Walton v. Roosevelt Univ.

2023 IL 128338

217 N.E.3d 968

466 Ill.Dec. 692

William WALTON, Appellant,

v.ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

Docket No. 128338

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed March 23, 2023

Ryan F. Stephan, James B. Zouras, Haley R. Jenkins, and Paige L. Smith, of Stephan Zouras, LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.

David M. Schultz, John P. Ryan, and Louis J. Manetti Jr., of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

Catherine Simmons-Gill, of Offices of Catherine Simmons-Gill, LLC, and Chiquita Hall-Jackson, of Hall-Jackson & Associates, P.C., both of Chicago, for amici curiae NELA/Illinois et al.

David Fish, Robin Potter, and Mara Baltabols, of Fish Potter & Bolaños P.C., of Naperville, for amicus curiae International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 705.

Nicole C. Henning, Efrat Schulman, and David Sandefer, of Jones Day, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.

Melissa A. Siebert, Matthew C. Wolfe, and Elisabeth A. Hutchinson, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this appeal, the Cook County circuit court certified the following question for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019):

"Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.[ ] § 185 [(2018)]) preempt [Biometric Information Privacy Act] claims ( 740 ILCS 14/1 [(West 2018)]) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement?"

The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative. 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 2, 456 Ill.Dec. 868, 193 N.E.3d 1276. This court allowed William Walton's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For the following reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In March 2019, plaintiff, William Walton, filed a class-action complaint against his former employer, defendant Roosevelt University (Roosevelt), alleging Roosevelt's collection, use, storage, and disclosure of Walton's and similarly situated employees’ biometric data violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Privacy Act) ( 740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b), (d) (West 2018)).

¶ 4 According to the complaint, Walton was employed in Roosevelt's campus safety department from January 2018 until January 2019. As a condition of employment, Roosevelt required Walton and similarly situated employees to enroll scans of their hand geometry onto a biometric timekeeping device as a means of clocking in and out of work. Walton alleged that (1) he was never provided with nor signed a release consenting to the collection, storage, or dissemination of his biometric data; (2) he had never been informed of any biometric data retention policy developed by Roosevelt; and (3) he had never been informed of the specific purpose or length of time for which his biometric information was being stored. Specifically, Walton claimed Roosevelt violated (1) section 15(a) of the Privacy Act (id. § 15(a)), by failing to develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers or information; (2) section 15(b) of the Privacy Act (id. § 15(b)), by failing to provide notice and to obtain written consent before collecting, using, and storing Walton's biometric identifiers or information; and (3) section 15(d) of the Privacy Act (id. § 15(d)), by disclosing or otherwise disseminating Walton's biometric identifier or information to a third party without consent. Walton sought damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney fees.

¶ 5 In July 2019, Roosevelt filed a motion to dismiss Walton's class-action complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018) ), alleging Walton's Privacy Act claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018) ). In moving to dismiss, Roosevelt stated that Walton was a member of SEIU, Local 1, a collective bargaining unit, while he worked as a nonsupervisory security employee for Roosevelt and thus agreed to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Roosevelt and Walton's union. Accordingly, Roosevelt argued Walton's claims under the Privacy Act were preempted by the LMRA because the manner by which any employee clocks in and out was a subject covered by a broad management-rights clause in the CBA. In support of federal preemption, Roosevelt cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 926 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2019), which held that federal labor law preempts Privacy Act claims when the claims require interpretation or administration of a CBA.

¶ 6 In May 2020, the circuit court denied Roosevelt's motion to dismiss, finding Miller distinguishable and concluding that preemption was inapplicable in this matter because a claim under the Privacy Act "is not intertwined with or dependent substantially upon consideration of terms of [a] collective bargaining agreement" where a "person's rights under [the Privacy Act] exist independently of both employment and any given CBA."

¶ 7 Roosevelt filed a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to certify a question for immediate appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). The circuit court denied Roosevelt's motion to reconsider but certified the following question for interlocutory appeal: "Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.[ ] § 185 ) preempt [Privacy Act] claims ( 740 ILCS 14/1 [(West 2018)]) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement?"

¶ 8 The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding "that Privacy Act claims asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement are preempted under federal law." 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 27, 456 Ill.Dec. 868, 193 N.E.3d 1276. The court found the Seventh Circuit recently addressed this question in Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc. , 14 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2021). 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 18, 456 Ill.Dec. 868, 193 N.E.3d 1276. The court noted that Walton also conceded at oral argument that the relevant factual and legal circumstances of this case are indistinguishable from Fernandez . Id. Therefore, the court determined its real objective in the appeal was to determine whether the Seventh Circuit's ruling on a matter of federal law lacked logic or reason and was, therefore, wrongly decided. Id. (citing State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc. , 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 54, 368 Ill.Dec. 503, 984 N.E.2d 449 ).

¶ 9 The appellate court recognized the Seventh Circuit in Fernandez , 14 F.4th at 646-47, held that unionized employees’ claims that their employer violated the Privacy Act were preempted by the LMRA ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 ). 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 18, 456 Ill.Dec. 868, 193 N.E.3d 1276. The court stated that in Fernandez

"the court of appeals explained that, when the employer invokes a broad management rights clause from a collective bargaining agreement in response to a Privacy Act claim, the claim is preempted because it requires an arbitrator to determine whether the employer and the union bargained about the issue or the union consented on the employees’ behalf." Id. ¶ 19 (citing Fernandez , 14 F.4th at 646 ).

The court further acknowledged "[t]he court in Fernandez refers substantially to its recent decision in Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019), in which it held that a Privacy Act claim was preempted in the same way under the Railway Labor Act ( 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2018))." Id. (citing Miller , 926 F.3d at 903-04 ).

¶ 10 The appellate court determined Fernandez reached the proper conclusion, as the Privacy Act contemplates the role of a collective bargaining unit acting as an intermediary on issues concerning an employee's biometric information. Id. ¶ 20 (citing 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018) (prohibiting private entities from collecting a person's biometric information without obtaining consent from the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative)). The court found the CBA in this case contained a broad management-rights clause. Id. ¶ 21. Thus, the court stated "[t]he timekeeping procedures for workers are a topic for negotiation that is clearly covered by the collective bargaining agreement and requires the interpretation or administration of the agreement." Id.

¶ 11 While the appellate court acknowledged Walton's argument that there was no reference to biometric information in the CBA, it found federal courts interpreting similar CBAs containing similar management-rights clauses have found the broad authority granted to the employer is sufficient to preempt Privacy Act claims. Id. ¶ 22 (citing, inter alia , Fernandez , 14 F.4th at 646-47, and Miller , 926 F.3d at 903 ). Therefore, the court determined the "issue in this case has been uniformly decided in federal courts in favor of preemption," found the "reasoning expressed by the federal courts to be sound," and "declin[ed] to find that all the federal decisions are wrongly decided and without logic or reason." Id. ¶ 24 (citing State Bank of Cherry , 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 54, 368 Ill.Dec. 503, 984 N.E.2d 449 ).

¶ 12 The appellate court concluded, because Roosevelt advanced a nonfrivolous argument that bargained-for rights are at issue, it met its burden to demonstrate that the claims are preempted under federal law. Id. ¶ 25. Accordingly, the court stated, "Walton and his fellow unionized employees are not prohibited from pursuing redress for a violation of their right to biometric privacy—they are simply required to pursue those rights through the...