Walton v. State, SC16–448

246 So.3d 246

Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Jason Dirk Walton, Petitioner,

v.Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.

No. SC16–448

No. SC17–1083

Supreme Court of Florida.

[May 17, 2018]

Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal by Jason Walton from an order denying a motion to vacate sentences of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Walton also petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief and deny Walton's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Walton was convicted and sentenced to death for the execution-style murders of three individuals that occurred during the commission of a robbery and burglary. Walton v. Dugger (Walton IV ), 634 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 1993).

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentences because the trial court failed to afford Walton an opportunity to confront two codefendants whose confessions and statements were presented during the penalty phase. See [ Walton v. State (Walton I ), 481 So.2d 1197,] 1198–1201 [ (Fla. 1985) ]. The trial court conducted a second penalty phase and the jury again recommended death on all three convictions. SeeWalton v. State [ (Walton II ) ], 547 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1989).^[1] The trial court again imposed the death penalty on all three convictions, and this Court affirmed those sentences on appeal. Seeid. at 626. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. SeeWalton v. Florida [ (Walton III ) ], 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).

Walton filed his initial postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. See Walton [IV ], 634 So. 2d [at] 1060–61.... After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. See id. Walton appealed that denial to this Court and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. This Court initially relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for resolution of a public records request by Walton. Seeid. at 1062. On remand, Walton amended his previously filed rule 3.850 motion to add claims based upon information discovered in the public records and newly adduced evidence. SeeWalton v. State [ (Walton V ) ], 847 So. 2d 438, 442–43 (Fla. 2003). One such claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. Seeid. at 442 n.2. The trial court again denied all of Walton's claims. Seeid. at 443. Walton appealed that denial to this Court and again petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. This Court affirmed the denial of Walton's postconviction motion and denied habeas relief. Seeid. at 460. [This Court] also denied a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Walton pursuant to Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). SeeWalton v. Crosby , 859 So.2d 516 (Fla. 2003).

Walton thereafter filed a successive postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. SeeWalton v. State [ (Walton VI ) ], 3 So.3d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2009). The trial court summarily denied relief. Seeid. at 1002. Walton appealed that denial to this Court, and this Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court. See id.

Walton v. State (Walton VII ), 77 So.3d 639, 640–41 (Fla. 2011). In 2010, Walton filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.851. Id. at 641. The postconviction court denied Walton's motion. See id. at 642. This Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court. Id. at 644.

On May 7, 2015, Walton filed a third successive postconviction motion asserting that he should either be resentenced to life or receive a new penalty phase due to the fact that his codefendant, Richard Cooper, was resentenced to life based on a cumulative review of the evidence. On December 28, 2015, the postconviction court denied Walton's motion. On March 7, 2016, Walton filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On September 16, 2016, this Court relinquished jurisdiction to allow for rehearing. On October 4, 2016, the postconviction court granted rehearing.

On June 20, 2016, Walton filed a fourth successive postconviction motion,² asserting that changes in Florida's capital sentencing law are part of the cumulative review of newly discovered evidence. On January 13, 2017, the postconviction court denied Walton's motion. This appeal follows.

Additionally, on June 8, 2017, Walton filed a petition for habeas relief. This Court stayed the proceedings on September 15, 2017, and then, on September 27, 2017, issued an order for Walton to show cause why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), does not control.

ANALYSIS

We affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief for the reasons discussed below.

Walton's Cumulative Analysis Claim

Walton contends that a proper Swafford³ / Hildwin⁴ cumulative analysis requires consideration of all changes in the law that might apply if a new trial were granted. We find this claim to be meritless.

To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements. First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. SeeJones v. State , 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) ( Jones II ). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it "weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability." Jones II , 709 So.2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State , 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996) ). If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence. SeeJones v. State , 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) ( Jones I ).

In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the postconviction court must "consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible" and must "evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial." Id. at 916. This determination includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence.

Jones II , 709 So.2d at 521 (citations omitted).

When ... the postconviction court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court "review[s] the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence." Green v. State , 975 So.2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008). In addition, "we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo." Id.

Swafford , 125 So.3d at 767–68 (alteration in original) (quoting Marek v. State , 14 So.3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009) ).

As to the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test, the postconviction court found that the resentencing of codefendant Cooper qualified as newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the postconviction court's finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Jones II , 709 So.2d at 521 ("First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence ‘must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence.’ " (quoting Torres–Arboleda v. Dugger , 636 So.2d 1321, 1324–25 (Fla. 1994) ) ).

The second prong of the newly discovered evidence test requires that "the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Id. (citing Jones I , 591 So.2d at 911, 915 ). The postconviction court found that Walton failed to show that the resentencing of his codefendant, Cooper, to a life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for Walton on retrial. Walton contends that the postconviction court erred because a proper cumulative analysis, as performed in Swafford and Hildwin , requires consideration of changes in the law. Walton asserts that his newly discovered evidence, considered together with the changes to Florida's capital sentencing law, i.e., Hurst , would probably result in him receiving a life sentence; thus he is entitled to resentencing.

As an initial matter, this Court has consistently applied its decision in Asay v. State (Asay V ), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 41, 198 L.Ed.2d 769 (2017), denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), as interpreted in Hurst , to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring . See, e.g. , Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217 ; Zack v. State , 228 So.3d 41, 47–48 (Fla. 2017), petition for cert. filed , No. 17–8134 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2018); Marshall v. Jones , 226 So.3d 211, 211 (Fla. 2017), ...