Walking the Tightrope: Finding Balance Between
Strict Nondelegation and the Administrative State
through an Examination of State Experiences
RACHEL SCHOLZ-BRIGHT*
ABSTRACT
Nondelegation doctrine is the subject of renewed debate in the wake of
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
Despite longstanding precedent following the more lenient “intelligible princi-
ple test,” nondelegation proponents argue that nearly any legislative delegation
to the executive branch is unconstitutional. Strict nondelegation opponents, in
addition to arguing in favor of some delegation’s constitutionality, also highlight
the concern that implementing a stricter nondelegation doctrine would seriously
hinder the administrative state’s ability to function. To evaluate the possible conse-
quences of implementing stricter nondelegation for the administrative state, this
paper examines the experiences of three states that have longstanding, strict non-
delegation doctrines: Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma. Examining how these state-
level nondelegation doctrines have interacted with the growth, development, and
vitality of each state’s administrative state can provide an analogy for how imple-
menting strict nondelegation may work federally. Despite these states’ restrictive
nondelegation doctrines, each has maintained a strong and extensive administra-
tive state, suggesting the conventional wisdom may be wrong: stricter nondelega-
tion may coexist with a viable regulatory system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
II. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
A. Justice Gorsuch and Gundy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
B. The Modern Nondelegation Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
1. Pro-Nondelegation Scholarship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
2. Anti-Nondelegation Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
3. Consequences of Nondelegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2021; A.B., Dartmouth College, 2018. © 2022, Rachel
Scholz-Bright. I would like to thank Professors Paul Clement and Lisa Blatt for their guidance on an
earlier version of this note during their Separation of Powers seminar. I would also like to thank the
editors of the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy for their thoughtful suggestions.
427
III. STATE NONDELEGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
A. Existing Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
B. States with Non-Strict Separation-of-Powers Clauses. . . . . . . 435
C. States with Strict Nondelegation Doctrines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
1. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
2. Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
3. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
D. State Doctrine Effects on Each Administrative System . . . . . . 441
1. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
2. Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
3. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
IV. APPLYING THE STATE EXPERIENCES TO THE FEDERAL CONTEXT . . . 446
A. The Equivalency of the Federal and State Frameworks . . . . . 447
B. Potential Implementation of Federal Nondelegation . . . . . . . 448
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Gorsuch’s recent dissent in Gundy v. United States
1
has sparked
renewed debate over the propriety of implementing a strict nondelegation doc-
trine. The dissent also raises questions about how a stronger barrier to legislative
delegation would challenge administrative agencies’ ability to promulgate rules
and make policy. To explore the potential consequences of a stricter federal non-
delegation doctrine, this paper examines the experiences of three states—Florida,
Oklahoma, and Texas—with longstanding nondelegation doctrines that are
stricter than the current federal “intelligible principle” test. Contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom that adopting strict nondelegation would cripple the adminis-
trative state, these states’ robust administrative systems coexist with strict
nondelegation, suggesting the doctrine may not present a substantial barrier to
continued regulatory government.
This paper proceeds in Part II by surveying the current federal debate over non-
delegation. In Part III, it examines the existing nondelegation doctrines of
Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas, which provide models of relatively nationally rep-
resentative states with well-established, strict nondelegation doctrines. Part III
1. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
428 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:427
