Walker v. Chasteen

230 N.E.3d 773

2023 IL App (3d) 220387

Reuben D. WALKER and M. Steven Diamond, Individually and on Behalf of Themselves and for the Benefit of the Taxpayers and on Behalf of All Other Individuals or Institutions Who Pay Foreclosure Fees in the State of Illinois, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Andrea Lynn CHASTEEN, in Her Official Capacity as the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Will County and as a Representative of All Clerks of the Circuit Courts of All Counties Within the State of Illinois; Candice Adams, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Du Page County; Erin Cartwright Weinstein, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lake County; Thomas A. Klein, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Winnebago County; Matthew Prochaska, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kendall County; Theresa E. Barreiro, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kane County; Lori Geschwandner, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Adams County; Patty Hiher, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Carroll County; Susan W. McGrath, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Ami L. Shaw, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Clark County; Angela Reinoehl, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Crawford County; John Niemerg, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Effingham County; Kamalen Johnson Anderson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Ford County; Leann Dixon, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Livingston County; Kelly Elias, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Logan County; Lisa Fallon, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Monroe County; Christa S. Helmuth, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Livingston County; Kimberly A. Stahl, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Ogle County; and Seth E. Floyd, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Piatt County, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal No. 3-22-0387

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Opinion Filed November 15, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois. Circuit No. 12-CH-5275, The Honorable John C. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Daniel K. Cray and Melissa H. Dakich, of Cray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago, Laird M. Ozmon, of Law Offices of Laird M. Ozmon, Ltd., of Joliet, and Michael T. Reagan, of Ottawa, for appellants.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Frank H. Bieszczat, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees Candice Adams, Erin Cartwright Weinstein, Thomas A. Klein, Matthew Prochaska, Theresa E. Barreiro, Lori Geschwandner, Patty Hiher, Susan W. McGrath, Ami L. Shaw, Angela Reinoehl, John Niemerg, Kamalen Johnson Anderson, LeAnn Dixon, Kelly Elias, Lisa Fallon, Christa S. Helmuth, Kimberly A. Stahl, and Seth E. Floyd.

Carrie L. Haas, of Dunn Law Firm, LLP, of Bloomington, for appellee Don Everhart Jr.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil Stein, Jessica

Scheller, Jonathon D. Byrer, Paul Fangman, and Patrick E. Dwyer III, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee Iris Martinez.

James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Scoltt Pyles, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Andrea Lynn Chasteen.

OPINION

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiffs in this case comprise a class of individuals who, in connection with the filing of their mortgage foreclosure complaints in the circuit courts, paid filing fees mandated by section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012)). The defendants are a class of all the Illinois circuit court clerks. The class action alleged, among other things, that section 15-1504.1 of the Code was facially unconstitutional. The supreme court agreed, thereby striking down section 15-1504.1, as well as two additional statutes that created programs funded by the filing fees (20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012)). Walker v. Chasteen, 2021 IL 126086, 11 47, 451 Ill.Dec. 107, 183 N.E.3d 153 (Walker II).

¶ 2 On remand from the supreme court, the circuit court dismissed the remainder of the plaintiffs’ action, which sought refunds of the filing fees paid by the plaintiffs. The circuit court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the plaintiffs’ requested relief, as the claim was against the State and therefore had to be brought in the Illinois Court of Claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the circuit court erred when it dismissed the remainder of their action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The facts of this case have been set out in previous appeals; most recently, in Walker II, 2021 IL 126086, 451 Ill.Dec. 107, 183 N.E.3d 153. We include only those facts necessary for the disposition of this appeal.

¶ 5 The original plaintiff in this action, Reuben D. Walker, filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint in the Will County Circuit Court in April 2012. At the time he filed his complaint, Walker paid a $50 filing fee mandated by section 15-1504.1 of the Code. Pursuant to sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act (Act) (20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012)), the fees collected in connection with the filing of mortgage foreclosure complaints were earmarked to fund a social welfare program.

¶ 6 In October 2012, Walker filed a putative class action complaint against the Will County Circuit Court, which, in part, alleged that section 15-1504.1 was unconstitutional. The circuit court certified the class, which included all individuals who paid the $50 filing fee up to and including Walker. The court also certified a class of defendants, which consisted of all the Illinois circuit court clerks in their official capacities. The State was later allowed to intervene.

¶ 7 In November 2013, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the State’s motion to dismiss. More specifically, the court ruled that (1) the circuit court clerks fell within the "fee officer" prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 14), and (2) the provision in section 15-1504.1 authorizing circuit court clerks to retain 2% of the $50 filing fees for administrative expenses created an unconstitutional fee office. Accordingly, the court struck down section 15-1504.1 as facially unconstitutional.

¶ 8 An appeal was taken to our supreme court. In Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, 11 30, 396 Ill.Dec. 156, 39 N.E.3d 982 (Walker I), our supreme court disagreed with both of the circuit court’s rulings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 9 In April 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint containing four counts. Count I alleged that section 15-1504.1 of the Code and sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Act violated separation-of-powers principles. Count II alleged that the statutes violated equal protection, due process, and uniformity-of-burden principles. Count III alleged that the statutes unconstitutionally provided for the imposition of a filing fee for a noncourt related purpose. Count IV requested the creation of a protest fund to contain all fees collected or to be collected pursuant to section 15-1504.1 until the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case. Counts I, II, and III requested the same relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional, (2) "[a] declaratory judgment that any expenditures of State funds collected pursuant to this statute must be returned to Plaintiffs," (3) temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions "enjoining Defendants from disbursing fees collected pursuant to [section 15-1504.1], and (4) "[a]n order to return all fees collected pursuant to [section 15-1504.1] to Plaintiffs."

¶ 10 The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, striking down all three statutes as violative of the equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 2)). The court also found the statutes violated the free access clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12). The court stayed its permanent injunction, which prohibited the collection of the fees and the funding the social welfare program, so our supreme court could review the case.

¶ 11 In June 2021, our supreme court addressed the appeal in Walker II. First, the court held that the filing fees were paid by the plaintiffs under duress such that the voluntary payment doctrine did not invalidate the plaintiffs’ cause of action. Walker II, 2021 IL 126086, ¶ 28, 451 Ill.Dec. 107, 183 N.E.3d 153. Second, the court held that section 15-1504.1 of the Code and sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Act violated the free access clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. The court then remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 49.

¶ 12 After remand, discovery proceeded on the issue of restitution. During that time, numerous motions were filed, including a motion and supplemental motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)) filed by Will County Circuit Court Clerk Andrea Lynn Chasteen.

¶ 13 In August 2022, the circuit court issued a written order dismissing the case. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ restitution claims, as those claims had to be brought in the court of claims because they were directed at recovering money from the State. The plaintiffs appealed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 While the plaintiffs claim there are five issues on appeal, there is only one—whether the circuit court erred when it granted Chasteen’s motion to dismiss.

[1, 2] ¶ 16 "The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation." Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367, 278 Ill.Dec. 555, 799 N.E.2d 273 (2003). Section 2-619(a)(9) permits a motion to dismiss that alleges "the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2...