Walia v. CPX Carrier, Inc.

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PREET WALIA, et al. Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CPX CARRIER, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents

A165798

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

February 20, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC19-01707)

GETTY J. ^[*]

This appeal concerns whether stopped traffic caused by an overturned tractor trailer blocking all lanes on one side of a highway can constitute a dangerous condition of public property for purposes of Government Code section 835. That statute defines when a public entity can be liable for injuries suffered on public property. (Gov Code^[1], § 835.) Here, the family of a man killed in an accident at the site of such a traffic blockage sued the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) under section 835. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Caltrans. It held the blockage did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property as a matter of law. We will affirm on that basis and also because Caltrans is immune from liability for its claimed failure to provide traffic or warning signals or devices. (§ 830.8.)

I. BACKGROUND

At 1:20 a.m. on May 25, 2018, a tractor trailer overturned on eastbound Interstate 80 (I-80 east). It caught on fire and spilled fuel and wreckage across the highway, blocking all four eastbound lanes.

The accident occurred west of the Carquinez bridge and Pomona exit and east of the Cummings Skyway exit. The California Highway Patrol (CHP) responded, and the accident site was marked with cones and flares and flashing lights from emergency responders. A CHP officer in charge of the accident site concluded it would take hours to clear. Just before 2:00 a.m., he directed Caltrans to close I-80 east at Cummings Skyway and divert all eastbound traffic off the highway at that exit. A Caltrans maintenance supervisor received the directive minutes later and promptly went to the accident site but did not effect a closure. Plaintiffs assert Caltrans took no steps in the next two hours to close I-80 east or divert traffic. Caltrans concedes there is a factual dispute whether it did so. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume it did not. Caltrans undisputedly did not post other warnings to approaching drivers of the freeway blockage at the accident site or of traffic queues that subsequently developed.

After the initial accident, lines of stopped vehicles formed behind the blockage. Just before 4:00 a.m.-two hours after the CHP's closure directive-Jaipal Walia neared the accident site while driving east on I-80. He failed to stop his car in time and fatally collided with a semi-truck at the end of a line of stopped vehicles. His wife and children sued Caltrans. They asserted a single cause of action for dangerous condition of public property under section 835. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged Caltrans was negligent and careless in the design, construction, maintenance, inspection, repair, and control of I-80 at this location, and the adjacent area, such that the roadway presented a dangerous, defective, and hazardous condition.

Caltrans moved for summary judgment. It contended plaintiffs could not prove the existence of a dangerous condition of public property, as an overturned big rig resulting in stopped traffic cannot amount to such a condition. As for the lines of stopped vehicles on the roadway, Caltrans contended they did not satisfy the definition of a dangerous condition, which must pose a substantial risk to those using the property with due care. (§ 830, subd. (a).) Caltrans contended a reasonable driver using due care would have seen the emergency vehicles and stopped traffic and been able to stop in time.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion. Among other evidence, they submitted a declaration by a traffic engineer. He opined that a traffic stoppage is dangerous when encountered without warning at 4:00 a.m. on a highway with otherwise free-flowing traffic. He also described how I-80 east slopes up to a crest after the Cummings Skyway exit, at a grade that kept drivers from seeing the accident site until they reached the top, leaving little time to react.

Plaintiffs also submitted deposition testimony by Robert Williams, a driver who reached the site just before Walia. He saw the stoppage when he crested the slope an estimated quarter mile before the site and came to an "aggressive stop," braking suddenly but not to a degree that threatened a loss of control. He felt afraid to stay in his lane because, if a subsequent driver was "not paying attention as they came over the hill," they might fail to stop in time and hit him. He thus pulled onto the shoulder beside a stopped tractor trailer, just behind the truck's cab. About a minute later, as Williams watched "very, very closely" in his rearview mirror, Walia's car came over the hill, "didn't slow down until [Williams] almost lost sight of him" in his mirror, and then "started braking very hard," skidded, and hit the truck.

After hearing argument, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment. It based its ruling solely on a conclusion that plaintiffs failed to establish that a dangerous physical condition of public property was a causal factor in Walia's collision.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 835 is part of the Government Claims Act (§§ 810-840.6). That act-originally known as the Tort Claims Act-defines the liabilities and immunities of public entities. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1047 &fn. 6.) A public entity "is not liable for injuries except as provided by statute." (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829.) The act's purpose is" 'to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.'" (Ibid.) Section 835 "sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property." (Ibid.)

To establish liability under section 835, a plaintiff must prove that, at the time of injury, a dangerous condition existed on public property, that it created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury suffered, and that it proximately caused the injury. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 716.) A plaintiff must also prove that a public employee's negligence or misconduct created the condition, or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to protect against it. (Ibid.) Section 830 defines a dangerous condition of property as one creating a substantial risk of injury when the property is used with due care. Section 830 extends responsibility for a dangerous condition of public property to include risks from property adjacent to public property when the conditions expose those using the public property to a substantial risk of injury. (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 148 (Bonanno).) "[A] dangerous condition exists when public property is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself. [Citations.] . . . [P]ublic property has also been considered to be in a dangerous condition 'because of the design or location of the improvement, the interrelationship of its structural or natural features, or the presence of latent hazards associated with its normal use.'" (Bonanno, at pp. 148-149, italics omitted.) The fact that an accident occurs is not in and of itself evidence that public property was in a dangerous condition at the time of injury. (§ 830.5, subd. (a).)

While the existence of a dangerous condition is usually a question of fact, it may be resolved as a matter of law "if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion." (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2001) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1133 (Zelig).) The Legislature has expressly authorized courts in appropriate cases to determine no such condition existed: "A condition is not a dangerous condition . . . if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property . . . was used with due care" in a reasonably foreseeable manner. (§ 830.2.)

Even if a dangerous condition is demonstrated, a public entity may still prevail through a variety of statutory immunities "which [it] may assert as affirmative defense[s]." (Gonzales v. City of Atwater (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 929, 945.) Section 830.8 creates one such immunity. It provides that a public entity is not liable for injury caused "by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices" unless necessary to warn of a concealed defect. (Kessler v. State of California (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 317, 321-322.)

A trial court may grant summary judgment if "there is no triable issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action." (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) We independently review an order granting summary judgment, considering all evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers" '" 'except that to which objections were made and sustained.'" '" (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286.)" 'We liberally construe the evidence in support of the...