Wallace v. Garman

1

SPENCER WALLACE Petitioner v. MARK GARMAN, et al. Respondents

Civil Action No. 18-3509

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

March 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION INTRODUCTION

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.

Petitioner Spencer Wallace (“Petitioner” or “Wallace”), a Pennsylvania state prisoner initially proceeding pro se, ^[1] filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254, in which he asserted numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process. [ECF 1]. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72.1.IV(c), the petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lloret for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). [ECF 2]. The Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, which recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. [ECF 22]. Thereafter, Petitioner filed counseled objections to the R&R. [ECF 29]. This matter is, therefore, ripe for a de novo review and a determination of the merits of objections to the R&R.

After a thorough and independent review of the state court record and court filings, and for the reasons stated herein Petitioner's objections are sustained, in part and overruled, in part; the R&R is approved and adopted, in part; and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2010, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”), and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”) in connection with the death of Harry Ballard (“Ballard”). The facts underlying Petitioner's conviction were summarized by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and quoted in the R&R, as follows:

On July 10, 2008, [Appellant] was trying to track down Ballard, who owed him $50. He walked a few blocks down from the Queen Lane Apartments to where he believed that Ballard's mother lived. When he got there[, ] he yelled out that he was looking for Ballard's mother. Stella Lorick, Ballard's aunt, was told by another person that someone was looking for Ballard's mother, so she came out of her house and spoke to [Appellant]. [Appellant] told her that he wanted the money Ballard owed him. Ms. Lorick told him that if he had an issue with Ballard, he needed to take it up with Ballard and leave “them” alone. [Appellant] then informed Ms. Lorick that if he did not get his money, he would “bring back drama.”

Two days later, on July 12, 2008[, ] at about 8:00-8:30pm [sic], [Appellant] and a few other men were hanging out behind the Queen Lane Apartments next to a play ground [sic] where a few residents were enjoying the summer evening with their children. Braheim Ballard (“Braheim”), Harry Ballard's brother, drove up, got out of his car and confronted [Appellant] about [Appellant's] confrontation a few days earlier with Ballard's aunt, Stella Lorick. Braheim yelled at [Appellant] about disrespecting his mother and proceeded to slap [Appellant] in the face. [Appellant] did not retaliate and the fight was broken up by a Philadelphia Housing Authority Officer who was patrolling the area at that moment. Braheim then got back in his car and drove off. The residents who were on the playground with their children witnessed the scene. Afterwards, they overheard [Appellant] tell his friend Robert Shaheem “Sha” Pinkney to go get his gun in the blue city bag. [Appellant's] friends attempted to talk him out of handling the situation this way, but he insisted. Upon receiving the blue city bag containing his gun, he stuck the gun in his waist band [sic] and walked around to the front of the Queen Lane Apartments and waited in front of a dry cleaner.

A few minutes later, Ballard walked up to [Appellant] and attempted to make peace for what happened earlier between [Appellant] and Braheim. [Appellant] swung his fist at Ballard, missed[, ] and the two were separated by [Appellant's] friends. [Appellant] then walked up to Ballard in the middle of the intersection of Queen Lane and Pulaski Street and shot Ballard once. Ballard dropped to his knees and then to the ground and began pleading for his life. [Appellant] then proceeded to turn Ballard over and shoot him four more times, three shots entering Ballard's chest. He then fled the scene. Ballard was pronounced dead later that night at a hospital.

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 2017 WL 6181826, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2017) (alterations in original).

Following his conviction, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge, two to seven years on the VUFA charge, and one to five years on the PIC charge, with the sentences to run consecutively. Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal, challenging comments the prosecutor had made during closing arguments. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected this challenge and affirmed Petitioner's sentence.

Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq. Following the appointment of counsel and, later, subsequent retention of private counsel, Petitioner filed a second amended PCRA petition, identifying his five claims as follows:

I. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Court's charge on VUFA and PIC which directed a verdict against his client;

II. Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Court's giving the jury its personal opinion of the evidence as to the Defendant's possession of the firearm with intent to commit murder;

III. Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the Court's charge that highlighted uncontradicted facts because it encouraged the jury to give far more credence to testimony that is uncontradicted based on that fact alone and also focused the jury's attention on the fact that the Defendant did not testify so as to contradict those facts; and

IV. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Court's instructions which defined reasonable doubt in a manner where the jury was given the choice of eliminating reasonable doubts to which the Petitioner was entitled under the due process clause of the federal constitution.

V. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the charge of the court which equated malice with specific intent to kill and by so doing omitted an element of the crime of first degree murder.

(Sec. Am. PCRA Petition, at pp. 3, 8, 9, 13, and 17). The PCRA court dismissed the petition in a single-page Order that concluded that the “Petition is without merit.”

Petitioner appealed the PCRA Court's denial of his PCRA, identifying five issues/claims for appeal in his Superior Court brief as follows:^[2]

I. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the Court's charge on VUFA and PIC which directed a verdict against his client;

II. Was trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the Court giving the jury its personal opinion of the evidence as to the Defendant's possession of the firearm with intent to commit murder;

III. Was trial counsel ineffective because he failed to object to the Court's charge that highlighted uncontradicted facts because it encouraged the jury to give far more credence to testimony that is uncontradicted based on that fact alone and also focused the jury's attention on the Defendant's failure to testify so as to contradict those facts;

IV. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the charge of the Court which equated malice with specific intent to kill and by so doing omitted an element of the crime of first degree murder; and

V. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after he objected to the testimony from the deceased's mother that her son was a “Straight A Honor Student.”

(Pet. Sup. Ct. Br. at 6). On December 8, 2017, the Superior Court rejected Petitioner's appeal and affirmed the lower court's order of dismissal. Wallace, 2017 WL 6181826, at *3-8. Petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied on June 25, 2018.

On August 17, 2018, Petitioner timely filed his habeas petition in this case, asserting his five claims as follows:

I. Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Court's directing a verdict on VUFA and PIC which also directed a verdict against Petitioner as to his intent to murder, depriving him of his right to a jury trial and denying him due process of law;

II. Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Court's giving the jury her personal opinion of the evidence as to Petitioner's possession of the firearm and intent to commit murder;

III. Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Court's concluding charge which highlighted uncontradicted facts because it encouraged the jury to give far more credence to testimony that was uncontradicted based on that fact alone and also focused on Petitioner's failure to testify and contract such facts;

IV. Trial counsel ineffectively failed to move for a mistrial after he objected to the testimony from the deceased's mother that her son was a “Straight A” honor student;

V. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Court's charge that equated malice with specific intent to kill, thereby omitting an element of first degree murder.

(Habeas Pet., ECF 1, at pp. 3-4). In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge addressed each of these claims, finding that the claims were procedurally defaulted and/or without merit. Petitioner filed counseled objections to the R&R, in which he challenges the Magistrate Judge's conclusions and recommendations as to only Claims I, II, and V.

LEGAL STANDARD

Where objections to an R&R are filed, a court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the R&R, see Sample v. Diecks, 885...