Walker v. Northview Vill. Nursing Ctr.

HERSHEL WALKER, Plaintiff, v. NORTHVIEW VILLAGE NURSING CENTER, Defendant.

No. 4:14CV2094HEA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

February 9, 2017

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 65]. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

This is an employment discrimination case alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant terminated his employment because of religious discrimination, religious harassment and in retaliation for claiming he was discriminated against.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth affirmative evidence and specific facts by affidavit and other evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "A dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' only 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). A party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable controversy. See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir.2004). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir.1993).

"While employment discrimination cases are often fact intensive and dependent on nuance in the workplace, they are not immune from summary judgment." Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999)). There is no separate summary judgment standard for employment discrimination cases, and "it remains a useful pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial." Id.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005). The Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir.2000). However, the court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976).

Facts

The following facts are taken from Defendant's statement of uncontroverted facts, Plaintiff's statement of material facts, and exhibits in the record.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a temporary employee in the maintenance department from approximately January 2010 through July 2010. Defendant laid Plaintiff off in July 2010 because of the low resident census. Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination or harassment related to his 2010 employment.

In September 2012, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a temporary painter. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was Director of Maintenance, Allen Koonce ("Koonce"). Koonce supervised all employees in the maintenance department, including painters and maintenance workers.

In March 2013, Defendant changed Plaintiff's employment status to "full-time," and he became eligible for employee benefits. At that time, Defendant increased Plaintiff's pay from $10.00 per hour to$11.67 per hour.

In the fall of 2013, Defendant's corporate office informed Defendant's Administrator, Judy Deering ("Deering"), that it had to make lay-offs due to payroll budget cuts. One of the departments in which Defendant had to make a lay off was the maintenance department. Deering also learned that Defendant had to make lay-offs in another department as well due to payroll budget cuts. To that end, Deering decided to lay off Emilie Bradford-Taylor, RN, In-Service Nurse, on October 4, 2013. Deering decided to lay off Bradford-Taylor because she had the least seniority, and an employee with more seniority than her could absorb her job duties. Deering decided to lay off Plaintiff because he was the last full-timeemployee hired in the maintenance department prior to the lay-off directive and therefore had the least seniority.

Deering informed Koonce about Plaintiff's lay-off, and Koonce informed Plaintiff of his lay-off on October 3, 2013. His lay-off was effective October 4, 2013.

During his employment, Plaintiff never told Koonce, Deering, Northview's Human Resources Manager, Ralph Menees ("Menees"), or anyone at Northview's corporate office about what his religion was. Moreover, during his employment, Koonce, Deering, Menees and Northview's corporate office never asked Plaintiff about his religion.

In summer 2013, Defendant held a company picnic. Attendance was not mandatory. When Koonce asked Plaintiff if he was going to attend the picnic, Plaintiff told him "because of his religion [he] wouldn't be able to attend because of certain foods and stuff [he doesn't] deal with and [he doesn't] like to be around." Koonce "didn't inquire into it any further." Plaintiff did not attend the picnic, and he did not receive any discipline for not attending the picnic.

With regard to his lay off, Plaintiff asked Koonce "why me," and Koonce told him that "they were laying off people throughout the building, ... and it was budget cuts, that Mark Suissa told him he had to lay off someone in Maintenance - a painter in Maintenance is what he said."

During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that Koonce did not reference his religion or tell him that his religion was the reason for his lay-off.

During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that the "religion" referenced in his Charge of Discrimination - "Israelite" - is not actually a religion, but rather is an "ethnicity and a culture" and a "tribal name, [] a surname."

During his deposition, Plaintiff testified twice that he does not have a religion "per se." During his deposition, testified that "the way you could describe my religion would be considered Yahwism," but admitted he did not reference "Yahwism" in his Charge of Discrimination.

Defendant maintains an equal opportunity employment policy and a harassment policy prohibiting unlawful harassment and a procedure for reporting perceived harassment. Plaintiff admitted he received a copy of both policies and was aware of their contents.

According to Plaintiff, three of his co-workers made jokes to him on occasion about his beard and his dietary habits. These jokes began about 3-4 months into his 2012 employment. Plaintiff testified that he does not remember specific dates any comments were made to him or specifically what was said to him on any particular occasion. At first, Plaintiff made jokes to his co-workers about their habits, too. He testified that, a couple of months into his 2012 employment, he complained to Koonce about his workload being unfair, but he didnot tell Koonce that he believed it was unfair because of his religion. He also testified that he complained to Koonce about two co-workers sleeping on the job and having more work assignments than those two co-workers. With respect to his complaints, Plaintiff testified:

Q: Okay. At any time when you complained, did you ever specifically tell Mr. Koonce that you felt you were being given more work assignments because of your religion?

A: Well, I think I alluded to it. I didn't specifically, I don't think, say it. I might have said it in a way like, 'Hey, is this because, you know, of my religion?' That's how I most likely phrased it to him, in those kind [sic] of terms.

Plaintiff testified that once or twice he went to the Human Resources office and told Menees he would like to speak with him, but there were other people in the office at the time. Plaintiff testified that he did not tell Menees he wanted to talk to him about discrimination or unfair treatment.

Plaintiff never told Koonce that he experienced religious discrimination or unfair treatment because of his religion. Plaintiff never reported unfair treatment or discrimination to Defendant's corporate office.

Prior to his lay off in October 2013, Plaintiff never reported religious discrimination or harassment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR").

Plaintiff never received any formal discipline during his employment. He also testified that he believed, like him, Vance Flemings also received morepressure and assignments from Koonce.

In March 2013, Plaintiff turned down a job with the City of St. Louis offering $13.28 per hour because he "liked the environment" and "enjoyed the work" he did at Northview.

Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, however, he failed to...