Waldron v. State

Lane Walker Waldron, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee

NO. 03-17-00065-CR

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

February 1, 2018

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. CR2015-178, HONORABLE JACK H. ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lane Walker Waldron was charged with capital murder for "intentionally caus[ing] the death of . . . the female unborn child of [S.F.] while [the] unborn child was in gestation of . . . [S.F.], by striking or punching . . . [S.F.] in the abdomen with [his] hands or fists." See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(8) (providing that person commits offense of capital murder if he "murders an individual under 10 years of age"). At the end of the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial, the jury found Waldron guilty of the charged offense. Waldron's punishment was automatically assessed at life imprisonment. See id. § 12.31 (setting out mandatory punishments for individuals convicted of capital felonies). In ten issues on appeal, Waldron challenges the district court's judgment of conviction. We will affirm the district court's judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

As set out above, Waldron was charged with capital murder for the death of S.F.'s unborn daughter. According to the undisputed evidence presented at trial, Waldron and S.F. were romantically involved and were living together at the time of the offense, and S.F. was pregnant with Waldron's twin children. One of the twins was male, and the other was female. On the day after the offense is alleged to have occurred, S.F. went to the hospital seeking treatment for injuries that she sustained, and S.F. was told that both of her unborn children had died. The twins were between 27 and 28 weeks old at the time of their deaths. According to the testimony given by the doctor who performed an autopsy on the female twin, the cause of death was a "placental abruption resulting from maternal trauma." In other words, the placenta separated from "the wall of the uterus" due to "a significant force" being applied to S.F.

A few days after the death of the twins and on the day that Waldron was arrested, Detective Frank Cockrell questioned Waldron about the death of the twins. During the interview, Waldron indicated that he was not going to say anything without a lawyer being present, and Detective Cockrell ended the interview and explained to Waldron that the interview had to end because Waldron had invoked his right to counsel. Several months later and after Waldron had been charged with the instant offense, Waldron sent Detective Cockrell a letter indicating that he wanted to speak with the officer about the incident and "perform a confession." In response, Detective Cockrell made arrangements to interview Waldron again, and that conversation was recorded.

Prior to trial, Waldron filed a motion to suppress arguing, among other things, that the recording should be suppressed because the statements in that recording were obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. Duringa hearing on the motion to suppress, the recording as well as the letter that Waldron wrote to Detective Cockrell were admitted into evidence. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Cockrell explained that he had to read Waldron the Miranda warnings, gave Waldron a copy of those warnings, and read the warnings to Waldron. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (setting out warnings that accused must be given before being questioned by police). After Detective Cockrell read each right, he asked Waldron if he understood that right, and Waldron indicated that he did and placed his initials next to each listed right where it appeared on the form. When explaining that Waldron had the right to have an attorney present, the following exchange occurred:

[Waldron]: I understand, but I have a question. . . . Could that mean at this specific time, or would it have to delay?

[Detective Cockrell]: Whenever you want one.

. . . .

[Waldron]: Like right this second?

[Detective Cockrell]: Well, I can't—you know it's, I don't know if your attorney can be here right now.

[Waldron]: Yeah.

[Detective Cockrell]: I mean that's up to you.

[Waldron]: Right. I understand.

[Detective Cockrell]: I just need to know that you understand you can have one for—

[Waldron]: Yes sir, yes sir.

. . . .

[Detective Cockrell]: [J]ust as long as you understand you have that right to have an attorney present. If you are too poor, or are unable to employ a lawyer, you have theright to have a lawyer appointed by the Court to advise you prior to and during any questioning. Do you understand that?

[Waldron]: Yes sir.

[Detective Cockrell]: Number five—you have the right to terminate the interview at any time.

[Waldron]: Yes sir.

. . . .

[Detective Cockrell]: And if you do want to sit here and talk to me if you could print your name in that line and then sign down here where it says "signature of person."

[Waldron]: Yes sir.

In addition to the recording and the letter, the Miranda form with Waldron's initials next to each warning was admitted into evidence during the suppression hearing. That form also shows that Waldron signed below the statement acknowledging that he was "knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily WAIV[ING] the above explained Rights and will make a Voluntary Statement."

At the end of the suppression hearing, the district court explained that it did not hear "an unequivocal invocation of his right in any way" and that Waldron waived his rights, and the district court denied the motion to suppress. Following the conclusion of the trial, the district court issued several findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its ruling on the suppression motion, including the following ones relevant to this appeal:

Findings of Fact

. . . .

3. [Waldron] can speak, read, write[,] and understand English.. . . .

6. [Waldron] also had experience with the criminal justice system.

. . . .

16. The Detective confirmed that [Waldron] sent him the letter stating that he wanted to confess.

17. The Detective explained that he had to again give the Miranda warning and make sure the Defendant understood it.

18. The Detective gave the Defendant a copy of the warning he was reading, and the Defendant followed along and initialed next to the waivers.

19. The Defendant indicated that "Yes, Sir," he understood his rights, and initialed next to the rights to indicate he understood them.

. . . .

21. The Defendant understood that he could delay, cancel[,] or terminate the interview if he wanted to have counsel present, but he did not desire or request that his counsel be present, and in fact unequivocally waived his right to an attorney and continued with the interview.

. . . .

Conclusions of Law

1. The Defendant was repeatedly given the Miranda warning, and the Defendant understood said warnings. The Defendant's decision to waive his rights and speak to the Detective was free and voluntary.

2. Prior to making the recorded statements, the Defendant was fully warned of his rights in compliance with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.22 and Miranda, and he unequivocally, freely, deliberately, knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily waived his rights. There was no Due Process or any other constitutional or statutory violation related to the Defendant's interview.

3. The statements from the Defendant's interview[] were admissible.

After the suppression hearing, Waldron sought to question the jury panel during voir dire regarding the lesser-included-offense of manslaughter and regarding the punishment range for that lesser offense, but the district court denied that request.

During the trial, various witnesses were called to the stand, including S.F.; Detective Cockrell; Dr. Suzanna Dana, who performed an autopsy on the female twin; Dr. Barrett Blaue, who treated S.F. at the hospital; and Dr. Amy Gruszecki, who testified as an expert on Waldron's behalf. In addition, the recording of Waldron's interview by the police was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

At the end of the trial, Waldron requested that the jury charge include instructions regarding whether the statements made during the interview were voluntarily made, and Waldron also requested a lesser-included-offense instruction for manslaughter. The district court denied both requests. After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury found Waldron guilty of the charged offense, and the district court rendered its judgment of conviction accordingly.

DISCUSSION

In his first three issues on appeal, Waldron asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. In his fourth through sixth issues on appeal, Waldron argues that the district court erred by failing to provide certain instructions in the jury charge. In his seventh issue on appeal, Waldron contends that the district court erred by failing to provide a lesser-included-offense instruction. In his eighth issue on appeal, Waldron argues that the district court erred by prohibiting him from questioning the jury panel regarding a potential lesser-included offense. Finally, in his last two issues on appeal, Waldron urges that the district court erred by commentingon evidence presented at trial. We will consider the issues in the order briefed but will address many of them jointly consistent with Waldron's briefing.

Motion to Suppress

In his first, second, and third issues, Waldron argues that the district court "abused its discretion by denying [his] motion to suppress" the recording of his interview with the police.

Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under that standard, the record is "viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 'outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.'" State...