Walker v. State

390 So.3d 504

Jessica L. WALKER a/k/a Jessica Lashunda Walker

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2023-KA-00467-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

07/18/2024

NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. CALEB ELIAS MAY, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON

BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN AND GRIFFIS, JJ.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jessica Walker was convicted by a jury of knowingly possessing methamphetamine pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) (Rev. 2018) with a firearm enhancement in the Newton County Circuit Court. She was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with three years suspended and three years to serve.

¶2. Walker timely appealed her conviction and raises the following issues for the Court’s review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove constructive possession or whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by limiting defense theory evidence. Because the State failed to present sufficient, competent evidence connecting Walker to the methamphetamine, we reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

1. Factual History

¶3. On October 21, 2020, Jessica Walker and her then-boyfriend, Richard Buckley, were on their way home when they approached a safety check-point roadblock administered by the Newton County Sheriff’s Office. While Buckley was initially driving Walker’s vehicle, the two switched seats as they approached the roadblock because Buckley did not have a driver’s license. Deputy Donna Chapman approached Walker’s vehicle, took her driver’s license, and then asked Walker to exit the vehicle when she smelled unburned marijuana. Deputy Chapman asked Walker if there was anything of concern in the vehicle, and Walker responded that she had a handgun under the driver’s seat. Deputy Chapman secured the weapon as well as a "brown paper balled up in the driver’s seat," which she believed to be a small amount of marijuana. Deputy Chapman proceeded to search the vehicle and found "a clear bag containing a white, crystallized substance" between the driver’s seat and center console.

¶4. Walker was arrested, and Buckley, who had also exited the vehicle and was being supervised by another officer, Deputy Fred Hardy, was released. Buckley retreated from the scene on foot, leaving Walker’s car to be towed. Buckley was not investigated or charged with a crime. While Deputy Chapman suspected that the substance wrapped in brown paper was marijuana, it was never tested. The substance found between the driver’s seat and center console, however, was tested and was identified as 0.245 grams of methamphetamine.

2. Procedural History

¶5. Walker was indicted on one count of possession of methamphetamine with a firearm enhancement pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) and -152 (Rev. 2018), respectively. Walker pled not guilty. While she readily admitted to possessing the firearm, as well as her occasional recreational use of marijuana, Walker vehemently maintained that the methamphetamine was Buckley’s and that she was unaware that he had stowed it in her vehicle. Indeed, Walker testified that she had never taken methamphetamine or dealt with it in any way.

¶6. In support of her defense that Buckley was the sole possessor of the methamphetamine, Walker sought to elicit on cross-examination evidence of his prior arrests and convictions for drug-related offenses from Investigator Benjamin Kelly, who evidently had some knowledge of Buckley through his work as the narcotics investigator with the Newton County Sheriff’s Department. Anticipating that line of questioning, the State made an ore tenus motion in limine in which it sought to preclude Walker’s counsel from asking Investigator Kelly if Buckley had a criminal history, if he had ever personally arrested Buckley, and if Buckley was a convicted felon. The circuit judge agreed, concluding that such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). Walker’s defense counsel proffered the following line of questioning:

Q. Was there anybody else in the car?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was the other person in the car?

A. Richard Buckley.

Q. Richard Buckley, and you know that because of the report that Ms. Donna — Deputy Chapman did?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you interview him?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you search him in any way or interrogate him or follow him or in some how or another involve him in this crime on October 21st?

A. No, sir.

Q. So you didn’t do anything related to Mr. Buckley?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know who he is?

A. I do.

Q. Well, if you know who he is and you know he was in the car, why didn’t you investigate him?

A. No arrest was made on him that night.

Q. But you would agree you’re the narcotics officer and this is a person in the car with narcotics?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so you could not find him?

A. I didn’t look for him.

Q. Do you know him?

A. I do.

Q. Do you know where he lives at?

A. I’ve known where he stayed at points but as far as like can I go directly to where he’s staying now or anything, no, sir.

Q. And you have the resources, knowing him through the department — through the sheriff’s department, you could use those to find him; correct?

A. I could.

¶7. The circuit judge allowed the questions proffered. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Walker was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with three years suspended and three years to serve. The circuit judge denied Walker’s motion for a new trial. Thereafter, Walker appealed her conviction, petitioning the Court to consider the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove constructive possession or whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by limiting defense theory evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1, 2] ¶8. The circuit court’s exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Carothers v. State, 152 So. 3d 277, 281 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2014) (citing Osborne v. State, 54 So. 3d 841, 845 (Miss. 2011)). While the trial court is afforded generous discretion "as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence[,]" the Court should reverse a trial court’s ruling when "the judge abuses his discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused[.]" Green v. State, 89 So. 3d 543, 549 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gore v. State, 37 So. 3d 1178, 1183 (Miss. 2010)).

[3] ¶9. "When reviewing a challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after reviewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Eubanks v. State, 341 So. 3d 896, 909-10 (¶ 41) (Miss. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Naylor v. State, 248 So. 3d 793, 796 (Miss. 2018)).

[4, 5] ¶10. To determine whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the Court "accept[s] as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial." Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 81 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Dudley v. State, 719 So. 2d 180, 182 (¶ 20) (Miss 1998), disagreed with by Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731 (Miss. 2005)). And "[o]nly in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the circuit judge abused his discretion by limiting Walker’s theory of defense.

[6] ¶11. The State sought to preclude evidence of Richard Buckley’s criminal history on the basis that it was inadmissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). The circuit judge agreed, and he also found such evidence irrelevant. On appeal, Walker contends that the circuit court erred by ruling the evidence was inadmissible because prior bad act evidence may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, [or] knowledge[.]" Miss. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Walker also argues that the evidence was relevant and supported the inference that it was Buckley, not she, who constructively possessed the methamphetamine. Thus, Walker asserts that she was unfairly denied the opportunity to present her full theory of defense to the jury—that Buckley alone had knowledge and constructive possession of the methamphetamine seized from her vehicle.

[7] ¶12. Indeed, we have long held that "[a] criminal defendant is entitled to present his defense to the finder of fact, and it is fundamentally unfair to deny the jury the opportunity to consider the defendant's defense where there is testimony to support the theory." Terry v. State, 718 So. 2d 1115, 1121 (¶ 28) (Miss. 1998) (citing Keys v. State, 635 So. 2d 845, 848-49 (Miss. 1994)). However, "[w]hen testimony is not allowed at trial, a record of the proffered testimony must be made in order to preserve the point for appeal." Jackson v. State, 245 So. 3d 433, 441 (¶ 45) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green v. State, 89 So. 3d 543, 554 (¶ 28) (Miss. 2012)). Walker’s counsel failed to proffer questions of Buckley’s criminal history. Without the above-quoted questioning, the Court has no way to know what evidence would have been presented regarding the defendant’s passenger. Therefore, we hold that Walker failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove constructive possession or whether the evidence contrary to the weight of the evidence.

[8] ¶13. Jessica Walker was convicted of violating Mississippi Code Section 41-29-139(c), which states in pertinent part:

[I]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess any controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid

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