-2, Proposed Am. Compl. at ¶ 7. Anthony suffered from mental illness, which was “noticeably” on display at the time of his arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. After he was transported to MPD's Second District Station and placed in a holding cell alone, Anthony continued to “clearly and persistently” show signs of mental distress, including suicidal ideation. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. Shortly thereafter, Anthony fashioned a noose from a bedsheet in his holding cell and hung himself. Id. at ¶ 14.

Plaintiff alleges that cells in the Second District Station are equipped with cameras, and “a Second District staff member” was responsible for monitoring detainees in their cells. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. On January 21, 2017, this responsibility fell to an unnamed Officer John Doe. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that at the time of Anthony's death, Officer John Doe was away from his post and Anthony, unmonitored, was able to commit suicide without intervention. Id. at ¶ 17.

Plaintiff also alleges that MPD personnel lacked sufficient training on mental health issues and suicide prevention, and that because of this lack of training, MPD personnel do not notice warning signs of suicidal ideation or obtain information from inmates that would help them identify suicidal ideation. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. She further alleges that MPD does not have sufficient suicide resistant cells in which to house inmates presenting suicidal ideations. Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff contends that this lack of training and deliberate indifference to mental health and suicide prevention is responsible for Anthony's death. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23.

Two of Plaintiff's claims-denial of medical care and denial of protection from harm (Counts III and IV)-are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants' failure to prevent

Anthony's death violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶¶ 35-44. Three-a survivor action, wrongful death, and negligence (Counts I, II, and V)-are brought under D.C. common law. Id. at ¶¶ 24-34, 45-48.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts should “freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Justice “so requires” that leave to amend be granted absent any one of several factors-unreasonable delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, failure to cure, prejudice, or futility of amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint make allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when “well-pleaded factual allegations” allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and “must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). When a defendant argues that the claims in an amended complaint would be futile, as Defendants do here, the court employs the same Rule 12(b)(6) analysis that governs a motion to dismiss. In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead actionable constitutional claims against the District in Counts III and IV of the proposed amended complaint, rendering the proposed

amendment futile. Specifically, Defendants argue that the additional allegations are “insufficient to support” Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

A plaintiff may only bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a municipality if they can show that a government policy or custom was the “moving force” behind an alleged constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Policies or customs may be specific, see Id. (city ordinance); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 629 (1980) (act of city council); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (high-level municipal policymaker decision), but also exist when a municipality fails to train employees in a manner that makes it highly foreseeable that constitutional violations will result. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1992).

A municipality may be liable for failure to train an employee when the likelihood of constitutional violation is so high and so obvious that policymakers “can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. A showing “that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action” demonstrates such deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Put simply, when a failure to train makes an employee's constitutional violations a plainly “obvious consequence” of their actions, municipalities have shown a deliberate indifference that makes them liable under Monell. Id.

There is no different, higher pleading standard for alleging a failure to train claim. While the D.C. Circuit recognizes that proving a failure to train claim is “no easy task, ” the difficulty lies in identifying a “close link between the alleged injury and the alleged deficiency in training.” Atchinson v. D.C., 73 F.3d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 391); see also

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 163-69 (1993) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard for Monell claims)). As a practical matter,...