Walker v. Inch

1

ANTWAN WALKER, Petitioner, v. MARK S. INCH, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 20-cv-62062-CANN/MCCABE

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

November 18, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RYON M. MCCABE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Antwan Walker's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 (“Petition”) (DE 1), which was referred to the undersigned by United States District Judge Aileen M. Cannon (DE 14). Petitioner raises three grounds for relief:

1. The state courts violated his clearly established Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing;

2. State prosecutors violated his clearly established Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to disclose exculpatory information prior to trial specifically, the fact that one of the State's witnesses had expressed doubts about her eyewitness identification of Petitioner; and

3. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation of his clearly established Sixth Amendment rights, because his trial counsel failed to depose State witnesses and failed to perform an adequate factual investigation of the case.

As set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED because Petitioner failed to fully exhaust his claims and because the claims fail on the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Proceedings

On May 13, 2010, a state court grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of first-degree murder (R. at 16).^[1] The charges stemmed from a fight in a nightclub parking lot on April 10, 2010, which escalated into a shooting, leaving two people dead (R. at 13). After a five-day jury trial in July 2015, the jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder (R. at 52-53). On August 24, 2015, the trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment (R. at 55-62).

B. Direct Appeal

On September 1, 2015, Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) (R. at 70). Petitioner raised two arguments: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to reference in opening statement, or to question witnesses about, a silver gun that police found four hours after the murder, within two miles of the crime scene; and (2) the trial court erred by refusing to allow Petitioner to cross examine State witness on facts that supported his “defense of others” theory (R. at 89).

The Fourth DCA per curium affirmed the judgment and sentence on May 25, 2017. See Walker v. State, 226 So.3d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). Petitioner did not seek further review with the Florida Supreme Court or with the United States Supreme Court (DE 1 at 3). The Fourth DCA issued its mandate on June 23, 2017 (R. at 155). Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on August 23, 2017.

C. Postconviction Proceedings

On July 28, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (R. at 157-64, 172-79). The motion sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of two witness affidavits (R. at 173). The first, signed by one of the State's key eyewitnesses at trial (hereafter “J.B.”), attested that she had expressed doubts to prosecutors and law enforcement about identifying Petitioner as the shooter (R. at 176-77). The other affidavit, signed by a newly discovered witness (hereafter “A.O.”), attested that she witnessed the parking lot fight and saw a “stocky” male with “long dreads hanging down his back” with a gun in his hand “near the guy who was laying on the ground” (R. at 178). Petitioner was not stocky, nor did he have dreads, at the time of the shooting (DE 1 at 11; DE 13 at 6). Petitioner argued the new evidence would “probably lead to an acquittal if the case is retried” (R. at 173).

On December 7, 2018, the state trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion “for reasons set forth in the State's Response,” without holding an evidentiary hearing (R. at 186). The State's response, in turn, argued that the new evidence would be unlikely to produce an acquittal because, among other reasons, it contradicted the evidence offered at trial (R. at 181-84).

Petitioner appealed to the Fourth DCA on December 11, 2018 (R. at 189). Petitioner argued the trial court erred in denying the Rule 3.850 motion, but he did not specifically argue the failure to afford an evidentiary hearing on the motion violated his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process rights (R. at 206). The Fourth DCA per curium affirmed the trial court's order on September 12, 2019. See Walker v. State, 279 So.3d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Petitioner did not seek further review with the Florida Supreme Court or with the United States Supreme Court (DE 1 at 6). The Fourth DCA issued its mandate on October 11, 2019 (R. at 264).

This Petition followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Petitioner brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides that “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The statute further provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2).

Here, Petitioner alleges three grounds for relief:

1. The state courts violated his clearly established Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing;

2. State prosecutors violated his clearly established Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to disclose exculpatory information prior to trial, specifically, the fact that one of the State's witnesses had expressed doubts about her eyewitness identification of Petitioner; and

3. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation of his clearly established Sixth Amendment rights, because his trial counsel failed to depose State witnesses and failed to perform an adequate factual investigation of the case.

(DE 1 at 7, 9-10). The Court will address procedural issues before turning to the merits.

A. Exhaustion

A habeas petitioner must exhaust state court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To satisfy this requirement, a habeas petitioner must “fairly present every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.” Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). While a petitioner need not “cite book and verse on the federal constitution,” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), he must “alert[ ] the [state] court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). He accomplishes this only when a “reasonable reader would understand each claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation.” Kelley v. Sec'y Dep't of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2004). Once a petitioner has “fairly presented” his federal claim to the state trial and appellate courts, he must then “present that exact same claim to the federal courts - adjacent claims or nominally similar claims do not make the cut.” Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 28 F.4th 1089, 1158 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971)).

Petitioner argues he exhausted ground one, but concedes he did not exhaust grounds two or three. The Court disagrees as to ground one. The undersigned has reviewed Petitioner's direct review briefs (R. at 79-101, 128-51) and his Rule 3.850 motion and appellate briefs (R. at 172-79, 196-24, 242-60). Based on this review, Petitioner did not “fairly present” to the state courts the issue raised in ground one. To be sure, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, but he did not argue the failure to afford him an evidentiary hearing violated his federal constitutional rights. As such, Petitioner did not give the state courts a fair opportunity to address this issue. See Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o exhaust state remedies fully[,] the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues.”).

Moreover Petitioner's claims are now procedurally barred from further state court review on grounds one, two, or three. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When it is obvious that the unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-law procedural default, we can forego the needless judicial ping-pong and just treat those claims now barred by state law as no basis for federal habeas relief.”) (cleaned up). As a result, Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice,” or “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S....