Waller v. The Salvation Army

1

KIMBERLY WALLER, Plaintiff, v. THE SALVATION ARMY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01336-M-BK

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

August 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA M. G. LYNN SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Prejudgment Interest. ECF No 80. For the reasons stated below, the Court awards Plaintiff $99,456.00 in attorney's fees. Plaintiff shall submit by September 6, 2024, further documentation to support her request for taxable court costs. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 60(a), the Court amends the Final Judgment entered on June 10, 2024, to award Plaintiff prejudgment interest of $76,328.00.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kimberly Waller moves for an award of $155,200.000 in attorney's fees and $2,039.67 in taxable costs under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). ECF No. 80, p. 1. Plaintiff also moves for prejudgment interest totaling $76,328.00, citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii). ECF No. 80, pp. 2, 4.

On June 10, 2024, this Court entered a Final Judgment for Plaintiff, ordering Defendant pay her $258,533.37 in backpay plus an equal amount of liquidated damages, resulting in $517,066.74 in total damages. ECF No. 78. The Court also ordered that Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant post-judgment interest on all amounts awarded from and after the date of judgment at the legal rate provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). This Judgment was entered after the Court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which it granted Plaintiff's requests for relief under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ECF No. 77, p. 7. The Court denied Plaintiff's requests for relief pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ECF No. 77, p. 7.

II. ANALYSIS

The FMLA states that courts “in such an action shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney's fee . . . and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant.” § 2617(a)(3). The FMLA, therefore, “requires that reasonable attorney's fees be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.” Carroll v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No. H-10-3018, 2014 WL 549380, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2014). Courts, however, have “the discretion to determine the amount of the fee.” Id. at *6 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see also Stanton v. Jarvis Christian Coll., NO. 6:18-cv-479, 2020 WL 5269439, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020). In fact, “trial courts are considered experts as to the reasonableness of attorney's fees.” Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004).

This Court rendered judgment for Plaintiff for $517,066.74 in total damages. Although Plaintiff did not recover on all her claims, there is no question that Plaintiff prevailed. ECF No. 78; see Alexander v. Servisair, LLC, 593 Fed. App'x 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Even an award of nominal damages is sufficient to render the plaintiff the prevailing party.” (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992))). The question here is whether Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is reasonable, a question on which Plaintiff retains the burden. Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006).

There is no clear-cut formula for determining what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Instead, the court applies a two-step framework: first, the court calculates a lodestar; second, the court-if the circumstances warrant-adjusts the lodestar. Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

A. Calculating the Lodestar

The lodestar method provides an initial estimate of reasonable attorney's fees. Stanton, supra, at *4 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Under the lodestar method, the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1993). “A reasonable hourly rate should be similar to rates ‘prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.'” Stanton, supra, at *4 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n.11). Since the services must be similar, courts consider the type of representation and the litigation's subject matter. Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-CV-0953, 2015 WL 3999171, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015).

Plaintiff contends that she spent a total of 388.00 hours on this litigation and that her rate should be set at $400 an hour. ECF No. 80, p. 3; ECF No. 80-1. Accordingly, Plaintiff's proposed lodestar value-which is the amount of attorney's fees she requests-is $155,200.00. ECF No. 80, p. 3. To support her request, Plaintiff includes the Declaration of Attorney Brenda J. Williams. ECF No. 80-2. Williams states that Plaintiff's requested rate is reasonable. ECF No. 80-2. Plaintiff also includes a chart listing the amount of time she spent on individual tasks and the date on which each task was completed. ECF No. 80-1. Plaintiff relies solely on Williams's Declaration and the chart to support her claim that her proposed lodestar value is reasonable.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that she reasonably spent 388.00 hours on this litigation. ECF No. 81, p. 3. Defendant argues that Plaintiff inadequately documented her time, improperly block billed, and failed to exercise billing judgment or segregate her fees by claim. ECF No. 82, p. 4-5, 8-9. Defendant also argues that the vague wording in Plaintiff's chart makes it impossible to determine whether she included duplicative or clerical time in her calculations. ECF No. 82, p. 7, 9. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff's $400 an hour rate is unreasonable. See ECF No. 81, p. 3 (“Ms. Iwu has not met her burden of proof nor provided adequate proof or documentation that the hours she allegedly spent on this matter are reasonable.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, this Court's analysis regarding whether Plaintiff's proposed lodestar is reasonable will focus on whether Plaintiff proved she reasonably expended 388.00 hours on this litigation.

Courts consider various factors when determining whether the amount of time included in a lodestar calculation is reasonable. First, courts consider the degree of specificity included in the time record. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[N]ot illuminating as to the subject matter or vague as to precisely what was done gives the district court sufficient leeway within which to accept or reject fee applications ....” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 324 (noting that courts will consider whether contemporaneous billing records or other sufficient documentation is provided). Second, courts consider whether the attorney exercised billing judgment-i.e., the attorney wrote off certain hours. Walker v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 1987)). Third, courts consider whether the attorney used block billing.^[1] Hoffman, supra, at *4. Block billing is disfavored because it prevents the Court from examining whether the hours were reasonably expended. Id. Fourth, courts consider whether there is excessive, duplicative, or unnecessary time. Harrison, supra, at *2. Fifth, courts consider whether the attorney properly segregated her time spent pertaining to the claims on which she prevailed from other claims on which she did not prevail. Stanton, supra, at *5 (citing United States ex rel. Varco Pruden Bldgs. v. Reid & Gary Strickland Co., 161 F.3d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1998)). Sixth, courts consider whether clerical work was distinguished from non-clerical work. Walker, 99 F.3d at 771.^[2] Defendant argues that Plaintiff's documentation suffers from various deficiencies and requests that the fee awarded to Plaintiff be reduced as a result. See generally ECF No. 81.

This Court finds that the chart Plaintiff offers as support for her assertion that she spent 388.00 hours on the relevant litigation is deficient in a number of respects. For example, Plaintiff has described fifty hours of her time only as “[b]egin trial prep.” ECF No. 80-1. Plaintiff also includes several entries such as “[r]eview docket entries/filings” or “[c]orrespondence with Plaintiff.” ECF No. 80-1. Other courts have found that similarly vague entries were properly excluded by the district court. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991) (reducing hours for vague entries such as “trial preparation”); La. Power, 50 F.3d at 326 (finding that entries like “review pleadings” were too vague); League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. 4552 (LULAC) v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that “research and review of cases” was too vague). The Court excludes 10.0 hours for entries of Plaintiff's counsel that are impermissibly vague.

For the 1/15/24-1/20/24 “Begin trial prep” (50.0 hour) entry, the Court determines that the entry's nature does not require complete exclusion, but rather a reduction. See La. Power, 50 F.3d at 324 (“[A] district court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete.” (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted)). Given the number of different tasks that may be subsumed within “trial prep” and the sizeable amount of time Plaintiff includes in this entry, the Court reduces this entry by 20%, or 10 hours. The Court, therefore, excludes 20 hours in total for vague entries.

Plaintiff's documentation also makes it difficult for the Court to determine whether she included duplicative, unnecessary, or...