Wallace v. Smith

TANYA WALLACE, Appellant, v. SHAFER C. SMITH, Respondent.

No. 70574

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

March 5, 2018

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Tanya Wallace appeals from district court orders denying a motion for reconsideration and granting a motion for determination of good faith settlement.¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge.

David Wallace, appellant's former husband, sued respondent Shafer C. Smith, now professionally known as "Ne-Yo," for damages under a talent management contract. While litigation was pending, Wallace divorced his wife, Tanya, and the divorce decree awarded Tanya one-half of the proceeds from any future judgment in the lawsuit. The district court later dismissed the case and while Wallace's appeal was pending he passed away. The Nevada Supreme Court subsequently reversed the district court, see Wallace v. Smith, Docket No. 60456 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding, September 26, 2014), and upon remand Wallace'stwo daughters, as administrators of the estate, proceeded with the case. Tanya continued to monitor the case.

Smith moved the district court for summary judgment against Wallace's Estate. During the hearing, Tanya orally moved to intervene, which was granted. Tanya then requested a continuance to oppose Smith's motion for summary judgment, but the district court denied her request and granted partial summary judgment on an issue that was unopposed by Wallace's Estate.

Tanya moved the district court for reconsideration of its order granting partial summary judgment, but the district court denied Tanya's motion. Thereafter, Smith and Wallace's Estate settled the case and filed a motion for a determination of good faith settlement, which was granted over Tanya's objections.²

On appeal, Tanya argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reconsider the granting of partial summary judgment and granting Smith's and Wallace's Estate's joint motion for determination of good faith settlement.³ We disagree.

Tanya first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reconsider the granting of partial summary judgment because she provided new issues of fact, rendering partial summary judgment inappropriate. Despite the fact that Tanya retained the same counsel that filed the lawsuit and was monitoring the case, she never filed a written motion to intervene, nor a written opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Thus, by failing to intervene sooner and oppose Smith's motion for summary judgment, she consented to the court's decision to grant the motion. See EJDC 2.20(e) ("Failure of the opposing party to serve and file written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion and/or joinder is meritorious and a consent to granting the same."). Further, under these facts, the district court properly granted partial summary judgment because Wallace's Estate agreed with Smith and did not oppose the issue within in its opposition. Substantively, Tanya's motion for reconsideration did not provide substantially different evidence or show that the district court's decision was clearly erroneous. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997) ("A district court may reconsider a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is subsequently introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous."). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tanya's motion for reconsideration.

Next, Tanya contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting Smith's and Wallace's Estate's motion for determination of good faith settlement because the settlement was unreasonable. She further contends that Wallace's Estate did not adequately represent her interests and that Wallace's Estate and Smith colluded to keep her out of settlement negotiations. We review a districtcourt's determination of good faith for an abuse of discretion. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Davidson, 107 Nev. 356, 360, 811 P.2d 561, 563 (1991). We will uphold the district court's decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence: "that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Otak Nev., LLC v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 799, 805, 312 P.3d 491, 496 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). "This standard of review vests the district court with considerable discretion." Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 652, 98 P.3d 681, 687 (2004).

Our review of the record reveals the district court properly considered the relevant factors and determined the settlement was made in good faith, was reasonable, and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Otak, 129 Nev. at 805, 312 P.3d at 496 (holding that factors such as "[t]he amount paid in settlement, the allocation of the settlement," the defendant's financial condition, and the existence of fraud or collusion are relevant though not exclusive factors for determining a good faith settlement (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Wallace's Estate had every incentive to recover the greatest amount of money in the settlement as 50 percent of the judgment would be turned over to Tanya. Further, Tanya's opposition to the good faith settlement was without merit because Tanya failed to present any evidence of collusion orlack of prosecution in this case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion for good faith settlement. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

/s/_________, C.J.

Silver

/s/_________, J.

Gibbons

TAO, J., concurring:

Tanya Wallace doesn't possess legal standing to maintain this appeal, and I would just dismiss it without reaching the merits.

I.

This case seems to have the trappings of a classic morality tale of right, wrong, and redemption. It involves, on the one hand, a local kid who made good and against all odds became an internationally famous singer, songwriter, and producer; on the other hand, the manager he once signed a contract with when young and who claims to have been callously left behind on the road to fame and fortune, and who tragically died before justice could be done, leaving his heirs to see things through. It seems imbued with its own built-in drama. So it may seem a buzz-kill for me to object on grounds of something like "standing." Structural questions about "standing" don't make for interesting reading, whether in story-telling oreven in judicial opinions whose readability is generally pretty low to begin with. But they may be the most legally important thing about this entire case.

During oral argument, the parties represented that they mutually agreed to "stipulate" that Tanya possessed legal standing to bring this appeal. But whether a party has standing is a question that goes to the court's jurisdiction, and questions of jurisdiction can never be waived or stipulated away by the parties. Furthermore, they may be raised at any time, even sua sponte by the court for the first time on appeal. See Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 964-65, 194 P.3d 96, 105 (2008); Vaile v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 262, 276, 44 P.3d 506, 515-16 (2002). This is so because questions of jurisdiction go to whether the court has the fundamental power to grant the requested relief and enforce its own judgment. If the court has no power to grant relief—either because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, an indispensable party is absent from the litigation, the dispute is moot or not yet ripe, or a party does not have the legal right to seek or receive the requested relief—then its ruling is legally void and not much more than a meaningless advisory opinion whether or not any party raised a timely objection below. See State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Sleeper, 100 Nev. 267, 269, 679 P.2d 1273, 1274 (1984) ("There can be no dispute that lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void."). A failure of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived because parties cannot artificially invest a court with a power it does not constitutionally have by ducking their heads and pretending the problem doesn't exist. Vaile, 118 Nev. at 276, 44 P.3d at 515-16 ("subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived"); Swan v. Swan, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990) (subject matter jurisdiction "cannot be conferred by theparties"). Consequently, whether raised and briefed by the parties or not, Tanya's standing, or lack thereof, is a critical matter that must be addressed before we even get to the merits, if any, underlying her arguments.

II.

Tanya isn't a signatory to the contract that is the basis of this lawsuit. She was merely married to someone who was. She asserts that she has an interest in the outcome of the litigation because the marriage was domiciled in Nevada, a community-property state, and Nevada's community property laws entitle her to 50% of anything that her now-deceased ex-husband earned during the marriage, and the proceeds of this contract constitute income earned during the marriage.

All of that is correct, as far as it goes. But Tanya takes it much too far. It's true that Nevada's community property laws entitle her to a 50% interest in anything her ex-husband earned while alive. But that doesn't make her a signatory to his business contracts. It doesn't give her an interest in the contract itself. It only gives her an interest in any proceeds that might be collected under it. Those are two different things. The difference lies in the question of who has privity with whom. Tanya has a relationship of privity with her ex-husband by virtue of her marriage to him, and therefore has a right to recover a share of proceeds from him. But marriage to one contracting party creates no privity with the other. Merely because Tanya was married to Wallace does not...