Wallace v. Sharp

PEKAH WALLACE v. CHERYL SHARP and TANYA HUGHES

Civ. No. 3:19CV00391(SALM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

February 11, 2022

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc #59]

HON SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Pekah Wallace (“plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants Cheryl Sharp (“Sharp”) and Tanya Hughes (“Hughes”) (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that defendants denied plaintiff equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Doc. #1 at 35. Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim for defamation against both defendants. See Id. at 37.

Pending before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. #59]. Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to defendants' motion [Doc. #62], to which defendants have filed a reply [Doc. #63]. For the reasons stated below, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #59] is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 14, 2019, asserting various federal and state law claims against defendants and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter the “CHRO”). See Doc. #1. On March 26, 2020, Judge Michael P. Shea^[1] dismissed all claims against the CHRO, as well as claims against the other defendants for: (1) retaliation based on plaintiff's exercise of free speech in violation of the First Amendment; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) tortious interference with contractual relations; and (4) all claims against defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages. See generally Doc. #34.

Plaintiff now proceeds on her claims against defendants for denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Three) and state law defamation (Count Six). See Doc. #1 at 35, 37; Doc. #34 at 25. Plaintiff's equal protection claim asserts that defendants “intentionally singled out [plaintiff] for adverse treatment that was entirely irrational and wholly arbitrary as compared to other Regional Managers similarly situated to” plaintiff. Doc. #1 at 35, ¶177. Her defamation claim asserts that defendants “knowingly, intentionally and maliciously publicized false statements, both verbal and written, regarding [plaintiff] to, inter alia, the Commissioners of the CHRO, which were harmful and injurious to [plaintiff's] business reputation.” Doc. #1 at 37, ¶191.

II. Legal Standard

The standards governing summary judgment are well-settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) [.]

Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper if, after discovery, the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) .

“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 286. The moving party may discharge this burden by “pointing out to the district court ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. “In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “If there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party, summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Hapag Lloyd Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphases in original).

“In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court may rely on any material that would be admissible or usable at trial.” Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, “a summary judgment motion is supported or opposed by affidavits, those ‘affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.'” Id. at 310 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Therefore,

[i]n order to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion, the opposing party must proffer admissible evidence that “set[s] forth specific facts” showing a genuinely disputed factual issue that is material under the applicable legal principles. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see, e.g., Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) [.] A party opposing summary judgment does not show the existence of a genuine issue of fact to be tried merely by making assertions that are conclusory, see, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996), or based on speculation, see, e.g., Id. (“Though we must accept as true the allegations of the party defending against the summary judgment motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, ... conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.”)[.]

Major League Baseball, 542 F.3d at 310 (alterations added).

III. Facts

The Court sets forth only those facts deemed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised in, and decision rendered on, this motion for summary judgment. The following factual summary is based on plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. #1], defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Material Facts [Doc. #59-1], plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Material Facts [Doc. #62-1], and accompanying affidavits, depositions and exhibits, to the extent that they are admissible evidence. The following factual summary, therefore, does not represent factual findings of the Court.

Before reciting the undisputed material facts, the Court notes defendants' argument that the Court should deem certain facts admitted because of: (1) plaintiff's improper objections; (2) plaintiff's failure to admit or deny certain facts; and (3) the insufficiency of the evidence cited to in support of a denial. See Doc. #63 at 2-4. Plaintiff has not responded to this argument. Generally, a responsive statement of material facts that contains “argument, legal conclusions, personal belief, and speculation[]” is “inappropriate.” Martin v. Town of Simsbury, 505 F.Supp.3d 116, 125 (D. Conn. 2020). To the extent plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement contains inappropriate responses, or where it otherwise “does not comply with Local Rule 56(a)(3), the Court will deem admitted certain facts within Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement that are supported by the evidence in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)(1) for the purposes of resolving this motion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the following facts are either expressly undisputed or deemed admitted by plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56(a)(3).

The CHRO is a State civil rights organization, which has statutory authority to enforce human rights laws, including those related to employment discrimination. See Doc. #59-1 at 2, ¶¶5-6. Defendant Hughes has served as the executive director of the CHRO since 2013, and in that capacity “is responsible for managing the day to day operations of the CHRO, ” including “management of the CHRO's employees at all levels and locations.” Id. at 3, ¶¶9-10. Defendant Hughes appointed defendant Sharp to serve as the Deputy Director of the CHRO in 2014. See Id. at ¶12. Sharp continues to serve in that role. See id.

The CHRO is comprised of five offices -- one Central Office and four Regional Offices. See Id. at 3-4, ¶13. Each Regional Office has a Regional Manager, who is responsible for supervising the staff and operations within that region. See Id. at 4, ¶14. The Regional Managers are supervised by the CHRO Deputy Director, defendant Sharp. See Id. at ¶15. Plaintiff acted as the Regional Manager of the CHRO's Capitol Region from 2013 until the time of her termination. See Id. at ¶16; Id. at 15, ¶81.

During her time at the CHRO, plaintiff received several counseling memorandums, and plaintiff also filed various grievances/complaints regarding her performance evaluations and ratings. See Doc. #59-1 at 5, ¶26; Id. at 7, ¶33; Id. at 8, ¶37.

On May 1, 2017, defendant Sharp sent plaintiff a counseling memorandum regarding plaintiff's conduct towards defendant Sharp during the course of an investigation into plaintiff's treatment of a CHRO employee, Charles Perry. See Doc. #59-1 at 7, ¶33; Doc. #59-14 (Ex. L). Plaintiff asserts...